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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 08) (U)

J. (U) AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 November 1993.

2. (U) **SCOPE OF REPORT:** In accordance with (IAW) the references listed above, this report provides information on:

a. (U) Questionable Intelligence Activities (QIAs) reported to the Intelligence Oversight Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (DAIG-IO), during 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2008;

b. (U) Updates to QIAs previously reported;

c. (U) Results of intelligence oversight (IO) inspections and other actions conducted by DAIG-IO during 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2008;

d. (U) Summary of substantive changes to the Army IO program during 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2008; and

e. (U) Summary of any changes to intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related policies during 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2008.

3. (U) **NEW QIA REPORTS:** Nine new reports of QIAs were reported during 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2008.

a. (U) **DAIG Case No. 08-001:**

(1)



(2) (U) DAIG-IO notes a *lack of clarity* with regard to *approval authority policy and standard operating procedure* for US Army Intelligence organizations, other than the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and the 650th MI Group (MIG), to obtain NAIA, as currently outlined IAW AR 381-10 and the classified memo mentioned above. Additionally, there appears to be an ability for Army Intelligence organizations to obtain NAIA through the DNI CIO's browsing service, which may conflict with required approvals in documents referenced above. DAIG-IO recommended that the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G2 examine the existing policy guidance for obtaining NAIA to ensure consistency and clarity and provide a report of findings. This action was completed 17 December 2007.

(3) (U) **Update** – We are awaiting the results of the USAREUR 15-6 investigation into this matter in order to close this case. USAREUR plans to take the following corrective actions to resolve the above-mentioned allegations:

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(a) (U) Conduct a Commander's Inquiry to ascertain the extent of regulatory violations in addition to identifying the shortfalls and shortcomings of the current USAREUR NAIA policy.

(b) (U) Request reinstatement of NAIA approval authority to the USAREUR G2 as the Command's Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO).

(c) (U) No further NAIA access will be granted for USAREUR intelligence personnel unless it is granted IAW AR 381-10.

(4)

(a)

(b)

(5) (U) A command investigation under the provisions (UP) of AR 15-6 is ongoing. A final report will be provided once the investigation is completed. **STATUS: Open.**

b. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-002:

(1) (U) **Background** - On 12 October 2007, DAIG-IO received a Procedure 15 report of QIA from the INSCOM Inspector General (IG). The INSCOM report provides information with regard to alleged federal criminal activity by an intelligence Soldier (97E-Interrogator) assigned to Force Protection Detachment - Columbia. On or about 7 September 2007, a female Colombian citizen reportedly filed an official complaint of statutory rape against the Soldier.

(2) (U) **Update** - The 470th Military Intelligence Brigade (MIB) opened an AR 15-6 investigation on 6 October 2007 and informed the Fort Sam Houston Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the alleged incident. CID opened an investigation (#0344-2007-CID044) on

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11 October 2007. The 470th suspended its AR 15-6 investigation pending the results of the CID investigation. The Soldier has been recalled to Fort Sam Houston, TX by the 470th MIB. Upon review of the initial 470th MIB report, INSCOM Staff Judge Advocate has determined that allegations may violate UCMJ Articles 120 (Carnal Knowledge) and 134 (Indecent Assault). DCS G2 and INSCOM will submit a final report upon completion of the CID investigation and the Command's review of those findings. STATUS: Open.

c. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-003:

(1) (U) Background – On 5 October 2007, DAIG-IO received a report of QIA from a CI Officer working for USAREUR, G2X, ATCICA. An Army Counterintelligence (CI) Special Agent (S/A) assigned to Task Force (TF) Prowler, TF Falcon, 29th Infantry Division (ID) at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo was informed about a classified document found in a trashcan inside living quarters on Camp Bondsteel. Under *standing investigative authority* (SIA) the CI S/A interviewed additional personnel and identified the individual that was responsible for inappropriately disposing of the classified material. The CI S/A then proceeded to conduct an *unofficial* subject interview of the subject, telling the subject that he did not have to worry about getting in trouble since the CI S/A did not advise him of his rights prior to questioning him. The subject admitted to both inappropriately disposing of classified document as well as inappropriately securing classified documents in his personal wall locker. USAREUR ATCICA alleged the CI S/A failed to comply with the following regulatory guidance:

(a) (U) Used his position to require a subject to comply with a subject interview *without authorization* and *without advising him of his rights* IAW paragraph 15-4b. (Misrepresentation), AR 381-10.

(b) (U) Failed to follow US Army regulations, Chapter 4 of AR 381-20, while conducting a counterintelligence investigation.

(2) (U) Update – CI investigation (# 08-TFFCI-001) was closed 19 October 2007 and the results were referred back to the Company for action. The CI investigation did not expose any espionage indicators. The Company Commander counseled all employees on appropriate storage of classified documents. The CI S/A was counseled verbally and in writing and was retrained on AR 381-10 and AR 381-20. The Commander has assessed this incident as inappropriate activities of one individual and it should not be considered a systemic issue within the Task Force. This matter is considered closed with no further action anticipated. STATUS: Closed.

d. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-004:

(1) (U) Background – 30 October 2007, INSCOM Inspector General (IG) reported alleged federal criminal activity UP Chapter 16, AR 381-10. The INSCOM IG alleged Federal Criminal Activity / QIA by an INSCOM / National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) civilian employee who was investigated, charged, and convicted for using a government furnished computer to view and store child-pornography and who is now serving a federal sentence.

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(2) (U) Update – This case was erroneously reported as a Procedure 15, a federal crime that had been properly reported to the DCS, G2, UP Procedure 16, AR 381-10. It should not have been reported as a Procedure 15 and the Procedure 15 is hereby closed. Monitoring and reporting IAW Procedure 16 is unaffected by this action. STATUS: Closed.

e. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-005:

(1) (U) Background – 30 October 2007, INSCOM IG reported alleged federal criminal activity UP Chapter 16, AR 381-10. A Warrant Officer assigned to the NGIC, with duty at the Washington Navy Yard, on 4 August 2007 allegedly assaulted his spouse while on Fort Belvoir, VA. The Warrant Officer has subsequently received a General Officer Letter of Reprimand and, according to the INSCOM SJA, a civil case is pending.

(2) (U) Update – This case was erroneously reported as a Procedure 15 a federal crime that had been properly reported to the DCS, G2, UP Procedure 16, AR 381-10. It should not have been reported as a Procedure 15 and the Procedure 15 is hereby closed. Monitoring and reporting IAW Procedure 16 is unaffected by this action. STATUS: Closed.

f. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-006:

(1) (U) Background – INSCOM IG reported on 30 October 2007 alleged federal criminal activity UP Chapter 16, AR 381-10. An INSCOM civilian employee and Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) assigned to NGIC, between November 2004 and March 2007, allegedly submitted fraudulent claims to the government amounting to approximately \$62,000.00.

(2) (U) Update – This case was erroneously reported as a Procedure 15 a federal crime that had been properly reported to the DCS, G2, UP Procedure 16, AR 381-10. It should not have been reported as a Procedure 15 and the Procedure 15 is hereby closed. Monitoring and reporting IAW Procedure 16 is unaffected by this action. STATUS: Closed.

g. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-007:

(1) (U) Background – 30 October 2007, INSCOM IG reported of alleged federal criminal activity UP Chapter 16, AR 381-10. An NGIC Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) improperly changed the locale designation for her basic allowance for housing (BAH) from Charlottesville, VA to Washington, DC, thereby defrauding the government of approximately \$14,770.00.

(2) (U) Update – As the reported activity is currently being investigated by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), and as there are no apparent systemic intelligence oversight issues requiring attention, DAIG-IO determines no further investigation or reporting IAW AR 381-10 is required. STATUS: Closed.


h. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-008:

(1) [REDACTED]

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(2) (U) Update - On 18 January 2008, DAIG-IO referred this issue to INSCOM to take appropriate action in order to facilitate an Army response to the Member of Congress. STATUS: Open.


I. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-009:

(1) (U) Background - 30 November 2007, Third Army / U.S. Army Central - Area Support Group Qatar (ASG-QA) reported allegations of QIA by a counterintelligence (CI) special agent (S/A) assigned to the CI Resident Office (RO), ASG-QA. DAIG-IO in a Confidential//NOFORN memorandum, subject: Initial/Final Report of Questionable Intelligence Activity, Procedure 15, AR 381-10 (DAIG-07-019) (U), 12 July 2007, reported earlier allegations against the same special agent which were investigated by ASG-QA under the provisions of AR 15-6 and found to be *unsubstantiated*. The current allegations allege that the S/A, the [redacted] conducted unauthorized military police investigations, improperly collected information concerning U.S. Persons (USP), improperly handled and released investigative material (Initial Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army [SAEDA] reports), and committed various regulatory infractions in the handling and exploitation of evidence seized during gate security operations and investigations.

(2) (U) Update - The Commander, ASG-QA has initiated a second investigation UP of AR 15-6 to address the new allegations, and will report the results upon conclusion of the investigation. STATUS: Open.

4. (U) UPDATES ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED QIAs:

a. (U) DAIG Case No. 05-037:



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(c)

(2) (U) The officer and the 42nd ID have since redeployed back to Idaho and New York, respectively. ACICA determined allegations were *not of CI interest*. CID-Iraq elected not to investigate the allegations. 42nd ID conducted an initial command investigation, but was unable to resolve all allegations. NGB assumed the responsibility for completing the investigation.

(a) (U) 42nd ID determined ICF related allegation to be *unsubstantiated*, but NGB is reviewing the results to ensure the Division appropriately applied AR 381-141(C), ICF (U), 16 January 2004. Allegations associated with a Category-1 Interpreter have been resolved as *unsubstantiated*. Also found to be *unsubstantiated* were the related allegations concerning the compromise of classified information. DAIG-IO determined hacking allegation should be referred to CID for criminal investigation and recommended Army-G2 report hacking allegation as a possible federal crime under the provisions of Chapter 16, AR 381-10. CID opened a criminal investigation 0048-2006-CID221-501109.

(b) (U) Upon review of the initial command investigative product, DAIG-IO noted other issues requiring resolution by NGB:

(1) (U) In the command investigative report, the investigating officer *substantiated* a previously unknown allegation that the officer's "THT (Tactical HUMINT Team) *improperly conducted raids without the presence or knowledge of the task force...*". DAIG-IO requested NGB confirm the status of the allegation and report corrective actions, as the THT was supposedly under the officer's control and raids were presumably in support of intelligence activities.

(2) (U) The officer's company commander and the BCT S2 allegedly sanctioned the THT's unauthorized use of alcoholic beverages during source operation, which violates theater policies. DAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of allegations and corrective actions.

(3) (U) The commander and S2 allegedly prevented a witness from reporting the QIAs. DAIG-IO requested NGB report status of allegation and corrective actions.

(4) (U) The officer allegedly required THT members to falsify intelligence reports, omitting references to the officer's presence during interrogations. DAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of this allegation and related corrective actions. On 11 January 2008, NGB IG confirms that the findings from the NGB ROI were referred to the New York and Idaho State Joint Force Headquarters with Soldiers involved for UCMJ action as appropriate.

(d) (U) 20 November 2007, DAIG-IO received NGB's Final Report of Investigation (ROI) dated 12 November 2007 regarding this issue. The ROI substantiates only allegations (b) (2) and (b) (4) above.

(e) (U) 11 December 2007, NGB IG provided a more focused assessment of their command's 15-6 investigation and stated the following:

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(1) (U) With regard to allegation (1)(a) the preponderance of the evidence suggests there were no violations of ICF usage.

(2) (U) With regards to allegation (1)(c) the preponderance of the evidence suggests the subject did not seek or receive authorization from the appropriate approval authority to conduct electronic surveillance of a non-US person's computer or computer records in the Operation IRAQI FFREEDOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) as defined by Procedure 7, paragraph C.4., AR 381-10.


(c) (U) On 25 May 2006, CID's Computer Crime Investigative Unit (CCIU) issued its final report (0048-2006-CID221-501109 - 8P3 - 9G2F) regarding this case and determined that unauthorized access to a protected computer (allegation (1)(c) above) was *unfounded*. The CCIU made the following determination: *Investigation determined there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations that the officer in question committed any criminal offense. A ...source reported the officer in question made comments to the effect he had "hacked" into E-mail accounts and foreign computers. The officer in question was interviewed and denied "hacking" into any computer systems. The ...source was re-interviewed and stated he/she had no first hand knowledge of the incident and only the word of the Officer in Question. Subsequent investigation did not identify any witnesses to the allegations or physical evidence.*

(2) (U) Update -

(a) (U) On 23 January 2008, DAIG-IO IGs met CCIU investigators to deconflict the results of the NGB's final ROI and the CID investigation. As computer subject matter experts (SMEs), CCIU investigators felt the conclusions from the final NGB ROI did not warrant any further criminal investigation in relation to allegation (1)(c).

(b) (U) DAIG-IO will arrange to discuss the merits of this case with the Army OGG to determine if further investigation is required prior to closing this case. **STATUS: Open.**

b. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-003:



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(b) [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(d) [REDACTED]

(2) (U) Update – INSCOM has taken further measures to mitigate the likelihood of similar actions in the future by establishing the following policies and procedures:

(a) (U) INSCOM will approve all National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) operational support to FMA activities. Requests for NGIC support will be forwarded to INSCOM for coordination with, and approval by, Army G2X. INSCOM has requested DCS G2 update AR 381-100 and AR 381-26 and Issue FMA guidance to mitigate problems highlighted by the investigation.

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
(b) (U) G2X will designate a single FMA point of contact and develop procedures to coordinate FMA requirements within INSCOM before forwarding to DAMI-FIT for validation. An FMA standing operating procedure will be developed and coordinated with DIA.

(c) (U) NGIC analysts are prohibited from conducting site visits to vendors and will not interact with vendors in support of FMA activities without prior INSCOM coordination and approval. NGIC personnel involved in FMA activities will be trained in basics of FMA activities and Operational Security (OPSEC) measures.

(U) INSCOM is still resolving the issues raised concerning TSCM. This case remains open pending INSCOM's final determination/actions. STATUS: Open

c. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-004:

(1)



(2) (U) Update – IAW AR 381-20 (The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 November 1993), the 650th MiG initiated a counterintelligence investigation (LCCN: 06-TFFCI-003) concerning the deliberate security compromise. Concurrently, the IO Officer, G2, USAREUR, is conducting a command investigation into the QIAs (Procedure 15, AR 381-10). To date, we are still awaiting the results of both investigations. STATUS: Open

d. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-009:

(1) (U) Background – INSCOM notified DAIG-IO 5 January 2006 that a 902d MIG CI S/A, with duty at Joint Terrorism Task Force, Miami, FL (JTTF-Miami) may have collected and reported information on US-persons.

(a) (U) The agent reported the information as a Threat and Local Observance Notice (TALON) report, submitting it through 902d MIG to CI Field Activity (CIFA) for analysis and entry in the Cornerstone database.

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(b) (U) The report described a workshop and planning meeting to discuss countering US military recruiting in High Schools, as well as efforts to assist recruits in getting out of military contracts.

(c) (U) The CI S/A provided an updated TALON report describing plans to set up tables at schools in order to perform surveillance on military recruiters while on campus.

(d) (U) The TALON report referred to US Persons as a "group" and a "US Domestic Protest Group."

(e) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense issued 13 September 2007 guidance on the implementation of interim threat reporting procedures effectively closing the TALON reporting system. CIFA General Counsel reportedly maintains a copy of the TALON data for intelligence oversight and Freedom of Information Act purposes.

(2) (U) Update – INSCOM conducted an IG preliminary investigation into alleged QIAs reporting that no further investigation was required.

(a) (U) Additionally, INSCOM advised that DAIG Case No. 06-009 and DAIG Case No. 06-019 (next below) were administratively combined, as both contained similar allegations of QIAs related to US persons and that issues raised in both cases would be addressed in a CG INSCOM directed IG Special Inspection of TALON (reporting) in INSCOM.

(b) (U) 19 October 2007, DAIG-IO informed INSCOM that they would maintain both this case and DAIG Case No. 06-019 (next below) as open cases, pending receipt of clarifying information received from INSCOM relative to the special IG inspection of TALON reporting and any appropriate actions taken.

(c) (U) DAIG-IO anticipates closure of these cases within the next quarter's reporting period. STATUS: Open.

e. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-019:

(1) (U) Background – According to a 27 April 2006 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, "Pentagon Steps up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders," intelligence analysts assigned to the 902d MIG, Fort Meade, MD, allegedly collected and disseminated information concerning participants in a 19 March 2005 anti-war protest in Akron, OH.

(2) (U) Update – Review update for DAIG 06-009 listed above. STATUS: Open.

f. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-022:

(1) (U) Background – In June 2006, DAIG-IO received numerous allegations concerning members of the 101st Airborne Division (101st Abn), 4th ID, and Operational Detachment-Alpha 386 (ODA-386), 3rd Special Forces Group, during their 2006 deployment in Iraq. Some of the allegations were non-IO related and they were referred to Assistance Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-AC), for action/resolution as appropriate.


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
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However, other allegations (outlined below) are considered QIAs requiring resolution IAW AR 381-10. The QIAs were referred to the appropriate commands and DAIG-IO continues to monitor the investigative progress. (Note: At the time of the alleged incidents, elements of the 4th ID were task organized as a subordinate element of the 101st Abn.)


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
(b)



(c)



(d)



(e) (U) After formally briefing the Army G2, Army General Counsel, and The Inspector General, DAIG-IO referred the allegations to MNC-1 and US Army Special Operations Command for resolution. DAIG-IO also provided courtesy notifications to IG DIA, IG CENTCOM, and IG Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).

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(2)



(a) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist conducted unauthorized source operations in violation of Army regulations and theater policies. One such unauthorized operation may have contributed to a source's death.

(b) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist interfered with THT operations, in violation of Army regulations and theater policies.

(c) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist conducted unauthorized detention and interrogation operations, in violation of Army regulations and theater policies.

(d) (U) Four officers in the 1/187th failed to report and accurately resolve the QIAs reported to them, in violation of AR 381-10.

(3) (U) The remaining allegations were determined to be *unsubstantiated*. As a result of the I/O's substantiated findings, the CG of the 101st Abn issued letters of reprimand to four officers. The officers will also publish a "Company and Battalion Commanders Handbook and Guide to HUMINT Operations consistent with the recently published FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, September 2006." The Division G2, who is not a subject in the command investigation, will supervise the handbook project. The CG also directed improvement to training and coordination activities to prevent future incidents.

(4) (U) The 101st Abn's command investigation is closed. USASOC's investigative report regarding this case is anticipated no later than (NLT) the end of FEB 2008. **STATUS:** Open.

g. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-026:

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


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
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(2) (U) Update – USASOC has conducted a command investigation UP AR 15-6, which concluded in FY 07. However, this case is pending interview of one additional witness that may provide more information regarding this case. That lead should be resolved by NLT the end of February 2008. STATUS: Open.

h. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-027:



(2) (U) Update – Per INSCOM's FY 08, 1st Quarter IO Activities Report dated 17 January 2008, the unit commander ordered an AR 15-6 investigation which *substantiated* the majority of the allegations. As a result, the commander issued a memorandum of proposed removal from civilian employment as a MICECP to the individual and submitted a memorandum for security clearance determination to the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF). Subsequently, the individual submitted a letter of resignation, and is no longer a federal employee as of 13 October 2007. Case closed. STATUS: Closed.

i. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-029:

(1) (U) Background – On 23 March 2006, the IG, DoD received an anonymous complaint concerning an MI officer's alleged misconduct in the performance of his intelligence duties while he was assigned to the US Army TF In Kosovo. On 15 June 2006, the DoD IG referred the case to the US Army Inspector General Agency's (USAIGA) Assistance Division (DAIG-AC). On or about 17 July 2006, after notifying the DAIG-IO, DAIG-AC further referred the case to the TF IG for resolution (DAIG-AC case number: DIH-06-8182). According to the initial report, the officer allegedly misused his position as a TF MI officer and ICF custodian/agent to make personal trips monthly to Headquarters, US Army Europe (USAREUR), Heidelberg, GM, under the possible guise of reconciling the ICF account with USAREUR. It was further alleged that the officer's supervisor would conceal the purpose of the trip(s) as official MI business.

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(2) (U) Update – The TF has been directed to report its investigative results to DAIG-AC and DAIG-IO. DAIG-AC will also provide a copy of the investigative results to the IG, DoD. Further updates are expected at the end of February 2008. STATUS: Open.

j. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-030:

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(2) (U) Update – As this is an ongoing CE investigation, no further updates will be provided until ACCO completes their investigation. STATUS: Open.

k. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-034:

(1)

(2) (U) Update – As this matter is still being investigated by ACICA, no further updates will be reported until the case is closed. STATUS: Open.

l. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-001:

(1)

(a) (U) ACCN: PI-SCO-07-001 substantiated the following: First, in 1998 the SAO provided a Foreign Military Attaché with Foreign Country troop movements *without proper approval*. Second, the SAO *improperly stored* a compact disk (CD) containing information up to SECRET level at his personal residence. Third, the SAO had an *improper relationship* with a female Foreign National. The results of this investigation were forwarded to CCF, the General Officer Management Office (GOMO), and the Army G2 for future action/awareness.

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
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(b) (U) The USAIGA concluded its Report of Investigation (ROI) (Case 07-006) on 27 March 2007 which substantiated the following: the SAO engaged in inappropriate relationships and also improperly handled classified material.

(2) (U) Update – On or about 29 March 2007, the SAO received a Memorandum of Concern from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. This matter is considered closed with no further action anticipated. STATUS: Closed.

m. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-002:

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


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n. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-007:


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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 08) (U)




(2) (U) Update - The MND-B has completed a command investigation to resolve the allegations. DAIG-IO is currently reviewing that investigation and subsequent MND-B actions. STATUS: Open.

o. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-008:

(1) (U) Background - On 6 October 2008, the S2, 506th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) Forward Operating Base (FOB) Rustamiyah, Iraq, allegedly violated regulations by directing his subordinates to gather as much evidence as they could against a USP interpreter who worked on the FOB. Initial reporting indicated that the S2 possibly violated portions of AR 381-10, 381-12 and AR 381-20. Initial reporting also stated that the activities directed by the S2 were not part of an authorized CI investigation. The Commanding General, MND-B, directed an investigation UP AR 15-6, to resolve the allegations.




p. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-012:




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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 08) (U)



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


(4) (U) 7 January 2008, DAIG-IO continues to coordinate with INSCOM requesting clarification of the fact that no allegations were substantiated against any individuals in this case. STATUS: Open.

q. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-018:

(1) (U) Background - On 17 April 2007, DAIG-IO received a memorandum from ATSD-IO forwarding a report from the NSA alleging QIA by members of the 27th Cavalry in Iraq. The reference also requested that the Inspector General, MNF-I, conduct an inquiry / investigation into the NSA allegations.

(a)



(b) (U) A 9 November 2007 Update Memorandum reported the results of the investigation to ATSD-IO. ATSD-IO discussed the results with the FBI and requested on behalf of the FBI, that a copy of the investigation be provided to the FBI to facilitate possible FBI investigation of the potential misconduct of their agents in Iraq. After obtaining permission to release the command investigation to the FBI from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Staff Judge Advocate, a copy of the investigation was provided to ATSD-IO for transmittal to the FBI.

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(2) (U) Update – The Army anticipates no further action in this matter. STATUS: Closed.

r. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-020:

(1) (U) Background – In April 2007, a CI S/A (Sergeant) assigned to TF Prowler, Task Force Falcon, 29th Infantry Division possibly used his Installation Access Card (IAC) *Inappropriately* to bring a CAT II Interpreter onto Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. The interpreter lost her Kosovo Force (KFOR) badge while previously on leave in Serbia. It is further alleged that the CI S/A tried to assist the interpreter to get a new KFOR Identification Card (ID) the following day *without proper approval or authority*. Then, the agent *misidentified* the associated contract company, potentially to avoid detection of the lost KFOR ID and the potential consequences to the interpreter by her employer. The NCO's alleged actions are violations of Chapter 9, AR 381-20, and Paragraph 15-4b., AR 381-10.

(2) (U) Update – Task Force Falcon initiated a command investigation UP of AR 15-6. We have requested an update on this case from USAREUR G2 and are awaiting their reply. STATUS: Open.

s. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-021:

(1) (U) Background – On 12 June 2007, the 308th MI Battalion, 902nd MI Group provided information on the alleged federal criminal activity of a Department of the Army MICECP employee and his wife. The wife is being investigated by the Irvine, California, Police Department for embezzlement and fraud (approximately \$ 400,000) against the company for which she worked. The MICECP employee also worked for the company prior to and continuing after his employment with the Department of the Army. The stolen money was deposited in a joint bank account of the MICECP employee and his wife. The investigation is focusing on the MICECP employee's possible involvement in, or knowledge of and complicity with, the embezzlement and fraud. The Irvine Police Department has kept the FBI apprised. As a result, the FBI intended to open a criminal investigation by 22 June 2007 on both individuals.

(2) (U) Update – The employee's access to classified information has been suspended and he surrendered his CI badge and credentials, government credit card, access badges to supported civilian contracting facilities, and keys to the office. He is on paid administrative leave pending his unit finding suitable employment that does not require an active security clearance. This case was erroneously reported as a Procedure 15, but it was a federal crime that had been properly reported to the DCS, G2, under the provisions of Procedure 16, AR 381-10. It should have not been reported IAW Procedure 15 and is hereby closed. STATUS: Closed.

t. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-022:

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(2) (U) Update – As of 17 January 2008, the ACICA case is still active. A final report will be provided once the case is closed. STATUS: Open.

u. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-023:

(1) (U) Background – On 15 June 2007, the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) IG Office reported a possible violation of Section 4, (USSID) SP0018 (S//COMINT) and Procedure 2 of AR 381-10 in reference to the collection of U.S. persons information. During a field exercise on 6-7 April 2007 at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, a SIGINT NCO operating a SIGINT collection system allegedly intercepted civilian cell phone conversations. The incident was reported to the National Security Agency (NSA) Security Intelligence Directorate's (SID) Intelligence Oversight & Compliance (O&C) Office. The unit commander immediately conducted an inquiry into this situation.

(2) (U) Update – On 29 October 2007, the FORSCOM IG submitted its final report on this issue. The final determination of this situation is as follows: "The SIGINT Collection Operator did not admit to listening to conversations for entertainment as was first reported; he may have listened to some conversations longer than necessary to do his job but there is no proof available to indicate otherwise." In light of the seriousness of this allegation, the unit commander has directed the following action to mitigate future occurrences:

(a) (U) The SIGINT Collection Operator was counseled by the Intel Division Observation Controller (OC), the SIGINT OC, and the SIGINT Collection Operator's Platoon Leader.

(b) (U) Additionally, DA 5248 'Report of Unfavorable Information for Security Determination' was drafted and processed through the SIGINT Collection Operator's chain of command.

(c) (U) The SIGINT Collection Operator's chain of command decided not to suspend his clearance pending a determination from CCF.

(d) (U) NSA's Office of the Adjutant General provided refresher training on USSID SP0018 and Intelligence Oversight responsibilities to the personnel assigned to Ft. Polk in September 2007.

(3) (U) DAIG-IO has reviewed the information surrounding this case and considers this issue now closed from an intelligence oversight perspective. STATUS: Closed.

v. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-025:

(1) (U) Background – On 19 July 2007, DAIG-IO received a Procedure 15 report from the USAREUR, G2X, ATCICA via the DA DCS G2. The report alleged that two officers, one warrant officer, and one NCO assigned to TF Falcon's CI Team conducted a CI investigation without proper authorization. TF Falcon is currently stationed at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. The subjects of this unauthorized investigation were US Citizen interpreters with US secret

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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 08) (U)

clearances employed by TF Falcon. Sometime during June 2007, the subjects had reportedly traveled across the border without proper authorization, were temporarily detained by the border authorities, and potentially lied to these authorities for the reasons for their travel. During the interviews, the team learned that a fourth person was involved, and they interviewed that subject the following day. All four of the interviews were conducted without approval of the 650th MI Group's Sub Control Office (SCO) [their serving entity] and without reading the subjects their rights. Upon completing the investigation, the team's Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) drafted an unclassified memorandum outlining their actions and forwarded it to the TF G2. On 18 June 2007, the USAREUR ATCICA office was made aware of the incident outside of intelligence channels and proceeded to contact the 650th MIG's SCO to inform them of the incident. Only when the USAREUR ATCICA sent a message to the 650th MIG's SCO and TF Falcon's G2 on that same day was the SCO informed of the incident. On 16 July 2007, the USAREUR ATCICA contacted the TF IO Officer to check on the status of this event only to discover that the TF IO Officer had never been made aware of this incident, and because of this, it had not been reported to DA IG.

(2) (U) Update – 18 January 2008, MNTF-(E) TF CICA reported that they could find no record of this investigation at TF Falcon. USAREUR, G2X is probing into this case to provide this office with an update. STATUS: Open.

w. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-030:

(1)



(2) (U) Update – On 20 September 2007, ACICA opened a CI investigation (ACCN: 07-0033-002), which will be conducted jointly with the FBI, with Army in the lead. On 17 January 2008, INSCOM reports that this remains an active CI case. STATUS: Open.

5. (U) INSPECTIONS: During the 1st Quarter, DAIG-IO conducted inspections of Army elements located in Kansas during the periods 2-9 and 12-15 NOV 07. No significant IO violations were discovered; inspection results have been forwarded to the ACOM of the units that were inspected.

6. (U) IO PROGRAM CHANGES: Nothing Significant to Report (NSTR).

7. (U) ITEMS OF INTEREST: NSTR.

8. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT:



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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 08) (U)

 SIPRNET:

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as



ALAN W. THRASHER
Major General, USA
Deputy The Inspector General

CF:
DCS G2
OTJAG

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

SAIG-IO (381-10b)

30 October 2007



MEMORANDUM THRU GENERAL COUNSEL,
FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) (ATSD(IO))

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (4th Quarter, FY 07) (U)

1. (U) References:

- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, US Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981.
- b. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982.
- c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities, 27 August 2007.
- d. (U) Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007.
- e. (U) Unclassified memorandum, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 8 December 2006, subject: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement.
- f. (U) Unclassified//FOUO memorandum, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 23 March 2006, subject: Request for Information and Coordination.
- g. (U) SECRET//NOFORN memorandum, Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), 3 August 2007, subject: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U).
- h. (U) AR 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, 1 February 2007.
- i. (U) AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards, 30 September 1996.

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (4th Quarter, FY 07) (U)

2. (U) **SCOPE OF REPORT:** In accordance with the references listed above, this report provides information on:

a. (U) Questionable Intelligence Activities (QIAs) reported to the Intelligence Oversight Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-IO), during 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007;

b. (U) Updates to QIAs previously reported;

c. (U) Results of intelligence oversight (IO) inspections and other actions conducted by SAIG-IO during 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007;

d. (U) Summary of substantive changes to the Army IO program during 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007; and

e. (U) Summary of any changes to intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related policies during 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007.

3. (U) **NEW QIA REPORTS:** Five new reports of QIAs were reported during 4th Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007.

a. (U) **DAIG Case No. 07-026:**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Background - The Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) Inspector General (IG) received an IG Action Request (IGAR) alleging QIA by a contract employee, who allegedly attempted without authority to use government computer systems to search for information about a US person, thereby violating Procedure 14 (Employee Conduct), AR 381-10.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The contract employee allegedly used a government computer to search for personal information through a commercial fee-for-service website, thus potentially compromising the intelligence computer system.

(3) (U) Update - (U//~~FOUO~~) INSCOM concluded 30 August 2007 its AR 15-6 investigation and *substantiated* above allegations. Recommended corrective actions include:

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The contractor has been barred from the INSCOM HQ.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) As a contract employee, the employer has been given responsibility to determine employment status.

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) IO Refresher training has been accomplished of personnel assigned to the intelligence operations center (IOC). SAIG-IO concurs with INSCOM's assessment of this incident and considers this case to be closed. STATUS: Closed.

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b. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-027:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Background - Hanau Resident Office (HURO), 66th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) reported 25 July 2007 an alleged QIA involving a local national investigator (LNI) assigned to Hanau Military Intelligence Detachment (MID), 2d MI Battalion (BN), 66th MIG, Hanau, Germany, who allegedly conducted physical surveillance of a non-US person (N-USP) without proper authority, thus violating Procedures 9 (Physical Surveillance) and 14 (Employee Conduct), AR 381-10.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Update - HURO / 66th MIG has taken the following corrective actions to prevent future, similar violations.

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, Hanau MID, counseled LNI in writing 30 July 2007 on required authorizations and reporting procedures under AR 381-10.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, Hanau MID, required LNI to attend mandatory Intelligence Oversight (IO) training on purpose, history, and applicability of IO to all personnel assigned to a U.S. Department of Defense intelligence organization.

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) Furthermore, LNI was provided an IO reference card to be used as a quick reference and reminder of the need for authorizations to conduct specific activities.

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) SAIG-IO concurs with INCOM's recommendation to close this case.
STATUS: Closed.

c. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-028:

(1) (U) Background - INSCOM forwarded 24 August 2007 an email from Criminal Investigation Command (CID) to Office of the Inspector General (OTIG) referencing correspondence from Law Offices of [REDACTED] to LTG Stanley Green, in which [REDACTED] alleged "... INSCOM has made electronic surveillance of whistleblower calls ... to my law office line ..."

(a) (U) The alleged QIA outlined above relates to DoD Inspector General Hotline Whistleblower Complaint Case 104420 involving [REDACTED] client, an INSCOM employee.

(b) (U) INSCOM's report of QIA was submitted 29 August 2007 to the US Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA), Intelligence Oversight Division (IOD), SAIG-IO, as an initial QIA report.

(c) (U) USAIGA-IOD, SAIG-IO, in coordination with the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G2, conducted an informal inquiry into alleged QIA.

(2) (U) Update - SAIG-IO closed 10 October 2007 this case, as [REDACTED] assertions were implausible, given that INSCOM has neither the unilateral authority, nor the direct operational capability to conduct the type of electronic surveillance alleged by [REDACTED] INSCOM would have to justify a tasking requirement for national signal intelligence

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(SIGINT) collection assets in the midst of wartime operations to focus on [REDACTED] and his client in Alexandria, VA. SAIG-IO has closed the case, with no further action required.
STATUS: Closed.

d. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-029:

✓

[REDACTED]

(a)

[REDACTED]

(b)

[REDACTED]

(c)

[REDACTED]

(2)

[REDACTED]

(a)

[REDACTED]

(b)

[REDACTED]

(c)

[REDACTED]

e. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-030:

✓

(1)

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) Update - None. STATUS: Open.

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4. (U) UPDATES ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED QIAs:

a. (U) DAIG Case No. 05-006:

(1) [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

b. (U) DAIG Case No. 05-037:

(1) (U) [REDACTED]

(a) [REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED]

(d) [REDACTED]

(2) (U) ACICA determined allegations were not of CI interest. CID-Iraq elected not to investigate the allegations. 42nd ID conducted an initial command investigation, but was unable to resolve all allegations. NGB assumed the responsibility for completing the investigation.

(3) (U) 42nd ID determined ICF related allegation to be *unsubstantiated*, but NGB is reviewing the results to ensure the Division appropriately applied AR 381-141(C), ICF (U), 18 January 2004. Allegations associated with a Category-1 Interpreter have been resolved as *unsubstantiated*. Also found to be *unsubstantiated* were the related allegations concerning the compromise of classified information. SAIG-IO determined hacking allegation should be referred to CID for criminal investigation and recommended Army-G2 report hacking allegation as a possible federal crime under the provisions of Chapter 16, AR 381-10. CID opened a criminal investigation, which is ongoing.

(4) (U) Upon review of the initial command investigative product, SAIG-IO noted other issues requiring resolution by NGB:

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(a) (U) In the command investigative report, the investigating officer substantiated a previously unknown allegation that the officer's "THT (Tactical HUMINT Team) improperly conducted raids without the presence or knowledge of the task force...". SAIG-IO requested NGB confirm the status of the allegation and report corrective actions, as the THT was supposedly under the officer's control and raids were presumably in support of intelligence activities.

(b) (U) The officer's company commander and the BCT S2 allegedly sanctioned the THT's unauthorized use of alcoholic beverages during source operation, which violates theater policies. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of allegations and corrective actions.

(c) (U) The commander and S2 allegedly prevented a witness from reporting the QIAs. SAIG-IO requested NGB report status of allegation and corrective actions.

(d) (U) The officer allegedly required THT members to falsify intelligence reports, omitting references to the officer's presence during interrogations. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of this allegation and related corrective actions.

(5) (U) Update - NGB-IG advised 19 July 2007 that the primary investigator has concluded a subject interview, two additional interviews are pending as of 28 September 2007. STATUS: Open.

c. (U) DAIG Case No. 08-002:


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(2) (U) Update - The Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA) terminated the investigation 7 August 2007, finding the allegations were *unsubstantiated*. INSCOM issued 29 August 2007 a final report closing the case, as required by provisions of AR 381-10. SAIG-IO concurs with INSCOM's recommendation to close the case; no further action required. STATUS: Closed.

d. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-003:

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[REDACTED]

(a)

[REDACTED]

(b)

[REDACTED]

(c) AR 381-26(S), US Army Foreign Material Program (FMP) (U), 27 May 1991, is outdated and does not describe current policy and procedures for Army participation in FMP.

(d) SAIG-IO was unable to identify management and oversight controls for INSCOM participation in FMP operations.

(e) A risk or cover impact assessment may be necessary to determine security posture of at least one participant who is now serving in a sensitive position.

(2)

[REDACTED]

(a)

[REDACTED]

(b)

[REDACTED]

(c)

[REDACTED]

(3)

[REDACTED]

(4)

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED]

(8) (U) Update - (S/NF) INSCOM has taken further measures to mitigate the likelihood of similar actions in the future by establishing the following policies and procedures:

(a) (U//FOUO) INSCOM will approve all National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) operational support to FMA activities. Requests for NGIC support will be forwarded to INSCOM for coordination with, and approval by, Army G2X. INSCOM has requested DCS G2 update AR 381-100 and AR 381-26 and issue FMA guidance to mitigate problems highlighted by the investigation. DCS G2 acknowledges requirement to update AR 381-100 and AR 381-26(S) and has directed that the regulations "...be expeditiously updated ..."

(b) (U//FOUO) G2X will designate a single FMA point of contact and develop procedures to coordinate FMA requirements within INSCOM before forwarding to DAMI-FIT for validation. An FMA standing operating procedure will be developed and coordinated with DIA.

(c) (U//FOUO) NGIC analysts are prohibited from conducting site visits to vendors and will not interact with vendors in support of FMA activities without prior INSCOM coordination and approval. NGIC personnel involved in FMA activities will be trained in basics of FMA activities and Operational Security (OPSEC) measures.

(d) (U) INSCOM reports case closed. Although SAIG-IO concurs with the actions DCS G2 and INSCOM have taken to mitigate future, similar questionable activities, DCS G2 and INSCOM have not addressed the specific allegations in paragraph d. (2) (a-c) above identified by SAIG-IO. STATUS: Open - Pending final review of DCS G2 and INSCOM comments.

e. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-006:

(1) [REDACTED]

(a) [REDACTED]



(b) [REDACTED]

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(2) (U) Update - 902nd Military Intelligence Group's Sub-Control Office, with ACCO's concurrence, opened 10 January 2006 a preliminary investigation, which was resolved 2 August 2007 when allegations were found to be *unsubstantiated*. INSCOM submitted a final report IAW AR 381-10 closing the case. SAIG-IO concurs with INSCOM's conclusions; no further action required. STATUS: Closed.

f. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-009:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Background - INSCOM notified SAIG-IO 5 January 2006 that a 902d MIG CI special agent, with duty at Joint Terrorism Task Force, Miami, FL (JTTF-Miami) may have collected and reported information on a protest group made up of US-persons focused on countering military recruiting in high schools.

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The agent reported the information as a Threat and Local Observance Notice (TALON) report, submitting it through 902d MIG to CI Field Activity (CIFA) for analysis and entry in the Cornerstone database.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) The report described a workshop and planning meeting to discuss countering US military recruiting in High Schools, as well as efforts to assist recruits in getting out of military contracts.

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) The CI special agent provided an updated TALON report describing plans to set up tables at schools in order to perform surveillance on Military recruiters while on campus.

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) The TALON report referred to US Persons as a 'group' and a "US Domestic Protest Group."

(e) (U//~~FOUO~~) Deputy Secretary of Defense issued 13 September 2007 guidance on the implementation of interim threat reporting procedures effectively closing the TALON reporting system. CIFA General Counsel reportedly maintains a copy of the TALON data for intelligence oversight and Freedom of Information Act purposes.

(2) (U) Update -

(a) (U) INSCOM conducted an Inspector General preliminary investigation into alleged QIAs reporting that no further investigation was required.

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
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(b) (U) Additionally, INSCOM advised that DAIG Case No. 06-009 and DAIG Case No. 06-019 (next below) were administratively combined, as both contained similar allegations of QIAs related to US persons and that issues raised in both cases would be addressed in a CG INSCOM directed IG Special Inspection of TALON (reporting) in INSCOM.

(c) (U) SAIG-IO will maintain both DAIG Case No. 06-009 and DAIG Case No. 06-019 (two below) as open cases, pending receipt of clarifying information received from INSCOM relative to the special IG inspection of TALON reporting and any appropriate actions taken. STATUS: Open - Pending receipt of clarifying information from INSCOM.

g. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-016:

(1)



(2) (U) Update - Since the allegations were considered espionage indicators; Sub-Control Office (SCO), 500th MI Brigade (MIB), opened 12 April 2006 a preliminary investigation with concurrence of the Army Central Control Office (ACCO) / Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ACICA). ACICA terminated 15 September 2007 the case after finding the allegations were *unsubstantiated*. INSCOM submitted a final report closing the case. SAIG-IO concurs with INSCOM's determination; no further action required. STATUS: Closed.

h. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-019:


(1) (U) Background / Update -

(a) (U) According to a 27 April 2006 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, "Pentagon Steps up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders," intelligence analysts' assigned to the 902d MI Group (MIG), Fort Meade, MD, allegedly collected and disseminated information concerning participants in a 19 March 2005 anti-war protest in Akron, OH.

(b) (U) See update notes above related to DAIG Case No. 06-009. STATUS: Open - Pending receipt of clarifying information from INSCOM.

i. (U) DAIG Case No. 06-035:

(1)



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(2) (U) **Update** - The investigation was terminated 5 April 2007 by ACICA, as allegations were *unsubstantiated*. INSCOM submitted 29 August 2007 their final report closing the case. SAIG-IO concurs; no further action required. **STATUS: Closed.**

j. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-011 and Case No. 07-024:

(1) (U) **Background** - DAIG 07-011 duplicates DAIG-07-024 closed 19 July 2007; the resolution of DAIG 07-024 is considered the resolution of the same issue. INSCOM reported 28 November 2006 QIA by the 513th MI Brigade's CI elements deployed in the Southwest Asia area of operations, whereby two violations of regulatory guidance were alleged to have occurred.

(a) (U) CI elements routinely submitted initial CI investigative reports beyond the 72-hour time limit as specified in paragraph 3-4b.(1) of AR 381-12, and

(b) (U) may have been conducting investigative activity beyond the "Standing Investigative Authority," in violation of ACICA policies and AR 381-20.

(2) (U) Commander 513th MI Brigade directed a Commander's Inquiry which *substantiated* the allegations, making several findings and conclusions regarding the various causes of untimely SAEDA reporting. INSCOM Deputy Commander also directed an AR 15-6 Investigation, likewise making several findings and conclusions which *paralleled* the results of the 513th MIBDE Commander's Inquiry.


(3) (U) **Update** - INSCOM reported 13 July 2007 the results of a Commander's Inquiry to SAIG-IO. INSCOM Deputy Commander has approved the findings and recommendations of the AR 15-6 Investigation, closing the case. SAIG-IO concurs with INSCOM's findings and recommendations for corrective action; no further action required. **STATUS: Closed.**

k. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-012:

(1)



(2)




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


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I. (U) DAIG Case No. 07-017:



5. (U) INSPECTIONS:

SAIG-IO conducted 4th Quarter inspections of Army elements located in New York and New Jersey during the periods 13-17 AUG 07 and 17-21 SEP 07, which revealed no significant IO violations; inspection results will be reported back to the Army Commands of inspected subordinate units.

6. (U) IO PROGRAM CHANGES:

SAIG-IO acknowledges recent changes to AR 381-10 effective 3 May 2007 and DoD Directive 5240.1 effective 27 August 2007, which will form the basis for all future DAIG IO inspections.

7. (U) ITEMS OF INTEREST:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) REPORTING SIGINT RELATED QIAs: Acting INSCOM Command Inspector General advised 10 October 2007 SAIG-IO that National Security Agency (NSA) directs subordinate SIGINT elements to report questionable (SIGINT) intelligence activities to NSA Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID). NSA's requirement to report QIAs to SID does not obviate Army requirement per AR 381-10 to report QIAs. SAIG-IO will ensure Army cryptologic elements are aware of service QIA reporting requirements.

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b. (U//FOUO) DOD GUIDANCE NEEDED ON MI PERSONNEL OPERATING IN JTTF ENVIRONMENT: It was noted in discussions with the FBI Assistant General Counsel while visiting JTTF-Manhattan, NY, 17 September 2007, that there is a lack of guidance and common understanding relative to the left and right parameters of what missions DoD intelligence personnel assigned to the JTTFs can and cannot perform. Without clear guidance for Army intelligence personnel detailed to JTTFs, there is an increased potential for the conduct of QIAs by DoD (Army) personnel. FBI JTTF-Manhattan advised SAIG-IO team that DoD intelligence personnel are deputized as a precautionary measure to avoid procedural violations associated with military intelligence personnel performing domestic law enforcement missions. Legal ramifications of deputizing MI personnel are currently unknown, but SAIG-IO does not deem the measure a suitable substitute for DoD clarifying guidance.

9. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT:

[REDACTED] or SIPRNET [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] SIPRNET: [REDACTED]



ALAN W. THRASHER
 Major General, USA
 Deputy The Inspector General

Encl
as

CF:
DCS G2
OTJAG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

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SAIG-IO (381-10b)

10 May 2007

MEMORANDUM THRU GENERAL COUNSEL, ARMY

FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) [ATSD(IO)]

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

1. (U) References:

- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, US Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981.
- b. (U) DOD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982.
- c. (U) Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 22 November 2005.
- d. (U) Unclassified memorandum, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 8 December 2006, Subject: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress – New Requirement.
- e. (U) Unclassified//FOUO memorandum, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 23 March 2006, Subject: Request for Information and Coordination.
- f. (U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ memorandum, Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), 25 January 2007, Subject: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 07) (U).
- g. (U) AR 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, 19 July 2006.
- h. (U) AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards, 30 September 1996.

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2. (U) **SCOPE OF REPORT:** In accordance with references 1.b. – 1.d., and paragraph 3 of reference 1.e., this report provides information on the following:

a. (U) Questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) processed by the Intelligence Oversight Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-IO), during the reporting period, 2nd Quarter, fiscal year 2007.



b. (U) Updates on QIAs reported in previous quarters.

c. (U) The results of intelligence oversight (IO) inspections and other initiatives conducted by SAIG-IO during the reporting period.

d. (U) Summary of substantive changes to the Army IO program during the reporting period.

e. (U) Summary of any changes to intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related policies during the reporting period.

3. (U) **NEW REPORTS OF QIA:** There were five new reports of QIA processed during this reporting period.





c. (U) **DAIG-07-015:** On 2 February 2007, INSCOM reported the QIA of a CI Special Agent (S/A) assigned to the 202nd MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, Kuwait. On more than one occasion, the S/A allegedly misused his CI Badge and Credentials (B&Cs) to remove vehicle citations from his local Provost Marshal record. The battalion initiated a command investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6. **STATUS: Open.**



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4. (U) UPDATES: Updates of QIA cases reported last quarter (reference 1.f.) are provided below:



(1) (U) ACICA opened a case and promptly determined the allegations were not of CI interest. ACICA terminated its case (ACCN: 42ID-G2X-05-017) and referred the allegations to the officer's deployed unit of assignment and the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) in Iraq for further investigation, as appropriate. CID-Iraq elected not to investigate the allegations. However, the 42nd Infantry Division conducted the initial command investigation, but the 42nd Infantry Division was unable to resolve all of the allegations. The NGB assumed the responsibility for completing the investigation.

(2) (U) First, the 42nd Infantry Division determined the ICF related allegation to be unsubstantiated, but NGB is reviewing the results to ensure the Division appropriately applied AR 381-141(C), ICF (U), 16 January 2004. Second, the allegations associated with the use of a Category-1 Interpreter have been resolved as unsubstantiated, as the use of the interpreter was determined to be consistent with Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy). Also found to be unsubstantiated were the related allegations concerning the compromise of classified information to sources and interpreters. While the policy was not fully described in the command's investigative report, feedback from the Assistant Inspector General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), confirms the accuracy of the I/O's conclusion. Third, after consulting with the Army General Counsel, SAIG-IO determined that the hacking

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allegation might be a violation of federal law, specifically the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, USC Title 18, Part I, Chapter 119. Therefore, SAIG-IO referred the hacking allegation to CID Headquarters for criminal investigation and SAIG-IO recommended the Army-G2 report the allegation as a possible federal crime under the provisions of Chapter 16, AR 381-10. CID opened a criminal investigation under case number 0048-2006-CID221-50109, which is ongoing.


(3) (U) Upon review of the initial command investigative product, SAIG-IO noted other issues requiring resolution by NGB:

(a) (U) In the command investigative report, the IO substantiated a previously unknown allegation that the officer's "THT (Tactical HUMINT Team) *improperly conducted raids without the presence or knowledge of the task force...*" SAIG-IO requested NGB confirm the status of the allegation and report corrective actions, as the THT was supposedly under the officer's control and the raids were presumably in support of intelligence activities.

(b) (U) The officer's company commander and the BCT S2 allegedly sanctioned the THT's unauthorized use of alcoholic beverages during source operations, which violates theater policies. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of the allegations and corrective actions.

(c) (U) The commander and S2 allegedly prevented a witness from reporting the QIAs. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of this allegation and corrective actions.





(d) (U) It was alleged that the officer required his THT members to falsify intelligence reports. Specifically, the officer would always serve as the lead interrogator or interviewer, but he required the THT members to write the activity reports and omit his (officer's) presence and participation in the intelligence activity. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of this allegation and related corrective actions. STATUS: Open.



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c. (U) DAIG-06-009.

(1) (U) On 5 January 2006, INSCOM notified SAIG-IO that on 9 November 2004 a CI S/A assigned to the 902d MIG, with duty at the Joint Terrorism Task Force, Miami, FL (JTTF-Miami) may have inappropriately collected and reported information about a group's (US-person) plan to exercise its constitutional freedoms of assembly and speech. The information was reported as a Threat and Local Observance Notice (TALON) and submitted through the 902d MIG to the CI Field Activity (CIFA) for analysis and entry in the Cornerstone database. The report described the group's plan to convene a meeting titled "*Countering Military Recruitment, the Draft and Military Law.*" The report also described the group's plan to "*hold a workshop and planning meeting to discuss countering US military recruiting in High Schools, as well as efforts to assist recruits in getting out of military contracts.*" On 15 November 2004, the S/A provided an updated TALON report describing the group's plans to set up "*tables at the schools in order to perform 'surveillance' on Military recruiters while on campus.*" The TALON report did not indicate the group or planned activities had a foreign nexus. In the report, the S/A generically referred to the US Person as a "*group*" and a "*US Domestic Protest Group.*" However, INSCOM provided that when reporting the address of the group's meeting venue, the S/A included the name of the meeting facility, which was assumed to contain the name of the group. Until recently, the 902d MIG maintained a database of all or some of the TALON reports submitted by its S/As.

(2) (U) On 30 March 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) established an unclassified interim policy memorandum concerning the TALON Reporting System, Subject: Threats to the Department of Defense (DoD). In the memorandum, the DEPSECDEF confirmed the reporting system should only be used to report information regarding possible international terrorism activities and the information should be retained in accordance with DoD 5240.1-R, Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons, December 1982. Second, the interim policy requires that proposed TALON reports must meet one of the seven criteria outlined in the memorandum. Third, the Under Secretary for Defense (Intelligence) (USD(I)) will convene working groups to examine information fusion among intelligence, CI, force protection, law enforcement and security communities. Fourth, ATSD(IO) will conduct annual inspections of the TALON system. Finally, the lead components from each military department must provide CIFA with copies of their implementation guidance of the DEPSECDEF's interim policy memorandum. The USD(I) policy developments for TALON continue.

(3) (U) INSCOM recently reported that "*after the INSCOM Inspector General preliminary investigation of the TALON situation, per AR 20-1, the INSCOM Command Group determined that the allegations required no further investigation.*" According to various INSCOM staff officers and the 902d MI Group's IO Officer, the alleged infractions by the S/A were exacerbated, if not caused by, inadequate policy guidance from HQDA and USD(I), which are now being addressed (see the preceding subparagraph). The 902d MI Group IO Officer also stated that the name of the meeting facility, which was included in the S/A's TALON report, was not the name of the US domestic protest group; therefore, the assumption that the protest group was the target of collection is not supported by the content of the report. INSCOM considers this case closed, but SAIG-IO maintains this as an open case, pending the results of an IO review by the SAIG-IO Division Chief. STATUS: Open.

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d. (U) DAIG-06-019:


(1) (U) According to a 27 April 2006 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, "Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts Inside U.S. Borders," intelligence analysts assigned to the 902d MIG, Fort Meade, MD, allegedly collected and disseminated information concerning participants in a 19 March 2005 anti-war protest in Akron, OH. The article specifically alleged that the MIG's analysts downloaded information from activist web sites, intercepted emails and cross-referenced the information with police databases. The MIG allegedly reported the planned protest to the Akron police who, in turn, "followed" the rally. The Akron rally was said to be one of seven protests "monitored by the Army" in March 2005.

(2) (U) INSCOM recently reported that "after the INSCOM Inspector General preliminary investigation of the TALON situation, per AR 20-1, the INSCOM Command Group determined that the allegations required no further investigation." INSCOM considers this case closed, but SAIG-IO maintains this as an open case, pending the results of an IO review by the SAIG-IO Division Chief. STATUS: Closed.

e. (U) DAIG-06-021: On 9 May 2006, INSCOM reported the questionable intelligence activities of a former Department of the Army Civilian (Intelligence Specialist). According to the ACICA, the civilian allegedly attempted to ship classified material in his unaccompanied household baggage, subsequent to his dismissal from a US Embassy position. As a result, ACICA opened a CI investigation (ACCN: 06-0037-902). This case was closed on 14 June 2006 and referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) because it was determined the individual was no longer employed by the US Army. INSCOM is prepared to provide assistance to the FBI, as needed, but INSCOM will not maintain this as an open CI case. While the CI case was closed on 14 June 2006, INSCOM satisfied the Procedure 15 reporting requirements during the 2nd quarter, FY07. STATUS: Closed.





f. (U) DAIG-06-022:

(1) (U) In June 2006, SAIG-IO received numerous allegations concerning members of the 101st Airborne Division (101st Abn), 4th Infantry Division (4th ID), and Operational Detachment-Alpha 386 (ODA-386), 3rd Special Forces Group, during their 2006 deployment in Iraq. Some of the allegations were non-IO related and they were referred to Assistance Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-AC), for action/resolution as appropriate. However, other allegations (outlined below) are considered QIAs requiring resolution IAW AR 381-10. The QIAs were referred to the appropriate commands and SAIG-IO continues to monitor the investigative progress. (Note: At the time of the alleged incidents, elements of the 4th ID were task organized as a subordinate element of the 101st Abn.)




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(6) (U) After formally briefing the Army-G2, Army General Counsel, and The Inspector General, SAIG-IO referred the allegations to MNC-I and US Army Special Operations Command for resolution. SAIG-IO also provided courtesy notifications to IG-DIA, IG-CENTCOM, and IG-Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).



(a) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist conducted unauthorized source operations in violation of Army regulations and theater policies. One such unauthorized operation may have contributed to a source's death.

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(b) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist interfered with THT operations, in violation of Army regulations and theater policies.

(c) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist conducted unauthorized detention and interrogation operations, in violation of Army regulations and theater policies.

(d) (U) Four officers in the 1/187th failed to report and accurately resolve the QIAs reported to them, in violation of AR 381-10.

(e) (U) The remaining allegations were determined to be unsubstantiated. As a result of the I/O's substantiated findings, the Commanding General of the 101st Abn issued letters of reprimand to four officers. The officers will also publish a "Company and Battalion Commanders Handbook and Guide to HUMINT Operations consistent with the recently published FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, September 2006." The Division G2, who is not a subject in the command investigation, will supervise the handbook project. The Commanding General also directed improvement to training and coordination activities to prevent future incidents.

(8) (U) The 101st Abn's command investigation is closed. USASOC's investigative report is in draft and under legal review. STATUS: Open.

g. (U) DAIG-06-023: On 1 June 2006, INSCOM reported the alleged QIA of an employee assigned as the ICF Class-A Agent, MI Battalion (Provisional), 500th MI Brigade (MIB), Camp Zama, Japan. In March 2006, command representatives from the 500th MIB conducted a "cash count" inspection of the Battalion's ICF, which was managed by the employee. The March 2006 inspection revealed that the employee's records were insufficient to reconcile the Battalion account. The employee was given one month to properly organize his records for a re-inspection, which took place in May 2006 and again found that the employee's records were insufficient. Members of INSCOM's Internal Review Office later augmented the inspection team and, on 25 May 2006, the team determined that the Battalion was unable to account for approximately \$100,000 in ICF. The inspection/audit also showed irregularities pre-dating the last May 2004 inspection.


(1) (U) The employee was removed from his position as the Class-A Agent, placed on administrative leave, ordered to report daily to the Battalion Executive Officer, and ordered not to enter his office. Additionally, the command suspended the employee's access to classified information. The CID was notified and, on 25 May 2006, CID opened case number 0023-2006-CID018-73509 to investigate allegations of larceny of government funds and fraud. IAW Chapter 16, Federal Crimes, AR 381-10, INSCOM also reported to the incident to HQDA, DCS-G2.

(2) (U) As a result of CID's investigative findings, the employee was terminated from federal service, returned to the United States, and surrendered to federal authorities. On 8 January 2007, he signed a plea agreement for theft of government funds and filed it in Federal District Court. On 2 March 2007, he pleaded guilty. Sentencing is scheduled for 8 June 2007. STATUS: Closed.


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J. (U) DAIG-06-029: On 23 March 2006, the DoD Inspector General (IG-DoD) received an anonymous complaint concerning an MI officer's alleged misconduct in the performance of his intelligence duties while he was assigned to the US Army Task Force (TF) in Kosovo. On 15 June 2006, the IG-DoD referred the case to the SAIG-AC. On or about 17 July 2006, after notifying the SAIG-IO, SAIG-AC further referred the case to the TF Inspector General for resolution (SAIG-AC case number: DIH-06-8182). According to the initial report, the officer allegedly misused his position as a TF MI officer and ICF custodian/agent to travel monthly to Headquarters, US Army Europe (USAREUR), Heidelberg, GM, under the possible guise of reconciling the ICF account with USAREUR. It was further alleged that the officer's supervisor would conceal the purpose of the trip(s) as official MI business. The TF's investigation continues and once complete, the TF will report its results to SAIG-AC and SAIG-IO. SAIG-AC will also provide a copy of the investigative results to the IG-DoD. STATUS: Open.



I. (U) DAIG-06-033:

(1) (U) On 15 August 2006, INSCOM reported the QIA of a Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) employee, CI S/A, 500th MI Brigade's Pacific Liaison Detachment (PLD),


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Tokyo, Japan. The QIA occurred during a liaison meeting in a Japanese restaurant with Japanese officials. Representing PLD was the PLD Chief, a Japanese national employee, the DAC, and another CI S/A. During the meeting, the DAC became intoxicated and used foul language. The two Japanese officials were offended by the DAC's lack of decorum, causing them to end the meeting and depart the restaurant. Subsequently, when the PLD Chief attempted to discuss the evening's mishaps with the PLD team, the DAC responded violently and assaulted the Chief and the team members. The restaurant employees attempted to quell the commotion by restraining the DAC, removing him from the restaurant and placing him in a taxi. However, the DAC managed to exit the taxi, grab the PLD Japanese national employee, and throw her onto the street. The injuries to all involved were limited to bruises and the PLD Chief's preliminary assessment is that the episode "will not become an international incident." PLD's Japanese national employee "appears to have no intention" of reporting the matter to the Japanese police.

(2) (U) The Brigade Commander appointed an I/O, reported the incident to CID, secured the DAC's CI badge and credentials, and placed him on administrative leave. CID completed their investigation on 30 August 2006 under case number 0041-06-CID018-7359 [Destruction of Things in General, Article 261, Japanese Penal Code (JPC); Bodily Injury, Article 204, JPC; and Violence, Article 208, JPC] and provided the results to the command for inclusion in the 15-6 investigation.

(3) (U) The CID investigation obtained a confession from the employee and substantiated the allegations. As a result, the employee was terminated from federal service.
STATUS: Closed.




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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

n. (U) DAIG-07-003: On 5 October 2006, INSCOM reported the alleged QIA of a US Army Staff Sergeant (SSG) CI S/A, while attending the MI Basic NCO Course (BNCOC), Fort Huachuca, AZ, from July-August 2006. In July 2006, the SSG allegedly misused his official position when approached a female soldier, identified himself with his CI Badge and Credentials (B&Cs), deceptively suggested he worked for US Special Forces, and solicited her interest in working in special operations on behalf of the Army, without authority. The soldier agreed and began answering numerous personal questions, which she assumed to be part of the assessment process. During the next month, he provided her training in surveillance and elicitation techniques (without authority), and they engaged in a physical relationship. Their relationship ended when he graduated from BNCOC and departed Fort Huachuca. The SSG's alleged actions are apparent violations of chapters 5 and 9, AR 381-20, The Army CI Program, 15 November 1993, and Procedure 14, AR 381-10 (reference 1.c.). INSCOM completed a command investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6 (reference 1.h.), which disproved all of the allegations. STATUS: Closed.

o. (U) DAIG-07-007:

(1) (U) On 28 November 2006, SAIG-IO received an initial report of QIA from the Deputy Inspector General, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Iraq. The allegations concern unauthorized and/or inappropriate source operations by members of 506th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), which are possible violations of Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, HUMINT Intelligence Collector Operations; MNF-I HUMINT CONOP for the Iraq theater of Operations; the 4th Infantry Division's Commanding General's Intelligence Collection Policy dated 7 June 2005; and Procedure 14, AR 381-10.



p. (U) DAIG-07-008:

(1) (U) On 28 November 2006, SAIG-IO received an initial QIA report from the Deputy Inspector General, MND-B. The original allegation appeared to have been reported by the G2, MND-B, and concerns an unauthorized investigation of a US-Person by the S2, 506th RCT, in possible violation of AR 381-12, AR 381-20 and Procedures 2 and 14 of AR 381-10.

(2) (U) On 6 October 2006, the S2 allegedly directed four subordinate personnel to obtain the personnel files of a Category II linguist, a US-Person, who worked on Forward Operating Base-Rustamiyah. Specifically, the S2 directed his people to "gather as much

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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

evidence as you can about this terp. (Note: The term "terp" is military slang for "interpreter.") There is no indication that the investigation was part of an authorized CI investigation. The MND-B initiated a command investigation to resolve the allegations. STATUS: Open

q. (U) DAIG-07-009: On 12 October 2006, INSCOM reported the QIA of two CI S/As, 524th MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade, Korea. The Military Police (MP), US Army-Yongsan, Korea, alleged that the S/As violated a General Order (Article 92, UCMJ), and Obstruction of Justice (Article 134, UCMJ). Allegedly, on 19 November 2006, the MPs, working with the Korean National Police, identified two junior Soldiers in a drinking establishment in Itaewon, Korea (off-base), during curfew hours. When questioned by the MPs, the individuals identified themselves as on-duty CI S/As conducting an investigation. The MPs stated that one of the S/As used his CI B&Cs to assert his official status, which the S/A later denied. Initial investigation by the MPs determined that the S/As were not on duty. Both individuals were apprehended (MPR#01653-2006-MPC338) and transported to the MP Station, US Army-Yongsan, where they failed sobriety tests. The Soldiers were then processed and released to their unit. The Commander, 524th MI Battalion, completed a command investigation, which determined only one of the individuals misused his Badge and Credentials. The offending individual received a Field Grade Article 15. No further action was taken. STATUS: Closed.

r. (U) DAIG-07-011: On 28 November 2006, INSCOM reported the QIA of the 513th MI Brigade's CI elements deployed in the Southwest Asia area of operations. The CI elements routinely submit Initial CI investigative reports late, beyond the 72-hour time limit, and may have been conducting investigative activity beyond the "Standing Investigative Authority." In violation of ACICA policies and AR 381-20. The Commander, 513th MI Brigade, is conducting a commander's inquiry to determine the scope of the problem, responsible CI elements, and appropriate corrective actions. Key leaders in the 513th MI Brigade have opined that unrealistic policies are contributing factors to the incidents. Specifically, some leaders believe that the 72-hour reporting requirement and the "Standing Investigative Authority" policy are often too restrictive in a combat environment. STATUS: Open.

s. (U) DAIG-07-012:



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- 5. (U) **INSPECTIONS:** SAIG-IO did not conduct any IO inspections during the reporting period.
- 6. (U) **INSPECTION TRENDS:** Unchanged. Please refer to the inspection trends reported in the 1st Quarter, FY07, reference 1.f. above.
- 7. (U) **IO PROGRAM CHANGES:** There have been no substantive changes to the Army's IO program during the reporting period.
- 8. (U) **CHANGES TO MI REGULATIONS / POLICIES:** SAIG-IO is coordinating with Army-G2 to establish a quarterly reporting mechanism to keep abreast of changes to MI regulations and policies. SAIG-IO will submit a separate report to ATSD(IO) if there have been substantive changes to MI regulations and policies during the second quarter of FY07.
- 9. (U) **POINT OF CONTACT:** [redacted] at [redacted] NIPRnet email:
[redacted] SIPRnet email: [redacted]


 ALAN W. THRASHER
 Major General, USA
 Deputy The Inspector General

Encl
as

CF:
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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20316-1700

AUG 03 2007

SAIG-IO (381-10b)



MEMORANDUM THRU GENERAL COUNSEL, ARMY

FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) [ATSD(IO)]

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

1. (U) References:

- a. (U) Executive Order 12333, US Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981.
- b. (U) DOD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982.
- c. (U) Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007.
- d. (U) Unclassified memorandum, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 8 December 2006, subject: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement.
- e. (U) Unclassified//FOUO memorandum, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 23 March 2006, subject: Request for Information and Coordination.
- f. (U) SECRET//NOFORN memorandum, Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), 10 May 2007, subject: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 07) (U).
- g. (U) AR 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, 1 February 2007.
- h. (U) AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards, 30 September 1998.

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2. (U) **SCOPE OF REPORT:** In accordance with references 1.b. – 1.d., and paragraph 3 of reference 1.e., this report provides information on the following:

a. (U) Questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) processed by the Intelligence Oversight Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-IO), during the reporting period, 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year 2007.

b. (U) Updates on QIAs reported in previous quarters.

c. (U) The results of intelligence oversight (IO) inspections and other initiatives conducted by SAIG-IO during the reporting period.


d. (U) Summary of substantive changes to the Army IO program during the reporting period.

e. (U) Summary of any changes to intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related policies during the reporting period.

3. (U) **NEW REPORTS OF QIA:** There were eight new reports of QIA processed during this reporting period.

a. (~~U//FOUO~~) **DAIG-07-018:** On 17 April 2007, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight [ATSD(IO)] forwarded to SAIG-IO an incident report from the National Security Agency (NSA) which alleges questionable intelligence activity (QIA) on behalf of 27th Cavalry while deployed to Iraq. SAIG-IO further has referred this matter to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) for resolution. To date, no further updates have been received.

STATUS: Open.




c. (~~U//FOUO~~) **DAIG-07-020:** On 30 May 2007, SAIG-IO received a report of a possible Procedure 15 violation from the Inspector General of Multi-National Task Force (East), KFOR8, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. The alleged incident involves a CI Sergeant inappropriately assisting a CAT II Interpreter onto Camp Bondsteel to replace an identification badge lost while on leave

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in Serbia. It is further alleged that the CI Special Agent (S/A) tried to assist the interpreter to get a new KFOR Identification Card (ID) the following day without proper approval or authority. Then, the agent misidentified the associated contract company, potentially to avoid detection of the lost KFOR ID and the potential consequences to contractor by her employer. The NCO's alleged actions are violations of Chapter 9, AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 November 1993, and paragraph 15-4b., AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007. Task Force Falcon has initiated a command investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6 Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, 30 September 1996.
STATUS: Open.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) DAIG-07-021: On 21 June 2007, the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) provided SAIG-IO information on the alleged federal criminal activity of a Department of the Army Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program (MICECP) employee and his wife. The wife is being investigated by the Irvine, California, Police Department for embezzlement and fraud (approximately \$ 400,000) against the company for which she worked. The MICECP employee also worked for the company prior to and continuing after his employment with the Department of the Army. The stolen money was deposited in a joint bank account of the MICECP employee and his wife. The investigation is focusing on the MICECP employee's possible involvement in, or knowledge of and complicity with, the embezzlement and fraud. The Irvine Police Department has kept the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) apprised. As a result, the FBI intended to open a criminal investigation by 22 June 2007 on both individuals. The employee's access to classified information has been suspended and he surrendered his CI badge and credentials (B&Cs), government credit card, access badges to supported civilian contracting facilities, and keys to the office. He is on paid administrative leave pending his unit finding suitable employment that does not require an active security clearance.
STATUS: Open.




X f. (U//~~FOUO~~) DAIG-07-023: On 15 June 2007, the US Forces Command (FORSCOM) IG Office reported to SAIG-IO a possible violation of Section 4, (USSID) SP0018 (S//COMINT) and Procedure 2 of AR 381-10 in reference to the collection of U.S. persons information. During a field exercise on 6-7 April 2007 at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, a SIGINT NCO operating a Prophet system allegedly intercepted civilian cell phone conversations. This incident was reported to the National Security Agency (NSA) Security Intelligence Directorate's (SID) Intelligence Oversight & Compliance (O&C) Office. The unit commander conducted an inquiry into this situation. Closure of this case is pending receipt of findings from the command directed investigation. The draft report of findings is currently under the scrutiny of the Command's Staff Judge Advocate. **STATUS: Open.**

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g. (U//FOUO) DAIG-07-024:



(3) (U//FOUO) On 13 July 2007, INSCOM reported the results of a Commander's inquiry and a Command 15-6 Investigation into this situation to SAIG-IO. The INSCOM Deputy Commander has approved the findings and recommendations of the AR 15-6 Investigation and considers this case closed. DAIG has further reviewed all the provided documentation and concurs with INSCOM's assessment and also considers this case closed. STATUS: Closed.

h. (U//FOUO) DAIG-07-025:

(1) (U//FOUO) On 19 July 2007, SAIG-IO received a Procedure 15 report from the USAREUR, G2X, Army Theater Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (ATCICA) via the DA DCS-G2. The report alleged that two officers, one warrant officer, and one NCO assigned to Task Force (TF) Falcon's CI Team conducted a CI investigation without proper authorization. The subjects of this unauthorized investigation were US Citizens interpreters with US secret clearances employed by TF Falcon. Sometime during June 2007, the subjects had reportedly traveled cross the border without proper authorization, were temporarily detained by the border authorities, and potentially lied to these authorities about the reasons for their travel. At 2345 hours on the evening of the interpreters return (date TBD); the TF Falcon CI Team proceeded to the subjects' quarters and escorted them back to their office where the Team commenced to interview each of them. During the interviews, the MI Bde Team learned that a fourth person was involved and they interviewed that subject the following day. All four of the interviews were conducted without approval of the 650th MI Group's Sub Control Office (SCO) (their servicing entity) and without reading the subjects their rights. Upon completing the investigation, the team's Special Agent In Charge (SAIC) drafted an unclassified memorandum outlining their actions and forwarded it to the TF G2. TF Falcon is currently stationed at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo.



(2) (U//FOUO) On 18 June 2007, the USAREUR ATCICA office was made aware of the incident outside of intelligence channels and proceeded to contact the 650th MIG's SCO to

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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

inform them of the incident. Only when the USAREUR ATCICA sent a message to the 650th MIG's SCO and TF Falcon's G2 on that same day was the SCO informed of the incident. On 18 July 2007, the USAREUR ATCICA contacted the TF Intelligence Oversight (IO) Officer to check on the status of this event only to discover that the TF IO Officer had never been made aware of this incident, and because of this, it had not been reported to DAIG. SAIG-IO submits this initial report under the provisions AR 381-10 and AR 381-20. A final report will be provided once the case is closed. STATUS: Open.

4. (U) UPDATES: Updates of QIA cases reported last quarter (reference 1.f.) are provided below:




c. (U) DAIG-07-015: On 2 February 2007, INSCOM reported the QIA of a CI S/A assigned to the 202nd MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, Kuwait. On more than one occasion, the S/A allegedly misused his CI B&Cs to remove vehicle citations from his local Provost Marshal record. The battalion has completed a command investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6. The investigation substantiated the allegation, the S/A was removed from his position and received a Field Grade Article 15. STATUS: Closed.



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(1) (U) ACICA opened a case and promptly determined the allegations were not of CI interest. ACICA terminated its case (ACCN: 42ID-G2X-05-017) and referred the allegations to the officer's deployed unit of assignment and the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) in Iraq for further investigation, as appropriate. CID-Iraq elected not to investigate the allegations. However, the 42nd ID conducted the initial command investigation, but the 42nd ID was unable to resolve all of the allegations. The NGB assumed the responsibility for completing the investigation.

(2) (U) First, the 42nd ID determined the ICF related allegation to be unsubstantiated, but NGB is reviewing the results to ensure the Division appropriately applied AR 381-141(C), ICF (U), 16 January 2004. Second, the allegations associated with the use of a Category-1 interpreter have been resolved as unsubstantiated, as the use of the interpreter was determined to be consistent with Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy). Also found to be unsubstantiated were the related allegations concerning the compromise of classified information to sources and interpreters. While the policy was not fully described in the command's investigative report, feedback from the Assistant Inspector General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), confirms the accuracy of the investigating officer's (I/O) conclusion. Third, after consulting with the Army General Counsel, SAIG-IO determined that the hacking allegation might be a violation of federal law, specifically the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, USC Title 18, Part I, Chapter 119. Therefore, SAIG-IO referred the hacking allegation to CID Headquarters for criminal investigation and SAIG-IO recommended the Army-G2 report the allegation as a possible federal crime under the provisions of Chapter 16, AR 381-10. CID opened a criminal investigation under case number 0048-2006-CID221-50109, which is ongoing.

(3) (U) Upon review of the initial command investigative product, SAIG-IO noted other issues requiring resolution by NGB:

(a) (U) In the command investigative report, the I/O substantiated a previously unknown allegation that the officer's *THT (Tactical HUMINT Team) improperly conducted raids without the presence or knowledge of the task force...*. SAIG-IO requested NGB confirm the status of the allegation and report corrective actions, as the THT was supposedly under the officer's control and the raids were presumably in support of intelligence activities.

(b) (U) The officer's company commander and the BCT S2 allegedly sanctioned the THT's unauthorized use of alcoholic beverages during source operations, which violates

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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

theater policies. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of the allegations and corrective actions.

(c) (U) The commander and S2 allegedly prevented a witness from reporting the QIAs. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of this allegation and corrective actions.



(d) (U) It was alleged that the officer required his THT members to falsify intelligence reports. Specifically, the officer would always serve as the lead interrogator or interviewer, but he required the THT members to write the activity reports and omit his (officer's) presence and participation in the intelligence activity. SAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of this allegation and related corrective actions.

(e) (U) According to an NGB-IG update on 19 July 2007, the primary investigator has concluded the subject interview for this investigation. However, two more interviews are pending. This case should reach its conclusion by the next quarterly reporting period.
STATUS: Open.



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g. (U) DAIG-06-009.

(1) (U) On 5 January 2008, INSCOM notified SAIG-IO that on 9 November 2004 a CI S/A assigned to the 902d MIG, with duty at the Joint Terrorism Task Force, Miami, FL (JTTF-Miami) may have inappropriately collected and reported information about a group's (US-person) plan to exercise its constitutional freedoms of assembly and speech. The information was reported as a Threat and Local Observance Notice (TALON) and submitted through the 902d MIG to the CI Field Activity (CIFA) for analysis and entry in the Cornerstone database. The report described the group's plan to convene a meeting titled "*Countering Military Recruitment, the Draft and Military Law.*" The report also described the group's plan to "*hold a workshop and planning meeting to discuss countering US military recruiting in High Schools, as well as efforts to assist recruits in getting out of military contracts.*" On 15 November 2004, the S/A provided an updated TALON report describing the group's plans to set up "*tables at the schools in order to perform 'surveillance' on Military recruiters, while on campus.*" The TALON

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report did not indicate the group or planned activities had a foreign nexus. In the report, the S/A generically referred to the US Person as a "group" and a "US Domestic Protest Group." However, INSCOM provided that when reporting the address of the group's meeting venue, the S/A included the name of the meeting facility, which was assumed to contain the name of the group. Until recently, the 902d MIG maintained a database of all or some of the TALON reports submitted by its S/As.

(2) (U) On 30 March 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) established an unclassified interim policy memorandum concerning the TALON Reporting System, Subject: Threats to the Department of Defense (DoD). In the memorandum, the DEPSECDEF confirmed the reporting system should only be used to report information regarding possible international terrorism activities and the information should be retained in accordance with DoD 5240.1-R, Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons, December 1982. Second, the interim policy requires that proposed TALON reports must meet one of the seven criteria outlined in the memorandum. Third, the Under Secretary for Defense (Intelligence) [USD(I)] will convene working groups to examine information fusion among Intelligence, CI, force protection, law enforcement and security communities. Fourth, ATSD(IO) will conduct annual inspections of the TALON system. Finally, the lead components from each military department must provide CIFA with copies of their implementation guidance of the DEPSECDEF's interim policy memorandum. The USD(I) policy developments for TALON continue.

(3) (U) INSCOM recently reported that "...after the INSCOM Inspector General preliminary investigation of the TALON situation, per AR 20-1, the INSCOM Command Group determined that the allegations required no further investigation." According to various INSCOM staff officers and the 902d MI Group's IO Officer, the alleged infractions by the S/A were exacerbated, if not caused by, inadequate policy guidance from HQDA and USD(I), which are now being addressed (see the preceding subparagraph). The 902d MI Group IO Officer also stated that the name of the meeting facility, which was included in the S/A's TALON report, was not the name of the US domestic protest group; therefore, the assumption that the protest group was the target of collection is not supported by the content of the report. INSCOM considers this case closed, but SAIG-IO maintains this as an open case, pending the results of an IO review by the SAIG-IO Division Chief. STATUS: Open.





h. (U) DAIG-06-022:

(1) (U) In June 2006, SAIG-IO received numerous allegations concerning members of the 101st Airborne Division (101st Abn), 4th Infantry Division (4th ID), and Operational Detachment-Alpha 386 (ODA-386), 3rd Special Forces Group, during their 2006 deployment in Iraq. Some of the allegations were non-IO related and they were referred to Assistance Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-AC), for action/resolution as appropriate. However, other allegations (outlined below) are considered QIAs requiring resolution IAW AR 381-10. The QIAs were referred to the appropriate commands and SAIG-IO continues to monitor the investigative progress. (Note: At the time of the alleged incidents, elements of the 4th ID were task organized as a subordinate element of the 101st Abn.)


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(6) (U) After formally briefing the Army-G2, Army General Counsel, and The inspector General, SAIG-IO referred the allegations to MNC-I and US Army Special Operations Command for resolution. SAIG-IO also provided courtesy notifications to IG DIA, IG CENTCOM, and IG Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).



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(a) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist conducted unauthorized source operations in violation of Army regulations and theater policies. One such unauthorized operation may have contributed to a source's death.



(b) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist interfered with THT operations, in violation of Army regulations and theater policies.

(c) (U) An Infantry Officer and his linguist conducted unauthorized detention and interrogation operations, in violation of Army regulations and theater policies.

(d) (U) Four officers in the 1/187th failed to report and accurately resolve the QIAs reported to them, in violation of AR 381-10.


(e) (U) The remaining allegations were determined to be unsubstantiated. As a result of the I/O's substantiated findings, the Commanding General of the 101st Abn issued letters of reprimand to four officers. The officers will also publish a "Company and Battalion Commanders Handbook and Guide to HUMINT Operations consistent with the recently published FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, September 2006." The Division G2, who is not a subject in the command investigation, will supervise the handbook project. The Commanding General also directed improvement to training and coordination activities to prevent future incidents.

(8) (U) The 101st Abn's command investigation is closed. USASOC's investigative report is in draft and under legal review. STATUS: Open.






SAIG-IO

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U)



k. (U) DAIG-06-029: On 23 March 2006, the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) received an anonymous complaint concerning an MI officer's alleged misconduct in the performance of his intelligence duties while he was assigned to the US Army TF in Kosovo. On 15 June 2006, the DoD IG referred the case to the SAIG-AC. On or about 17 July 2006, after notifying the SAIG-IO, SAIG-AC further referred the case to the TF IG for resolution (SAIG-AC case number: DIH-06-8182). According to the initial report, the officer allegedly misused his position as a TF MI officer and ICF custodian/agent to travel monthly to Headquarters, US Army Europe (USAREUR), Heidelberg, GM, under the possible guise of reconciling the ICF account with USAREUR. It was further alleged that the officer's supervisor would conceal the purpose of the trip(s) as official MI business. The TF's investigation continues and once complete, the TF will report its results to SAIG-AC and SAIG-IO. SAIG-AC will also provide a copy of the investigative results to the DoD IG. STATUS: Open.




m. (U) DAIG-07-007:

(1) (U) On 28 November 2006, SAIG-IO received an initial report of QIA from the Deputy Inspector General, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Iraq. The allegations concern unauthorized and/or inappropriate source operations by members of 506th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), which are possible violations of Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, HUMINT

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U)

Intelligence Collector Operations; MNF-I HUMINT CONOP for the Iraqi theater of Operations; the 4th ID's Commanding General's Intelligence Collection Policy dated 7 June 2005; and Procedure 14, AR 381-10.



n. (U) DAIG-07-008:

(1) (U//FOUO) On 28 November 2006, SAIG-IO received an initial QIA report from the Deputy Inspector General, MND-B. The original allegation appeared to have been reported by the G2, MND-B, and concerns an unauthorized investigation of a US-Person by the S2, 506th RCT, in possible violation of AR 381-12, AR 381-20 and Procedures 2 and 14 of AR 381-10.

(2) (U//FOUO) On 6 October 2006, the S2 allegedly directed four subordinate personnel to obtain the personnel files of a Category II linguist, a US-Person, who worked on Forward Operating Base-Rustamiyah. Specifically, the S2 directed his people to "gather as much evidence as you can about this *terp*." (Note: The term "*terp*" is military slang for "interpreter.") There is no indication that the investigation was part of an authorized CI investigation. The MND-B initiated a command investigation to resolve the allegations. STATUS: Open



o. (U) DAIG-07-011: On 28 November 2006, INSCOM reported the QIA of the 513th MI Brigade's CI elements deployed in the Southwest Asia area of operations. The CI elements routinely submit initial CI investigative reports late, beyond the 72-hour time limit, and may have been conducting investigative activity beyond the "Standing Investigative Authority," in violation of ACICA policies and AR 381-20. The Commander, 513th MI Brigade, is conducting a commander's inquiry to determine the scope of the problem, responsible CI elements, and appropriate corrective actions. Key leaders in the 513th MI Brigade have opined that unrealistic policies are contributing factors to the incidents. Specifically, some leaders believe that the 72-hour reporting requirement and the "Standing Investigative Authority" policy are often too restrictive in a combat environment. STATUS: Open.

p. (U//FOUO) DAIG-07-012:



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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 07) (U)



5. (U) **INSPECTIONS:** SAIG-IO conducted a Staff Assistance Visit to the Southwest Border to observe and assist local commanders in support of Operation JUMP START during the period of 14-27 April 2007. The results of the SAV were very positive and have been reported up to the Secretary of the Army.

6. (U) **INSPECTION TRENDS:** Unchanged. Please refer to the inspection trends reported in the 1st Quarter, FY07, reference 1.f. above.

7. (U) **IO PROGRAM CHANGES:** AR 381-10 was updated effective 3 May 2007. All future IO inspections will be conducted under the provisions of this newest update.

8. (U) **CHANGES TO MI REGULATIONS / POLICIES:** SAIG-IO is coordinating with Army-G2 to establish a quarterly reporting mechanism to keep abreast of changes to MI regulations and policies. SAIG-IO will submit a separate report to ATSD(IO) if there have been substantive changes to MI regulations and policies during the fourth quarter of FY07.

9. (U) **POINT OF CONTACT:** [redacted] at [redacted] NIPRnet email: [redacted]
SIPRnet email: [redacted]

Encl
as


ALAN W. THRASHER
Major General, USA
Deputy The Inspector General

CF:
G2
OTJAG



~~SECRET // NOFORN // MR~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1700

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APR 21 2008

SAIG-IO (381-10b)

Amended 17 Feb 08

MEMORANDUM THRU GENERAL COUNSEL, ARMY
FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) (ATSD(IO))

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report [2nd Quarter, Fiscal Year
(FY) 08] (U)

1. (U) REFERENCES:

- a. (U) Executive Order (EO) 12333, US Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as amended.
- b. (U) Department of Defense (DoD) Publication 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982.
- c. (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities, 27 August 2007.
- d. (U) Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007.
- e. (U) Unclassified memorandum, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 8 December 2006, subject: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress – New Requirement.
- f. (U) Unclassified//FOUO memorandum, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 23 March 2008, subject: Request for Information and Coordination.
- g. (U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ memorandum, Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), 30 January 2008, subject: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (1st Quarter, FY 08) (U).
- h. (U) AR 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, 1 February 2007.

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
SAIG-IO

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

- i. (U) AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards, 30 September 1996.
 - j. (U) AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 November 1993.
2. (U) **SCOPE OF REPORT:** In accordance with (IAW) the references listed above, this report provides information on:
- a. (U) Questionable Intelligence Activities (QIAs) reported to the Intelligence Oversight Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (DAIG-IO), during 2nd Quarter, FY 2008;
 - b. (U) Updates to QIAs previously reported;
 - c. (U) Results of intelligence oversight (IO) inspections and other actions conducted by DAIG-IO during 2nd Quarter, FY 2008;
 - d. (U) Summary of substantive changes to the Army IO program during 2nd Quarter, FY 2008; and
 - e. (U) Summary of any changes to intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related policies during 2nd Quarter, FY 2008.
3. (U) **NEW QIA REPORTS:** This office received six new reports of QIAs during 2nd Quarter, FY 2008.

a. (U) DAIG-08-010:

(1)



(a)



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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

(b) (U) The check of the Crisscross database established that the person was a USP, Department of the Army Civilian (DAC), assigned in Wiesbaden. The CIHOC provided that information to WIRO and directed that WIRO include the information in an initial report of possible Subversion and Espionage Directed against the U.S. Army (SAEDA), under the provisions of (UP) Army Regulation 381-12. INSCOM concludes that a QIA occurred when the database checks were run on a USP without proper investigative authority. Specifically, it concludes that the CIHOC should have been attentive to the possibility that the original identification of the DAC as a USP, although anonymous, was accurate. Further, it concludes that the failure of the CIHOC to more accurately identify the purpose of the request to the HAC caused the HAC to exceed Standing Investigative Authority (SIA) and potentially violate the rights of the USP.

(2) (U) Update – 14 January 2008, INSCOM reported in response to the QIA, desk officers in the CIHOC received tailored instruction concerning the use and limitations of SIA. Also, they received specific instruction on the submission of Requests for Assistance to the HAC, specifically identifying what information is being sought and for what purpose. Also, 66th MIG command response to the QIA determined that a critical element of the violation centered on a systemic weakness. Specifically, a provision within the USAREUR Counterespionage Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was insufficiently developed to clearly communicate the intent and restrictions inherent in actions between 66th MIG operational personnel and supporting analysts in the USAREUR ACE. The SOP has been revised to ensure clear and specific communication. Lastly, the Commander, 66th MIG confirmed that analysts with access to supporting intelligence data bases had completed Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recertification training within six months of the event and are scheduled for formal training in the US in FY 08. STATUS: Closed.

b. (U) DAIG-08-011:

(1)



(2) (U) Update – The Commander, 902d MIG has initiated a command inquiry UP AR 15-6 to ascertain the facts and determine appropriate action concerning the accusations against all three individuals. The inquiry will also explore the continued viability of the FCA Asset. STATUS: Open.

c. (U) DAIG-08-012:

(1) (U) Background – 2 January 2008, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, (ODCS) G2, reported QIA by personnel assigned to the Cyber Counterintelligence Activity

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
SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

(CCA), 902d MIG. Specifically, In August 2007 CCA personnel attended a commercial defense contractor conference without disclosing their intelligence affiliation. The conference, known as Black Hat, was hosted by various commercial computer security vendors and attended by computer security professionals. The CCA personnel judged the conference to be a training event and registered on-line, using their government credit cards. They did not reveal that they represented a military intelligence (MI) organization. The ODCS G2 determined, after the fact, that it was improper for the CCA personnel to attend Black Hat without either disclosing their MI affiliation or obtaining proper approval for undisclosed participation IAW Chapter 10, AR 381-10.


(2) (U) Update – 29 January 2008, the INSCOM Commanding General disapproved a request from the 902d MIG Commander for retroactive approval for CCA personnel to attend Black Hat without disclosing their MI affiliation. The basis for his disapproval was that AR 381-10 grants no authority for such retroactive approval and he believed that such approval would serve no purpose. However, in lieu of the retroactive approval, he tasked his staff to publish appropriate guidance to ensure that similar incidents do not occur in the future. The guidance will be fully vetted with the 902d MIG; the Office of The Judge Advocate General, Headquarters, DA; and the Office of the General Counsel, Headquarters, DA. This office anticipates no further action in response to this retroactive report of QIA. STATUS: Closed.

d. (U) DAIG-08-013:

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


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
e. (U) DAIG-08-014:

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
(2)



(3) (U) The Commander directed the following corrective actions. First, the USAOMS IO officer met with the responsible personnel involved in this incident and reinforced current unit policy regarding IO procedures, particularly undisclosed participation. And second, IO procedures, particularly undisclosed participation, will be emphasized to all unit members during annual refresher training. This office anticipates no further action regarding this case.
STATUS: Closed.

f. (U) DAIG-08-015:

(1)




(2) (U) Update - As this matter is being investigated by ACICA, no further updates will be reported until the case either changes status or is closed. STATUS: Open.

4. (U) UPDATES ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED QIAS:

a. (U) DAIG-05-037:

(1)



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(a) (U) The officer allegedly compromised classified defense information to sources and his Category-1 interpreter, even though appropriately cleared Category-2 interpreters were available.

(b) (U) Also, the officer allegedly violated numerous regulations governing Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF).

(c)



(2) (U) The Army Central Control Office (ACCO) opened and terminated their case, under LCCN: 42ID-G2X-05-016, after determining the allegations were not of CI interest. The ACCO referred the allegations to the officer's unit and the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) for further investigation (RFI 0282-06-CID001).

(3) (U) 18 October 2005, this office completed a review of a 15-6 investigation initiated by the Commanding General of the 42nd ID, NYARNG, dated 7 July 2005. The initial Report of Investigative Inquiry (ROI) 216th MICO did not clearly address allegation 4.a.(1)(b) mentioned above, but did state that allegations 4.a.(1)(a) and 4.a.(1)(c) were unsubstantiated. (Note: The officer in question did receive a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, dated 2 September 2005, for other incidents of unprofessional conduct.)

(4) (U) On 19 December 2005, DAIG-IO referred this case to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) IG office for further investigation into the three allegations addressed in paragraph 4.a.(1) above.

(5) (U) On 20 April and 3 May of 2006 respectively, DAIG-IO took sworn statements from two Soldiers with direct knowledge of the incidents surrounding the above-mentioned allegations. The testimony of these two Soldiers, accompanied with a review of the case by the Army Office of General Counsel (OGC), prompted DAIG-IO to again refer possible criminal allegations to CID for investigation on 1 June 2006 in reference to paragraph 4.a.(1)(c) above.

(6) (U) Upon review of the initial ROI, DAIG-IO noted other issues requiring resolution by NGB:

(a) (U) In the initial ROI, the investigating officer substantiated a previously unknown allegation that the officer's "THT improperly conducted raids without the presence or knowledge of the task force...". DAIG-IO requested NGB confirm the status of the allegation, as the THT was supposedly under the officer's control and raids were presumably in support of intelligence activities.

(b) (U) The officer's company commander (216th MICO) and the 116th BCT's S2 allegedly sanctioned the THT's unauthorized use of alcoholic beverages during source operation, which violated theater policies.

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

(c) (U) The company commander and S2 allegedly prevented a witness from reporting QIAs.

(d) (U) The officer allegedly required THT members to falsify intelligence reports, omitting references to the officer's presence during interrogations.

(e) (U) DAIG-IO requested NGB report the status of these four new allegations as well as all related corrective actions. DAIG-IO received NGB's final Report of Investigation (ROI) dated 12 November 2007 regarding these issues. The ROI substantiates allegations 4.a.(6)(b) and 4.a.(6)(d) above. 11 January 2008, the NGB IG confirmed that the findings from the ROI were referred to the Idaho and California State Joint Force Headquarters with Soldiers involved in this case for action as appropriate under provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

(7) (U) 25 May 2007, CID's Computer Crime Investigative Unit (CCIU) issued its final report (0048-2006-CID221-50109 - 8P3 - 9G2F) regarding this case and determined that unauthorized access to a protected computer [allegation 4.a.(1)(c)] was unfounded. The CCIU made the following determination: *Investigation determined there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations that the officer in question committed any criminal offense. A DIAG source reported the officer in question made comments to the effect he had "hacked" into E-mail accounts and foreign computers. The officer in question was interviewed and denied "hacking" into any computer systems. The DAIG source was re-interviewed and stated he/she had no first hand knowledge of the incident and only the word of the officer in question. Subsequent investigation did not identify any witnesses to the allegations or physical evidence.*

(8) (U) On 11 December 2007, the NGB IG provided this office with a memorandum summarizing the final ROI's findings and noting that the preponderance of evidence suggested allegation 4.a.(1)(b) was unsubstantiated and 4.a.(1)(c) was substantiated. Allegation 4.a.(1)(a) was not definitively addressed in the final ROI.

(9) (U) Update - On 23 January 2008, SAIG-IO IGs met with CCIU investigators to deconflict the results of the NGB's final ROI and their own investigation. As computer subject matter experts (SMEs), CCIU investigators felt the conclusions from the final NGB ROI did not warrant any further criminal investigation in relation to allegation 4.a.(1)(c) above.

(10) (U) During the course of four separate investigations, only one of the original allegations was substantiated and then later refuted by SME's; therefore, DAIG-IO considers this case closed from an IO perspective with no further action anticipated. STATUS: Closed.


b. (U) DAIG-06-003 & 07-012:



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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 08) (U)




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

(5) (U) Update – 3 March 2008, INSCOM responded to the concerns raised on 27 October 2007. In summary, their reply offered the following conclusions:

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
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(c) (U) As a result of the inquiry into the [redacted] operation, the NGIC Commander was tasked to determine appropriate disciplinary action, if any that needed to be taken against the involved [redacted]. The commander determined to handle the matter as a job performance issue. The employee was counseled on his poor performance, received a block 3 rating on his 2006-07 annual evaluation. In addition, his performance objectives were rewritten to cover specific areas of concentration and he continues to attend scheduled performance counseling sessions with his supervisor. In addition, all NGIC FMA Managers were trained on the new FMA procedures and coordination requirements. This office considers this matter closed with no further action anticipated. STATUS: Closed.

c. (U) DAIG-06-004:



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(2) (U) IAW AR 381-20, the 650th MIG's Sub-Control Office (SCO) initiated a CI investigation (LCN: 06-TFFCI-003) concerning the deliberate security compromise, which was later transferred to the 66th MIG (PI-06-025-TFF) for final resolution, after the unit in question rotated to home station in January 2006. The 66th MIG closed their investigation in March 2007. The 66th MIG's investigation answered the CI allegations [a violation of Procedure 16 (Federal Crime), AR 381-10], but did not address the Procedure 14 (Employee Conduct) issues.

(3) (U) Update – 13 March 2007, the 66th MIG provided the report of investigation to the individual's commander; however, they did not provide any information obtained during the subject interview which could be used by the 7th ARCOM's investigating officer to investigate the QIA allegations. Efforts by the USAREUR G2X could not get this information released to the command. The 7th ARCOM stated they could not open an AR 15-6 investigation based on what was provided; however, the individual is being processed out of the US Army on other, non-intelligence related violations.

(4) (U) On 21 November 2005, the USAREUR G2X queried the TFF Intelligence Oversight Officer (IOO) regarding their IO training. They discovered that although an IOO had been appointed, no IO training was provided during that rotation. USAREUR G2X provided TFF with 'train the trainer' assistance to include: providing an update on AR 381-10, USAREUR's IO briefing, and advice as how to run an effective IO program. USAREUR G2 ensured the IO was included in their quarterly Staff Assistance Visits (SAV) to Kosovo. IO training was also added to the USAREUR checklist certifying units for deployment to the Balkans. 28 September 2006, USAREUR G2X briefed the incoming KFOR J2 and G2 on their IO responsibilities and specifically addressed these allegations as a teaching point. DAIG-IO considers this issue resolved from an IO perspective and anticipates no further action regarding this case.
STATUS: Closed

d. (U) DAIG-06-009 & 06-019

(1) (U) Background – 3 February 2006 and 3 May 2006 respectively, this office reported multiple incidents of possible QIA regarding information collected and reported as Threat and Local Observation Notices (TALON) by elements of the 902d MIG, INSCOM. In one instance, a 902d MIG SA with duty at the Joint Terrorism Task Force, Miami, Florida, inappropriately collected and reported as a TALON information about plans for a USP organization to exercise its constitutional freedoms of assembly and speech. The report, which never indicated any foreign nexus, was reported through the 902d MIG to the DoD CI Field Activity (CIFA) for analysis and inclusion in a database. In a second instance, an April 2006 Wall Street Journal article alleged that officials from the 902d MIG collected and disseminated information concerning Quaker Church participants in a March 2005 anti-war protest in Akron, Ohio. Specifically, the article alleged that the 902d MIG had spent weeks downloading information from "activist" web sites, cross-referenced the information with information in police data-bases, and provided a written alert to the Akron Police Department that said, "even though these demonstrations are advertised as peaceful, they are assessed to present a potential force protection threat." The article further alleged that the written alert, "prompted the Akron Police

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to follow the Quaker-organized rally. Also, the article said that the Akron protest was one of seven monitored by the Army that month that turned out to be non-violent, and that the 902d MIG produced reports on the seven other protests and used "data-analysis techniques to look for signs of hidden coordination between the protests." Both references said that the INSCOM Commander had directed a special IG inquiry into the Command's participation in the TALON program.

(2) (U) On 7 September 2007, this office intended to close the QIA reported above. INSCOM had concluded its investigation into both matters. The INSCOM closure of both stated that, "After the INSCOM Inspector General preliminary analysis of the TALON issue IAW AR 20-1, the INSCOM Command Group determined that there were no substantiated allegations of impropriety against individuals in the violations of law, regulation or policy. DoD issued clarifying guidance that INSCOM implemented. Subsequently the Secretary of Defense has announced the cancellation of the report on TALON that concluded, 'the TALON reports were generated for law enforcement and force protection purposes, as permitted under DOD Directive 5200.27.' This case is closed."

(3) (U) Upon conferring with the Army's OGC, this office requested additional information from INSCOM on 19 October 2007 to enable resolution of alleged QIAs. Specifically, INSCOM was requested to provide findings from the special INSCOM IG inspection of TALON reporting and related actions taken to mitigate likelihood of similar future QIAs.

(4) (U) 19 November 2007, INSCOM responded to the request for additional information/clarification.

(a) (U) The memorandum outlined the scope and method for the special inspection. The inspectors were tasked to review TALON reporting in INSCOM to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the existing program, provide a detailed assessment of 902d MIG compliance with TALON regulations, policies and procedures, and determine if there was a void and/or conflict in TALON guidance from INSCOM or higher headquarters. To conduct the inspection, the INSCOM principal IG and one additional inspector contacted Soldiers and civilians at six locations including Headquarters, INSCOM, Fort Belvoir; 902d MIG headquarters and operational elements, Fort Meade; and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Washington, DC, Atlanta and Miami. Individual interviews were conducted with commanders, Soldiers, civilian CI agents, and operations officers. Also, the inspectors reviewed all applicable DoD, Army, INSCOM, and subordinate unit TALON directives, guidance, and policies.

(b) (U) The special inspection team observed that TALON reporting in INSCOM was almost exclusively limited to reporting from the 902d MIG. The TALON system was easy to use and a convenient tool to rapidly report and disseminate information. It was perceived by all users as a useful way to disseminate information to other DoD customers who might be under a particular threat. A weakness in the TALON system was that it had no mechanism for providing feedback to reporters. Also, the team noted that the objective of rapid reporting in the TALON system created a tension between rapid information and accurate information. The team further noted that the 902d MIG was largely in compliance with the TALON reporting system and there was no indication of systemic violation of any Army regulations or TALON policy. There were however, different interpretations of the intent and thrust of DoD level TALON guidance. Finally,

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the inspectors determined that Soldiers and civilians at all levels in the 902d MIG kept TALON reporting guidance readily available at their work stations and all those interviewed felt that they were familiar with intelligence reporting restrictions concerning the collection, retention, and dissemination of USP information.

(c) (U) The 902d MIG commander took the following actions to mitigate future potential QIAs: He issued specific guidance to TALON collection of USPs with regard to anti-war protests/demonstrations. He caused the command to analyze 902d TALON reports used to support a Northern Command threat briefing and determined that all met the basic TALON collection criteria. He also directed the command to conduct specific intelligence oversight training related to USP information tailored to TALON collection and retention. Lastly, in January 2006, the commander directed that the 902d MIG TALON database be taken off-line and any TALON data retained be transferred to CIFA.

(d) (U) Based on the observations of the special inspection team and a 902d MIG commander's inquiry into TALON, INSCOM concluded that no individual improperly violated laws, regulations, or policies while conducting TALON reporting.

(5) (U) TALON reporting was terminated in September 2007 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This office considers this matter to be closed from an IO perspective. **STATUS: Closed.**

e. (U) DAIG-06-022:

(1) (U) Background – 5 June 2006, DAIG-IO received numerous allegations of QIAs concerning unit members of the 101st Airborne Division (101st Abn Div) and 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) who were operating in Iraq at that time. [Note: At the time of the alleged incidents, elements of the 4th ID were task organized as a subordinate element of the 101st Abn Div.] The QIA allegations were described by numerous Soldiers in sworn and un-sworn statements and forwarded to DAIG-IO by a G2 staff officer from the 101st Abn Div.

(2) (U) The following allegations were outlined against the [REDACTED] Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (B/1/187th), 101st Abn Div, Forward Operating Base (FOB)-Summerall; [REDACTED] B/1/187th; the [REDACTED] 1/187th; and an unspecified member of B/1/187th:

(a) (U) The [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] conducted unauthorized source operations in possible violation of AR 381-172 and the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-Umbrella Concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations.

(b) (U) The [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] inappropriately detained sources under control of a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT), ordered the sources to cease contact with the THT, and ordered the sources to submit to the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] control for future intelligence activities, in possible violation of AR 381-172, OIF-Umbrella Concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations, FM 34-52, AR 190-8, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Policy #05-02 (Interrogation Policy), Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) Concept of Operations (CONOP) for Combined MNF-I, and Iraqi Intelligence Interrogation Operations.

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(c) (U) The [redacted] and [redacted] coerced/threatened their unauthorized sources to falsify sworn statements used to justify the apprehension of local/foreign nationals (L/FN), in possible violation of AR 381-172 and OIF-Umbrella Concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations.

(d) (U) An unspecified member of B/1/187th stole a passport and identification card of a L/FN and then used it as collateral to coerce the L/FN to serve as an (unauthorized) source, in possible violation of AR 381-172 and OIF-Umbrella Concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations.

(e) (U) The [redacted] and [redacted] conducted unauthorized detention and interrogation operations/activities in possible violation of FM 34-52, AR 190-8, MNF-I Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy), MND-N CONOP for Combined MNF-I, and Iraqi Intelligence Interrogation Operations.

(f) (U) Unspecified members of B/1/187th assaulted persons under US control, while they were being coerced to serve the [redacted] and [redacted] as intelligence sources [see paragraph 4.e.(2)(b) above], in possible violation of AR 190-8, FM 34-52, AR 381-172, OIF-Umbrella concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations, Article 83 (Cruelty and Maltreatment), and Article 128 (Assault), UCMJ.

(g) (U) The [redacted] failed to report and appropriately resolve allegations of QIAs [outlined in 4.e.(2)(a - f) above], in possible violation of procedure 14 (Employee Conduct), AR 381-10.

(3) (U) The following allegations were outlined against the [redacted] 2nd Battalion, 9th Cavalry Squadron (2/9th Cav), 4th ID, FOB-Wilson; the [redacted] 2/9th Cav; an [redacted] Category-II, Titan Corp, 2/9th Cav; the [redacted] THT 676, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Abn Div, in direct support of 2/9th Cav on FOB-Wilson; and a Specialist, Team Member, THT 676:

(a) (U) On numerous occasions, an [redacted] interrogated L/FNs in US custody without the presence/participation of a trained US interrogator or MI officer, in possible violation of MNF-I Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy), MND-N CONOP for Combined MNF-I, and Iraqi Intelligence Interrogation Operations.

(b) (U) On at least one occasion, an [redacted] and an Iraqi Army officer interrogated a L/FN in US custody, without the presence of a US interrogator or MI officer, in possible violation of MNF-I Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy), MND-N CONOP for Combined MNF-I, and Iraqi Intelligence Interrogation Operations.

(c) (U) The [redacted] directed the [redacted] to interrogate a L/FN in US custody, without the presence of a trained US interrogator or MI officer, in possible violation of MNF-I Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy), MND-N CONOP for Combined MNF-I, and Iraqi Intelligence Interrogation Operations.

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(d) (U) The [REDACTED] directed the [REDACTED] to interrogate a U/FN in US custody, without the presence of a trained US interrogator or MI officer, in possible violation of MNF-I Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy), MND-N CONOP for Combined MNF-I, and Iraqi Intelligence Interrogation Operations.

(e) (U) The [REDACTED] and/or other members of THT676, used unapproved interrogation techniques during interrogations at FOB-Wilson, in possible violation of MNF-I Policy 05-02 (Interrogation Policy).

(f) (U) The [REDACTED] and/or other members of THT676, falsified interrogation reports when they intentionally omitted their use of unapproved interrogation techniques and knowingly reported the wrong interrogation approach (direct versus fear-up approach), in possible violation of procedure 14 (Employee Conduct) of AR 381-10 and Article 107 (False Official Statement), UCMJ.

(g) (U) The [REDACTED] failed to report the QIAs outlined in paragraph 4.e.(3)(e - f) (above), in violation of procedure 14 (Employee Conduct) of AR 381-10.

(4) (U) 20 June 2006, DAIG-IO received the following additional allegations of QIA from the G2-CI, 101st Abn Div:

(a) (U) [REDACTED] B/1/187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd BCT, 101st Abn Div., FOB-Summerall, Iraq conducted unauthorized source operations that may have caused the death of one source, in possible violation of AR 381-172 (S//NF), FM 34-5 (S//NF), and OIF Umbrella Concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) (S//NF).

(b) [REDACTED]

(c) (U) A THT, B/1/187th, FOB-Summerall, conducted an authorized source operation that may have caused the death of a source, in violation of AR 381-172 (S//NF), FM 34-5 (S//NF), and OIF Umbrella Concept for CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO) (S//NF).

(5) (U) The 101st Abn Div G2 staff officer also provided these allegations to CID special agents in Iraq. CID did not investigate and referred the allegations to an in-theater IG. On 9 June 2006, DAIG-IO referred the first set of IO allegations to MNC-I IG for resolution. MNC-I IG further referred the IO allegations to the IG, MND-N (Forward) for inquiry/investigation and reporting. On 21 June 2006, DAIG-IO requested The Inspector General (TIG) release the additional allegations to the 101st Abn Div IG via the MNC-I IG for further investigation. 29 June 2006, DAIG-IO notified USCINCCENT of the new allegations needing resolution. 11 October 2006, DAIG-IO formally referred the allegations against OD-A 386 to USASOC for their resolution.

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(6) (U) In addition to the allegations of QIA outlined above, the sworn and un-sworn statements contain allegations of criminal activity and/or other non-IO related misconduct by members of the 101st Abn and 4th ID. The criminal and non-IO related allegations were forwarded to the Assistance Division of the US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-AC) for their action, oversight, and/or referral, as appropriate. The 101st Abn G2 staff officer also reported the non-IO related allegations to CID in Iraq. CID also referred those allegations to an in-theater IG. The criminal and non-IO related allegations included allegations of reprisal, acts of animal cruelty, and theft.

(7) (U) 19 December 2006, 101st Abn Div IG provided DAIG-IO with the results of their 15-6 investigation into the previously mentioned allegations. Only five of the allegations listed above were substantiated in their report, excluding the USASOC related allegation. The substantiated allegations were: 4.e.(2)(a), (b), (f) & (g), and 4.e.(4)(c). As a result of the investigating officer's substantiated findings, the [redacted] of the 101st Abn Div issued letters of reprimand to four officers. The officers were then directed to publish a "Company and Battalion Commanders Handbook and Guide to HUMINT Operations consistent with the recently published FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, September 2006." The Division G2, who was not a subject in the command investigation, supervised the handbook project. The [redacted] also directed improvements to training and coordination activities to prevent future incidents.

(8) [redacted]

f. (U) DAIG-06-028:

(1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]


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(3) (U) In early January 2008, a DAIG-IO status inquiry caused the USASOC Army Compartmented Element (ACE) IG to initiate review of the completed investigation.

(4)



(5)



(6) (U) Update – No further action is anticipated. **STATUS: Closed.**

g. (U) DAIG-06-027:

(1)



(2) (U) Update – Per INSCOM's FY 08, 1st Quarter IO Activities Report dated 17 January 2008, the unit commander ordered an AR 15-8 investigation which substantiated the majority of the allegations. As a result, the commander issued a memorandum of proposed removal from civilian employment as a MICECP to the individual and submitted a memorandum for security clearance determination to the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF). Subsequently, the individual submitted a letter of resignation, and is no longer a federal employee as of 13 October 2007. Case closed. **STATUS: Closed.**

h. (U) DAIG-06-028:

(1) (U) Background – On 23 March 2006, the DoD IG received an anonymous complaint concerning an MI officer's alleged misconduct in the performance of his intelligence duties while he was assigned to the US Army TF in Kosovo. On 15 June 2006, the DoD IG

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
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referred the case to the US Army Inspector General Agency's (USAIGA) Assistance Division (DAIG-AC). On or about 17 July 2008, after notifying the DAIG-IO, DAIG-AC further referred the case to the TF IG for resolution (DAIG-AC case number: DIH-08-8182). According to the initial report, the officer allegedly misused his position as a TF MI officer and ICF custodian/agent to make personal trips monthly to Headquarters, USAREUR, Heidelberg, GM, under the possible guise of reconciling the ICF account with USAREUR. It was further alleged that the officer's supervisor would conceal the purpose of the trip(s) as official MI business.


(2) (U) Update – The TF has been directed to report its investigative results to DAIG-AC and DAIG-IO. DAIG-AC will also provide a copy of the investigative results to the DoD IG. A request for further update has been made to USAREUR by DAIG-AC and is expected at any time. STATUS: Open.

i. (U) DAIG-07-007:

(1)



(2)



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j. (U) DAIG-07-020:

(1) (U) **Background** - In April 2007, a CI SA assigned to Task Force (TF) Prowler, TF Falcon, 29th Infantry Division allegedly violated chapter 9 (Badge and Credential Program), AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 November 1993; and paragraph 15-4b. (Misrepresentation), AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007 by the actions outlined below:

(a) (U) The SA used his Installation Access Card (IAC) inappropriately to bring a category Two (CAT II) interpreter onto Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. The interpreter lost her KFOR badge while previously on leave in Serbia.

(b) (U) It was further alleged that the CI SA tried to assist the interpreter to get a new KFOR Identification Card (ID) the following day without proper approval or authority. Then, the agent misidentified the associated contract company, potentially to avoid detection of the lost KFOR ID and the potential consequences to the contractor by her employer.

(2) (U) **Update** - 19 February 2008, USAREUR G2X reported that TF Falcon had completed its command investigation into this issue and determined the following:

(a) (U) The SA admitted to the TF Falcon CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA) that he attempted to assist the interpreter gain access without proper authority and assisted the interpreter to fill out paperwork to get a new KFOR identification card.

(b) (U) The CI SA received a written counseling statement regarding failure to follow proper procedures with regards to the use of an IAC. In addition, the CI SA was reassigned alternate covering agent duties that would not allow interaction with either the contract interpreter's company or the place of duty where the interpreter was assigned. DAIG-IO considers this matter closed with no further action is anticipated. **STATUS: Closed.**

k. (U) DAIG-07-025:

(1) (U) **Background** - On 19 July 2007, DAIG-IO received a report of QIA from the USAREUR, G2X, Army Theater CI Coordinating Authority (ATCICA) via the ODCS G2. The report alleged that two Officers, one Warrant Officer, and one NCO assigned to Task Force Falcon's (TFF) CI Team conducted a CI investigation without proper authorization (a violation of paragraph 4-2, AR 381-20). TF Falcon is stationed at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. The subjects of this unauthorized investigation were US Citizens interpreters with US Secret Clearances employed by TFF. Sometime during June 2007, the subjects were detained at the border between Serbia and Kosovo on an unauthorized trip to Serbia to purchase a vehicle.

(a) (U) At 2345 Hours on the evening of the interpreters return to TFF, the TFF CI Team proceeded to the subjects' quarters and escorted the interpreters back to their office where the team commenced to interview each of them. All four of the interviews were conducted without approval of the 650th MI Group's Sub Control Office (SCO) (their serving entity) and without reading the subjects their rights. Upon completing the investigation, the team's Special Agent In Charge (SAIC) drafted an unclassified memorandum outlining their

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actions and forwarded it to the TFF G2. Once the 650th SCO was made aware of the incident, the SCO requested that the team provide a copy of the memorandum for their review. The SCO made the decision that there were no indicators of espionage and did not open this case.


(b) (U) The results were referred back to the contract coordinators office for action. The interpreters that were involved were counseled IAW their contracts and warned that unauthorized travel could cause their employment to be terminated.

(c) (U) The TFCICA visited USAREUR HQ shortly after this incident and was counseled regarding the conduct of the subject interviews without SCO approval and appropriate procedures to open CI investigations. USAREUR G2X also had several telephonic conversations with the TFF G2 on ensuring that they were aware that investigations are required to be forwarded to the SCO for assessment. TFF made a decision not to take action.

(2) (U) Update – The individuals involved in this incident rotated back to home station shortly after this incident occurred. The TFF command took no corrective action with regards to this incident. In light of this, USAREUR ATCICA in conjunction with the 650th MIG's SCO developed a weekly activities report, which TFF is required to submit to both offices. In addition, USAREUR G2X now requires incoming Task Forces to copy both the SCO and the ATCICA on all communications to alleviate duplicative efforts as well as to clearly define any and all direction given to the TF. Additionally, the incoming TF drafted new SOPs and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) covering CI operations in theater to clearly define their roles and reporting procedures. DAIG-IO submits this final report UP AR 381-10 and AR 381-20 and considers this case closed. STATUS: Closed.

I. (U) DAIG-08-001:

(1)



(2) (U) DAIG-IO noted a lack of clarity with regard to approval authority policy and standard operating procedure for US Army Intelligence organizations, other than INSCOM and the 650th MIG, to obtain NAIA, as currently outlined IAW AR 381-10 and the classified memo mentioned above. Additionally, there appears to be an ability for Army Intelligence organizations to obtain NAIA through the DNI CIO's browsing service, which may conflict with required approvals in documents referenced above. DAIG-IO recommended that the ODCS G2 examine the existing policy guidance for obtaining NAIA to ensure consistency and clarity and provide a report of findings. This action was completed 17 December 2007.

(3) (U) Update – This office is awaiting the results of the USAREUR 15-8 investigation into this matter in order to close this case. USAREUR plans to take the following corrective actions to resolve the above-mentioned allegations:

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
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
(a) (U) Ascertain the extent of regulatory violations in addition to identifying the shortfalls and shortcomings of the current USAREUR NAIA policy.

(b) (U) Request reinstatement of NAIA approval authority to the USAREUR G2 as the Command's Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO).

(c) (U) No further NAIA access will be granted for USAREUR intelligence personnel unless it is granted IAW AR 381-10.


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(a) 

(b) 

(5) (U) A command investigation under the provisions of AR 15-6 is ongoing. A final report will be provided once the investigation is completed. STATUS: Open.

m. (U) DAIG-08-008:

(1) 

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(2) (U) Update – On 16 January 2008, DAIG-IO referred this issue to INSCOM to take appropriate action in order to facilitate an Army response to the Member of Congress. INSCOM is currently conducting a command investigation into this issue. STATUS: Open.

n. (U) DAIG-08-008:

(1) (U) Background – 30 November 2007, Third Army / U.S. Army Central – Area Support Group Qatar (ASG-QA) reported allegations of QIA by a CI SA assigned to the CI Resident Office (RO), ASG-QA. DAIG-IO in a Confidential//NOFORN memorandum, subject: Initial/Final Report of Questionable Intelligence Activity, Procedure 15, AR 381-10 (DAIG-07-019) (U), 12 July 2007, reported earlier allegations against the same SA which were investigated by ASG-QA under the provisions of AR 15-6 and found to be unsubstantiated. 30 November 2007, the Commander ASG-QA initiated a second investigation to address new allegations of QIA UP AR 15-6.

(2) (U) On 28 January 2008, only 8 of 19 allegations made against the SA and two of her subordinates were substantiated. The substantiated allegations are as follows:

(a) (U) Improper handling of classified and sensitive information in violation of chapters 4, 6, and 7 of AR 380-5.

(b) (U) Improper use of badge and credentials in violation of chapter 9, AR 381-20.

(c) (U) Unauthorized use of personal media/storage devices on government computers in violation of paragraphs 4 and 5 of AR 25-2.

(d) (U) Improper collection and retention of US person information in violation of chapters 2 and 3 of AR 381-10.

(e) (U) Improper conduct of CI investigations in violation of chapter 4 of AR 381-20.

(f) (U) Potential compromise of ongoing investigations in violation of chapter 4 of AR 381-20.

(g) (U) Improperly confiscated and/or searched US mail in violation of chapter 8 of AR 381-10.

(h) (U) Management controls for the proper administration of Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) were not established or employed in accordance with paragraph 3-1 of AR 381-141.

(3) (U) On 18 March 2008, the following corrective actions were directed by ARCENT:

(a) (U) The SA received an Article 15 and Punitive Reprimand from the Deputy Commanding General, was removed from access to classified information and her security clearance was suspended, and she was also relieved of duties and sent out of theater.

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(b) (U) The findings directed against the former NCOIC of ASG-QA's CI section were forwarded to that Soldier's chain of command with recommendations for action as appropriate.


(c) (U) The current NCOIC was counseled on his duty to recognize, report, and correct QIAs; and the following privileges were temporarily revoked for all CI personnel assigned to ASG-QA: traveling off-post, use of tactical vehicles, wear of civilian clothes, and access to off-post housing.

(d) (U) An S2X position has been created to provide: intelligence oversight, accounting, and training to the ASG-QA CI section; current revision of CI Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); and development of training covering ARs 381-10, 12, and 20 is in process in conjunction with ARCENT G2X and consistent with the 15-6 investigation's findings and recommendations.


(4) (U) Update – The matter is considered resolved with no further action is anticipated. STATUS: Closed.

5. (U) OTHER INVESTIGATIONS: The below listed QIAs are part of CI or Criminal investigations by Army Counterintelligence Coordinating Activity (ACICA) or the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), respectively. IAW paragraph 15-2.e., AR 381-10, DAIG-IO will provide updates on the following cases once they are closed.


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
b.



c.



d.



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[REDACTED]

e. (U) DAIG-08-002: On 12 October 2007, DAIG-IO received a report of QIA from the INSCOM IG. The INSCOM report provided information with regard to alleged federal criminal activity by an Intelligence Soldier (97E-Interrogator) assigned to Force Protection Detachment - Columbia. On or about 7 September 2007, a female Colombian citizen reportedly filed an official complaint of statutory rape against the Soldier. The 470th MIB opened an AR 15-6 investigation on 6 October 2007 and informed the Fort Sam Houston Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the alleged incident. CID opened an investigation (# 0344-2007-CID044) on 11 October 2007. The 470th suspended its AR 15-6 investigation pending the results of the CID investigation. The Soldier was recalled to Fort Sam Houston, TX by the 470th MIB. Upon review of the initial 470th MIB report, INSCOM Staff Judge Advocate determined that allegations may violate UCMJ Articles 120 (Carnal Knowledge) and 134 (Indecent Assault). ODCS G2 and INSCOM will submit a final report upon completion of the CID investigation and the Command's review of those findings. STATUS: Open.

6. (U) INSPECTIONS: During the 2nd Quarter, DAIG-IO conducted inspections of Army elements located in North Carolina during the period of 2-12 February 2008. No significant IO violations were discovered; inspection results have been forwarded to the ACOM IG offices of the units that were inspected.

7. (U) IO PROGRAM CHANGES: Nothing Significant to Report (NSTR).

8. (U) ITEMS OF INTEREST: NSTR.

9. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT: [REDACTED] NIPRNET:
 [REDACTED] or SIPRNET: [REDACTED]
 and [REDACTED] NIPRNET: [REDACTED] or
 SIPRNET: [REDACTED]


 ALAN W. THRASHER
 Major General, USA
 Deputy The Inspector General

Encl
 as

CF:
 DCS G2
 OTJAG



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON, DC

FEB 15 2002


MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight (IO), 1st Quarter, FY02

Between 1 Oct 01 and 31 Dec 01, Air Education and Training Command, Air Force Space Command, and Pacific Air Forces conducted a total of three reviews of USAF activities as outlined in the USAF IO report (Atch 1). No units were rated "Unsatisfactory". There were no illegal activities or violations of IO policy discovered during these inspections/reviews.

In addition, all MAJCOM, FOA, and DRUs reported end of year inspection status for all units and staffs for which they have intelligence oversight and inspection requirements. All MAJCOM, FOA, and DRU IO units accomplished either a formal IO inspection or accomplished a self-inspection per attachment 3 of AFI 13-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*. There were no illegal activities or violations of IO policy discovered during these inspections/reviews.


RAYMOND P. HUOT
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

982

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT

TO THE

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Oct 01 - 31 Dec 01)

1. There was no significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period other than the inspections reported below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R.
3. Three USAF Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections were conducted during this quarter. Inspection results follow:

a. Headquarters Air Combat Command Inspector General (HQ ACC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter. NOTE: Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency (HQ AIA) now reports results under HQ ACC.

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted one intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
162 FW (ANG), Tucson, AZ	SAT

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

e. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

f. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted one intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
30 SW, Vandenberg AFB, CA	SAT

h. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

i. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted one intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
154 WG, Hickam AFB, HI	SAT

j. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

4. The following is a list by MAJCOM/FOA/DRU of Air Force units that are scheduled for inspection for compliance with IO during the Jan - Mar 02 period:

a. HQ ACC plans to conduct one inspection:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
49 FW, Holloman AFB, NM

b. HQ AETC plans to conduct two inspections:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
97 AMW, Altus AFB, OK
17 TRW, Goodfellow AFB, TX

c. HQ AFMC plans to conduct one inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OK

d. HQ AFOSI: no inspections planned.

e. HQ AFRC: no inspections planned.

f. HQ AFSOC: no inspections planned.

g. HQ AFSPC plans to conduct one inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
91 SW, Minot AFB, ND

h. HQ AMC plans to conduct one inspection.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
126 ARW, Scott AFB, IL

i. HQ PACAF: no inspections planned.

j. HQ USAFE: no inspections planned.

5. All MAJCOM, FOA, and DRUs reported positive accomplishment of an IO self-inspection for all units that did not receive either an IG or functional staff inspection during calendar year 2001. No violations were discovered during the self-inspections.

//signed//

SAF/IG

//signed//

HQ USAF/XOI

//signed//

SAF/GC



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON DC

MAY 24 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board, 2nd Quarter, FY01

Between 1 Jan 01 and 31 Mar 01, Air Combat Command, Air Force Materiel Command, AFOSI, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Space Command, and Air Intelligence Agency conducted a total of 54 reviews of USAF activities as outlined in the USAF IO report (Atch 1). No units were rated "Unsatisfactory". There were no illegal activities or violation of IO policy discovered during these inspections/reviews.

//Signed//

RAYMOND P. HUOT
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

986

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT

TO THE

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Jan 01- 31 Mar 01)

1. There were no significant intelligence oversight activities in the reporting period other than the inspections reported below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R.
3. Fifty-four USAF Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections were conducted during this quarter. Inspection results follow:

a. Headquarters Air Combat Command Inspector General (HQ ACC) conducted three inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
SEADS, Tyndall AFB, FL	SAT
144 FW, Fresno, CA	SAT
110 FW, Battle Creek, MI	SAT

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
SMC/IN, Los Angeles AFB, CA	SAT
OC-ALC/IN, Tinker AFB, OK	SAT

d. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted forty-three intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
AFOSI Region 4, Randolph AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 405, Maxwell AFB, AL	SAT
AFOSI Det 407 Kessler AFB, MS	SAT
AFOSI Det 409, Lackland AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 411, Sheppard AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 419, Tyndall AFB, FL	SAT
AFOSI Det 426, New York, NY	SAT
AFOSI Det 427, Little Rock AFB, AR	SAT

AFOSI Det 252 (AST), Lackland AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 401, Randolph AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 406, Columbus AFB, MS	SAT
AFOSI Det 408, Goodfellow AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 410, Laughlin AFB, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 411 OLA, Vance AFB, OK	SAT
AFOSI Det 421, Luke AFB, AZ	SAT
AFOSI Det 422, Altus AFB, OK	SAT
AFOSI Det 428, HQ AIA, TX	SAT
AFOSI Region 5, Ramstein AB, GE	SAT
AFOSI Det 502, Sembach AB, GE	SAT
AFOSI 51 FIS OL-A, Bonn, GE	SAT
AFOSI 51 FIS OL-D, Berlin, GE	SAT
AFOSI Det 512 OLA, Mildenhall, UK	SAT
AFOSI Det 515, Ramstein AB, GE	SAT
AFOSI Det 517, Vaihingen, GE	SAT
AFOSI Det 518, OL-A, Cheves, BE	SAT
AFOSI Det 521, Ankara, TU	SAT
AFOSI 53 FIS, Naples, IT	SAT
AFOSI 53 FIS OL-A, Moron AB, SP	SAT
AFOSI Det 531, Aviano AB, IT	SAT
AFOSI Det 501, PSD Ramstein AB, GE	SAT
AFOSI 51 FIS, RAF Mildenhall, UK	SAT
AFOSI 51 FIS, OL-C, London, UK	SAT
AFOSI Det 512, Lakenheath, UK	SAT
AFOSI Det 514, Alconbury, UK	SAT
AFOSI Det 515 OL-A, Rhein Main AB, GE	SAT
AFOSI Det 518, Spangdahlem AB, GE	SAT
AFOSI Det 522, Incirlik AB, TU	SAT
AFOSI Det 523, Izmir, TU	SAT
AFOSI Det 535, Rome IT	SAT
AFOSI Det 536, Athens GR	SAT
AFOSI 53 FIS OL-B, Naples, IT	SAT
AFOSI Det 538, Paris, FR	SAT

e. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
940 th ARW, Beale AFB	SAT
315 th AW, Charleston AFB	SAT

f. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted one intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
50 Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO	SAT

h. Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency (HQ AIA) conducted three intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
690 th Intel Sq, Kadena AB, Japan	SAT
315 th Intel Sq, Yokota AB, Japan	SAT
20 th Intel Sq, Offutt AFB, NE	SAT

i. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

j. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

k. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no intelligence oversight this quarter.

4. The following is a list by MAJCOM of Air Force units that are scheduled for inspection for compliance with IO during the Apr 01- Jun 01 period:

a. HQ ACC plans to conduct six inspections:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
102 FW, Cape Cod, MA
552 ACW, Tinker AFB, OK
111 ASOC, Tacoma, WA
142 FW, Portland, OR
106 RQW, Gabreski, NY
104 FW, Westfield, MA

b. HQ AETC: no inspections planned.

c. HQ AFMC plans to conduct one inspection:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
AEDC/IN, Arnold AFB, TN

d. HQ OSI: no inspections planned.

e. HQ AFRC plans to conduct four inspections.

UNIT/LOCATION

419th FW, Hill AFB

944th FW, Luke AFB

434th ARW, Grissom ARB

919th SOW, Eglin Aux 3

f. HQ AFSOC: no inspections planned.

g. HQ AFSPC plans to conduct two inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

90 Space Wing, FE Warren AFB, WY

341st Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB, MT

h. HQ AIA plans to conduct eleven inspections

UNIT/LOCATION

480th Intel Group

27th Intel Squadron

36th Intel Squadron

690th Information Operations Group

690th Intelligence Support Squadron

690th Communications Support Squadron

690th Support Squadron

668th Logistics Squadron

485th Intelligence Squadron

Det 2, 26th Information Operations Group

39th Information Operations Squadron

i. HQ AMC plans to conduct two inspections.

UNIT/LOCATION

186th ARW, Key Field (Meridian, MS)

121st ARW Rickenbacker ANGB, OH

j. HQ PACAF plans to conduct four inspections.

UNIT/LOCATION

168th Wing (Guard), Alaska

154th Wing (Guard), Hawaii

36th ABW, Anderson AFB, Guam

486th CTS, Singapore

k. HQ USAFE: no inspections planned.

//Signed//

SAF/JG

//Signed//

HQ USAF/XOI

//Signed//

SAF/GC



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON DC


AUG 07 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board, 3rd Quarter, FY01

Between 1 Apr 01 and 30 Jun 01, Air Combat Command, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Space Command, Air Intelligence Agency, and Air Mobility Command conducted a total of 23 reviews of USAF activities as outlined in the USAF IO report (Atch 1). No units were rated "Unsatisfactory". There were no illegal activities or violation of IO policy discovered during these inspections/reviews.


RAYMOND P. HUOT
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT
TO THE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Apr 01- 30 Jun 01)

1. There were no significant intelligence oversight activities in the reporting period other than the inspections reported below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R.
3. Twenty-three USAF Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections were conducted during this quarter. Inspection results follow:

a. Headquarters Air Combat Command Inspector General (HQ ACC) conducted six inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
102 FW, Cape Cod, MA	SAT
552 ACW, Tinker AFB, OK	SAT
111 ASOC, Tacoma, WA	SAT
142 FW, Portland, OR	SAT
106 RQW, Gabreski, NY	SAT
104 FW, Westfield, MA	SAT

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

d. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

e. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted four intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
419 th FW, Hill AFB, UT	SAT
944 th FW, Luke AFB, AZ	SAT
434 th ARW, Grissom ARB, IN	SAT
919 th SOW, Eglin Aux 3, FL	SAT

f. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
90 th Space Wing, F. E. Warren AFB, WY	SAT
341 st Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB, MT	SAT

h. Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency (HQ AIA) conducted nine intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
480 th IG, Langley AFB, VA	SAT
27 th IS, Langley AFB, VA	SAT
36 th IS, Langley AFB, VA	SAT
690 th IOG, Kelly AFB, TX	SAT
690 th ISS, Kelly AFB, TX	SAT
690 th CSS, Kelly AFB, TX	SAT
690 th SS, Kelly AFB, TX	SAT
668 th LS, Kelly AFB, TX	SAT
485 th IS, Mainz-Kastel, GE	SAT

i. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
186 th ARW, Key Field, MS	SAT
121 st ARW, Rickenbacker ANGB, OH	SAT

j. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

k. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

4. The following is a list by MAJCOM of Air Force units that are scheduled for inspection for compliance with IO during the Jun 01- Sep 01 period:

a. HQ ACC plans to conduct three inspections:

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>
2 nd BW, Barksdale AFB, LA
366 th WG, Mountain Home, ID
49 th FW, Holloman AFB, NM

- b. HQ AETC: no inspections planned.
- c. HQ AFMC: no inspections planned.
- d. HQ OSI: no inspections planned.
- e. HQ AFRC plans to conduct three inspections.

UNIT/LOCATION

452nd AMW, March AFB, CA
932nd AW, Scott AFB, IL
910th AW, Youngstown ARB, OH

- f. HQ AFSOC plans to conduct one inspection.

UNIT/LOCATION

353rd Special Ops Group, Kadena AB, JA

- g. HQ AFSPC plans to conduct one inspection.

UNIT/LOCATION

21st Space Wing, Peterson AFB, CO

- h. HQ AIA plans to conduct three inspections.

UNIT/LOCATION

Det 2, 26th Intelligence Group
31st Intelligence Group
39th Intelligence Squadron

- i. HQ AMC: no inspections planned.
- j. HQ PACAF plans to conduct three inspections.

UNIT/LOCATION

154th Wing (Guard), Hawaii
36th ABW, Anderson AFB, Guam
486th CTS, Singapore

- k. HQ USAFE: no inspections planned.

James M. ... 2 Aug 01
SAF/G

Dan R. Goodrich, Brig Gen
HQ USAF/XOI

W. Kipley ... 4 Sep 01
SAF/GC



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
WASHINGTON, DC


APR 24 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight (IO), 2nd Quarter, FY02

Between 1 Jan 02 and 31 Mar 02, Air Combat Command, Air Education and Training Command, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Space Command, Air Mobility Command and HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations conducted a total of twenty-three reviews of USAF activities as outlined in the USAF IO report (Ateh 1). No units were rated "Unsatisfactory". There were no illegal activities or violations of IO policy discovered during these inspections/reviews.



RAYMOND P. HUOT
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT
TO THE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Jan - 31 Mar 02)

1. There was no significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period other than the inspections reported below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R.
3. Twenty-three USAF Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections were conducted during this quarter. Inspection results follow:

a. Headquarters Air Combat Command Inspector General (HQ ACC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter. NOTE: Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency (HQ AIA) now reports results under HQ ACC.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
49 FW, Holloman AFB, NM	SAT
451 IOS, Menwith Hill, UK	SAT

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted one intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
17 TRW, Goodfellow AFB, TX	SAT

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
911 AW, Pittsburgh ARB, OH	SAT
507 ARW, Tinker AFB, OK	SAT

e. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

f. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted 15 intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
AFOSI Det 101, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH	SAT
AFOSI Det 102/OL-F, Indianapolis, IN	SAT
AFOSI Region I HQ, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH	SAT
AFOSI Region 7/OL-B, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH	SAT
AFOSI Region 7/OL-C, Las Vegas, NV	SAT
AFOSI Region 7/OL-E, Langley AFB, VA	SAT
AFOSI Region 7/OL-F, Robins AFB, GA	SAT
AFOSI Region 7/OL-G, Arlington, TX	SAT
AFOSI Det 701, Las Vegas, NV	SAT
AFOSI Det 702, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH	SAT
AFOSI Det 703, Eglin AFB, FL	SAT
AFOSI Det 704, Hanscom AFB, MA	SAT
AFOSI Det 705, Albuquerque, NM	SAT
AFOSI Det 706, Washington D.C.	SAT
AFOSI Det 707, Lancaster, CA	SAT

g. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted one intelligence oversight inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
91 SW, Minot AFB, ND	SAT

h. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted two intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT/LOCATION</u>	<u>RATING</u>
126 ARW (ANG), Scott AFB, IL	SAT
134 ARW (ANG), Knoxville, TN	SAT

i. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

j. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no intelligence oversight inspections this quarter.

4. The following is a list by MAJCOM/FOA/DRU of Air Force units that are scheduled for inspection for compliance with IO during the Apr - Jun 02 period:

a. HQ ACC plans to conduct four inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

169 ASOS/182 ASOC, Peoria, IL
AFIWC, Lackland AFB, TX
692 IOG, Hickam AFB, HI
324 IS, Kunia, HI

b. HQ AETC plans to conduct two inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

37 TRW, Lackland AFB, TX
173 FW (ANG), Klamath Falls, OR

c. HQ AFMC plans to conduct one inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

OO-ALC, Hill AFB, UT

d. HQ AFOSI plans to conduct twenty inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

AFOSI Region 3 HQ, Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI Region 3/OL-A, Hurlburt Field, FL
AFOSI Region 3/OL-B, Robins AFB, GA
AFOSI Region 3/OL-E, Arlington, VA
AFOSI Det 301, Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI Det 303, Travis AFB, CA
AFOSI Det 305, McChord AFB, WA
AFOSI Det 306, Dover AFB, DE
AFOSI Det 307, McGuire AFB, NJ
AFOSI Det 309, Hurlburt Field, FL
AFOSI Det 310, Charleston AFB, SC
AFOSI Det 320, Grand Forks AFB, ND
AFOSI Det 321, McConnell AFB, KS
AFOSI Det 322, Fairchild AFB, WA
AFOSI Det 323, MacDill AFB, FL
AFOSI Det 324, Pope AFB, NC
AFOSI 33 FIS, Andrews AFB, MD
AFOSI Det 331, Andrews AFB, MD
AFOSI Det 332, Bolling AFB, DC
AFOSI Det 333, Ft. Meade, MD

e. HQ AFRC plans to conduct seven inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

439 AW, Westover ARB, MA
HQ 10 AF/610 RSG, Carswell ARS, TX
939 RQW, Portland, OR
HQ AFRC, Robins AFB, GA
934 AW, Minn-St Paul, MN
931 ARG, McConnell AFB, KS
442 FW, Whiteman AFB, MO

f. HQ AFSOC: no inspections planned.

g. HQ AFSPC plans to conduct one inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

341 SW, Malmstrom AFB, MT

h. HQ AMC plans to conduct five inspections this quarter.

UNIT/LOCATION

436 AW, Dover AFB, DE
165 AW (ANG), Savannah, GA
143 AW (ANG), Quonset Point, RI
43 AW, Pope AFB, NC
101 ARW (ANG), Bangor, ME

i. HQ PACAF plans to conduct four inspections this quarter.

UNIT/LOCATION

8 FW, Kunsan AB, Korea
51 FW, Osan AB, Korea
18 WG, Kadena AB, Japan
354 FW, Eielson AFB, AK

j. HQ USAFE: no inspections planned.

//SIGNED//, 4/24/2002

Lt Gen Raymond P. Huot

SAF/IG

//SIGNED//, 5/7/2002

Brig Gen Dan Goodrich

HQ USAF/XOI

//SIGNED//, 5/17/2002

Ms. Mary L. Walker

SAF/GC



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC


MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight (IO), Oct - Dec 05

Between 1 Oct and 31 Dec 05, the Air Force conducted 43 Intelligence Oversight inspections. All inspections were deemed compliant. There were no illegal activities or violations of IO that met reporting criteria outlined in E.O. 12333 or DoD 5240.1-R. Inspection details may be found in the attached summary.

Additionally, between 1 Jan 05 and 31 Dec 05, the USAF conducted over 500 self-inspections per Air Force Instruction 14-104 on units not otherwise receiving a higher headquarters inspection. These self-inspections yielded no significant findings.


JEFFREY M. MUSFELDT
Major General, USAF
Deputy Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1002

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT

TO THE

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Oct – 31 Dec 05)

1. There was no significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period with the exception of the inspections noted below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R. The USAF conducted 43 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections during this quarter and a total of 130 inspections for calendar year 2005. All units were found to be in compliance with IO requirements. Units not receiving an inspection this calendar year by a MAJCOM inspection team or equivalent were also required by AFI 14-104 to complete a self-inspection by the year's end. As a result, 529 self-inspections were completed. These self-inspections yielded no significant findings. The inspected units for this quarter are listed below:

- a. Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) conducted nine IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

148 Fighter Wing, Duluth, MN
Det 2, 25 IOS, RAF Mildenhall, UK
68 Information Operations Squadron, Brooks-City Base, TX
Western Air Defense Sector (WADS)
Det 2, 25 Information Operations Squadron, RAF Mildenhall, UK
103 Fighter Wing, Granby, CT
70 Intelligence Wing, Fort Meade, MD*
26 Information Operations Group, Ramstein AB, GE*
115 Fighter Wing, Madison, WI

*Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

- b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

12 Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, TX
56 Flying Wing, Luke AFB, AZ
162 Flying Wing (ANG), Tucson, AZ

- c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

161 ARW (ANG), Phoenix, AZ
171 ARW (ANG), Pittsburgh, PA

- h. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

176 WG, Kulis ANGB, AK
18 WG, Kadena AB, Japan

Additionally, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for IO (ATSD (IO)) conducted inspections of the following units:

611 AIS, Elmendorf AFB, AK
3 WG, Elmendorf AFB, AK
354 FW, Eielson AFB, AK

- i. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

- j. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

352 SOG, RAF Mildenhall, UK

3. USAF plans to conduct 32 IO inspections during the Jan - Mar 06 period:

- a. HQ ACC has 7 inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

55 Electronic Combat Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
355 Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
27 Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, NM
728 Air Control Squadron, Eglin AFB, FL
169 Intelligence Squadron (UTANG), Salt Lake City, UT
480 Intelligence Wing, Langley AFB, VA*
116 Air Control Squadron, Warrenton, OR
*Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

- b. HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

- c. HQ AFMC has one inspection planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome Research Site, Rome, NY

UNIT/LOCATION

311 Human Systems Wing, Brooks City-Base, TX
OO-ALC/75 Air Base Wing, Hill AFB, UT

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

944 FW, Luke AFB, AZ
910 AW, Youngstown - Warren RPT, PA

e. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted 21 IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

Region 3 Staff, Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI Detachment 301, Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI Detachment 303, Travis AFB, CA
AFOSI Detachment 303/OL-B, Los Angeles, CA
AFOSI Detachment 305, McChord AFB, WA
AFOSI Detachment 306, Dover AFB, DE
AFOSI Detachment 307, McGuire AFB, NJ
AFOSI Detachment 309, Hurlburt AFB, FL
AFOSI Detachment 310, Charleston AFB, SC
AFOSI Detachment 311, Moody AFB, GA
AFOSI Detachment 320, Grand Forks AFB, ND
AFOSI Detachment 321, McConnell AFB, KS
AFOSI Detachment 322, Fairchild AFB, WA
AFOSI Detachment 323, MacDill AFB, FL
AFOSI Detachment 324, Pope AFB, NC
AFOSI Detachment 325, Robins AFB, GA
AFOSI 33 Field Investigations Squadron (FIS), Andrews AFB, MD
AFOSI Detachment 331, Andrews AFB, MD
AFOSI Detachment 332, Bolling AFB, DC
AFOSI Detachment 334, Washington, D.C.
AFOSI Detachment 352, Lackland AFB, TX

f. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

460 SW, Buckley AFB, CO

g. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

4. USAF has no suggestions for improving the IO program.

5. POC is Lt Col (b)(2),(b)(6) alternate is
SMSgt (b)(2),(b)(6)

// WJF P/W/10 //
SAF/IG

// signed-RFS 8 Feb 06 //
HQ USAF/A2

// MS Waller, 15 Feb 06
SAF/GC



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

AUG 23 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight, Apr – Jun 05

Between 1 Apr and 30 Jun 05, the Air Force conducted 29 Intelligence Oversight inspections. One unit (373 Intelligence Group, Misawa AB, Japan) was non-compliant for several issues ranging from training to IO knowledge. The unit leadership is actively engaged to correct all deficiencies. All other inspections were deemed compliant.

vr-

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steve Polk".

STEVEN R. POLK
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1007

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT

TO THE

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Apr - 30 Jun 05)

1. The Intelligence Oversight Panel (IOP) met at 0900, 6 May 05, in the SSO conference room (MC845A). Lt Gen Polk (SAF/IG; Chair) and Ms. Walker (SAF/GC) were present, and Mr. (b)(6) represented Maj Gen Sams (AF/XOI). Observers included Col (b)(6) (AF/JA), Mr. Kip At Lee (SAF/GCM), Col (b)(6) (SAF/IGX), Col T.J. Jones (SAF/IGQ), Mr. (b)(6) (SAF/GCM), Lt Col (b)(6) (SAF/IGI), Mr. (b)(6) (AF/XOIR), Capt (b)(6) (SAF/IGI), and SMSgt (b)(6) (SAF/IGQ).

a. Mr. (b)(6) ATSD(IO), provided a briefing on *IO in the Defense Department*.

b. Capt (b)(6) provided an update on the 56 IWF Issue:

During a unit compliance inspection of the 56 IWF, ACC inspectors identified a potentially reportable incident and forwarded the information to the National Security Agency (NSA), the Air Force Cryptologic Office (AFCO, liaison between USAF and NSA), and to SAF/GC. In response to the incident, NSA and AFCO agreed to conduct an investigation of the incident and provide an assessment to the panel. Panel members agreed to meet and discuss once the investigation was complete.

2. The IOP visited the Central Intelligence Agency for an orientation tour on 16 May 05. Lt Gen Polk (SAF/IG; Chair) and Ms. Walker (SAF/GC) were present. Observers included Brig Gen Loren Perlstein (AF/JA), Col (b)(6) (SAF/IGI), Mr. (b)(6) (SAF/GCM), and Mr. (b)(6) (AF/XOIR). Panel members and observers met with Mr. (b)(6) Director of Congressional Affairs; Mr. (b)(6) Inspector General; Mr. (b)(6) General Counsel; and Mr. (b)(6) Office of Military Affairs.

3. On 24 May 05, Ms. (b)(6) and MSgt (b)(6) (AFCO), briefed the panel on results of the 56 IWF investigation. Lt Gen Polk (SAF/IG; Chair) and Ms. Walker (SAF/GC) were present, and Brig Gen Kennedy represented Maj Gen Sams (AF/XOI). Observers included Mr. Kip At Lee (SAF/GCM), Col (b)(6) (SAF/IGQ), Col (b)(6) (SAF/IGI), Mr. (b)(6) (b)(6) (SAF/GCM), Mr. (b)(6) (AF/XOIR), Capt (b)(6) (SAF/IGI), and SMSgt (b)(6) (SAF/IGQ).

In short, the investigation team found that while there was mission and role confusion at the 56 IWF, which has since been addressed, the incident in question was a misunderstanding on the part of the ACC inspection team. No reportable activity occurred and ACC would modify the inspection report to reflect this analysis. Panel members agreed to defer judgment on this issue until all had an opportunity to analyze the investigation report and the amended inspection report.

4. USAF conducted 29 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections during the second quarter. Most units were in compliance with IO requirements. The inspected units and discrepancies noted are listed below:

a. Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) conducted 12 IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

1 ASOG/5 ASOS, Ft. Lewis, WA
95 RS, RAF Mildenhall, UK
488 IS, RAF Mildenhall, UK
25 IOS Det 2, RAF Mildenhall, UK
67 IWF, Scott AFB, IL
33 FW, Eglin AFB, FL
53 FW, Eglin AFB, FL
373 IG, Misawa AB, Japan*
373 SPTS Misawa AB, Japan
301 IS, Misawa AB, Japan
303 IS, Osan AB, Korea
128 ACS, Camp Douglas, WI

*The 373 IG was non-compliant with Intelligence Oversight requirements. Specifically, the unit lacked adequate IO training and documentation, lesson plans, required publications, and overall IO knowledge.

- Three percent of assigned personnel did not receive initial Intelligence Oversight training. Additionally, the Group had exempted 40 assigned non-Special Compartmented Information (SCI) indoctrinated personnel from required Intelligence Oversight training requirements. AFI 14-104 requires intelligence units to provide initial and annual refresher training to all military and civilian personnel assigned or attached on a permanent or temporary basis, regardless of specialty or job function. No waivers or exemptions for Intelligence Oversight training to non-SCI cleared Air Force personnel have been approved by HQ USAF/XOI.

- Initial and annual training did not cover the requirement concerning restrictions on collection of publicly available information by intelligence professionals acting in official capacity and certain restricted internet-based activities.

- The 373 IG did not maintain a current copy of AFI 11-104, dated 14 April 2005, or ensure it was available to group members.

- At least 75 percent of 373 IG personnel did not understand or are not aware of all applicable provisions of the Intelligence Oversight program. Thirty percent were not aware of specific procedures and restrictions governing the collection of intelligence on US persons by methods such as electronic surveillance. Twenty-four percent were not aware of the correct procedure governing reporting of Intelligence Oversight violations. Unit leadership is addressing all discrepancies.

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

CADRE/TN, Maxwell AFB, AL
325 OG, Tyndall AFB, FL

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

AAC/DN, Eglin AFB, FL

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

927 ARW, Selfridge ANGB, MI
919 SOW, Eglin AFB, FL

e. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted 10 IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

Region 7 Staff, Arlington, VA
Det 701, Las Vegas, NV
Det 702, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Det 703, Eglin AFB, FL
Det 704, Hanscom AFB, MA
Det 705, Kirtland AFB, NM
Det 706, Pentagon, DC
Det 707, Palmdale, CA
Det 708, Arlington, VA
Det 709, Arlington, TX

The only noted discrepancies were in relation to initial IO training and program familiarity. Two individuals either had failed to accomplish or document initial training within 15 days of arriving on station. The unit has since updated the instruction to allow for initial training to be accomplished within 45 days of arriving on station. The other discrepancy dealt with in-depth familiarity by some agents assigned to various Region 7 detachments. The discrepancies were noted and procedures were put in place to prevent future occurrences.

f. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

127 WG, Selfridge ANGB, MI
109 AW, Schenectady, NY

h. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

i. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

j. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

5. USAF plans to conduct 39 IO inspections during the Jul-Sep 05 period:

a. HQ ACC has eight inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

544 IOS, Peterson AFB, CO
NEADS, Rome AFS, NY
55 RW, Offutt AFB, NE
20 IS, Offutt AFB, NE
97 IS Group, Ramstein AB, Germany
26 IOG, Ramstein AB, Germany
26 IOG, Det 3, Ramstein AB, Germany
426 IS, Vogelweh AB, Germany

b. HQ AETC has one inspection planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

12 OSS, Randolph AFB, TX

c. HQ AFMC has one inspection planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OK

d. HQ AFRC has three inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

452 AMW, March ARB, CA
439 AW, Westover ARB, MA
926 FW, New Orleans ARS, LA

- e. HQ AFOSI has 21 inspections planned (Region 3):

UNIT/LOCATION

Region 3 Staff, Scott AFB, IL
Region 3/OL-A, Hurlburt Field, FL
Region 3/OL-B, Robins AFB, GA
Region 3/OL-E, Arlington, VA
Det 301, Scott AFB, IL
Det 303, Travis AFB, CA
Det 305, McChord AFB, WA
Det 306, Dover AFB, DE
Det 307, McGuire AFB, NJ
Det 309, Hurlburt Field, FL
Det 310, Charleston AFB, SC
Det 311, Moody AFB, GA
Det 320, Grand Forks AFB, ND
Det 321, McConnell AFB, KS
Det 322, Fairchild AFB, WA
Det 323, MacDill AFB, FL
Det 324, Pope AFB, NC
33 FIS, Andrews AFB, MD
Det 331, Andrews AFB, MD
Det 332, Bolling AFB, DC
Det 334, Washington, DC

- f. HQ AFSPC has one inspection planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

91 SW, Minot AFB, ND

- g. HQ AMC has two inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

317 AG, Dyess AFB, TX
155 ARW (ANG), Lincoln, NE

- h. HQ PACAF has one inspection planned.

UNIT/LOCATION

613 CRG, Andersen AFB, Guam

- i. HQ USAFE has no inspections planned.

j. HQ AFSOC has one inspection planned:

UNIT/LOCATION
66 AOS, Ft Bragg, NC

6. USAF has no suggestions for improving the IO program.

7. POC is Maj (b)(2),(b)(6) alternate
is SMSgt (s) (b)(2),(b)(6)



SAF/IG

//MAJ GEN SAMS//23 AUG 05
HQ USAF/XOI

//MS WALKER//22 AUG 05
SAF/IGC



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

NOV 28 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight, Jul - Sep 05

Between 1 Jul and 30 Sep 05, the Air Force conducted 14 Intelligence Oversight inspections. All inspections were deemed compliant. Also during this quarter, the Intelligence Oversight Panel reviewed actions taken after the discovery of a potentially reportable incident under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R identified during an Air Combat Command Unit Compliance Inspection of the 56th Information Warfare Flight (56 IWF) reported in the first quarter this year. After reviewing the results of the investigation, the Panel concluded there was no intelligence oversight violation and has since closed the matter. Aside from these events, there was no other significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period.

VR-

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steve Polk".

STEVEN R. POLK
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1014

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT
TO THE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Jul - 30 Sep 05)

1. This report closes out the potentially reportable incident identified during an Air Combat Command Unit Compliance Inspection of the 56th Information Warfare Flight (56 IWF) reported in the first quarter this year. On 28 Sep 05, the Intelligence Oversight Panel received a memo from the Commander, Air Intelligence Agency delineating results of the incident investigation, his staff's actions to correct the inspection report and the unit's actions to prevent the perception of questionable activity while educating the rest of the community in the command. The Panel reviewed these actions and concurred with the closure of the issue. There was no other significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period with the exception of the inspections noted below.

2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R. The USAF conducted 14 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections during this quarter. All units were found to be in compliance with IO requirements. The inspected units are listed below:

a. Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) conducted four IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

544th Information Operations Group, Peterson AFB, CO**

Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS)

55th Wing, Offutt AFB, NE**

20th Intelligence Squadron, Offutt AFB, NE

**Included all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

71st Flying Training Wing, Vance AFB, OK, 14-23 Aug 05

12th Flying Training Wing, Randolph AFB, TX, 12-21 Sep 05

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OK

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

452 AMW, March ARB, CA

439 AW, Westover ARB, MA

926 FW, New Orleans ARS, LA was cancelled due to Hurricane Katrina

e. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

f. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

317 AG, Dyess AFB TX

155 ARW (ANG), Lincoln NE

h. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

613 CRG, Andersen AFB, Guam

i. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

j. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

129 RQW Moffett Fld, CA,

66 AOS Ft Bragg, NC

3. USAF plans to conduct 46 IO inspections during the Oct - Dec 05 period:

a. HQ ACC has 10 inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

148th Fighter Wing, Duluth, MN

Western Air Defense Sector (WADS)

Det 2, 25 IOS, RAF Mildenhall, UK

68th Information Operations Squadron, Brooks USA, TX

103rd Fighter Wing, Granby, CT

70th Intelligence Wing, Fort Meade, MD**

26th Information Operations Group, Ramstein AB, GE

Det 3, 26th Information Operations Group, Ramstein AB, GE
426th Intelligence Squadron, Vogelweh AB, GE
115 Fighter Wing, Madison, WI

**Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

- b. HQ AETC has two inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

56 FW / 944 FW (ANG) Luke AFB, AZ
162 FW (ANG) Tucson, AZ

- c. HQ AFMC has two inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

311th Human Systems Wing, Brooks City-Base, TX
OO-ALC/75th Air Base Wing, Hill AFB, UT

- d. HQ AFRC has two inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

944 FW, Luke AFB, AZ
910 AW, Youngstown - Warren RPT, PA

- e. HQ AFOSI has 23 inspections planned (all of Region 3):

UNIT/LOCATION

Region 3 Staff, Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI Region 3/OL-E, Arlington, VA
AFOSI Detachment 301, Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI Detachment 303, Travis AFB, CA
AFOSI Detachment 303/OL-B, Los Angeles, CA
AFOSI Detachment 305, McChord AFB, WA
AFOSI Detachment 306, Dover AFB, DE
AFOSI Detachment 307, McGuire AFB, NJ
AFOSI Detachment 309, Hurlburt AFB, FL
AFOSI Detachment 310, Charleston AFB, SC
AFOSI Detachment 311, Moody AFB, GA
AFOSI Detachment 320, Grand Forks AFB, ND
AFOSI Detachment 321, McConnell AFB, KS
AFOSI Detachment 322, Fairchild AFB, WA
AFOSI Detachment 323, MacDill AFB, FL
AFOSI Detachment 324, Pope AFB, NC
AFOSI Detachment 325, Robins AFB, GA
AFOSI 33rd Field Investigations Squadron (FIS), Andrews AFB, MD
AFOSI Detachment 331, Andrews AFB, MD
AFOSI Detachment 332, Bolling AFB, DC

AFOSI Detachment 334, Washington, D.C.
AFOSI Detachment 340, MacDill AFB, FL
AFOSI Detachment 341, Hurlburt Field, FL

f. HQ AFSPC plans to conduct one inspection:

UNIT/LOCATION

460 SW, Buckley AFB, CO

g. HQ AMC plans to conduct three inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

161 ARW (ANG), Phoenix, AZ
171 ARW (ANG), Pittsburgh, PA
172 AW (ANG), Jackson, MS

h. HQ PACAF plans to conduct two inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

176 WG, Kulis ANGB, AK
18 WG, Kadena AB, Japan

i. HQ USAFE has no inspections planned.


j. HQ AFSOC plans to conduct one inspection:

UNIT/LOCATION

352 SOG, RAF Mildenhall, UK

4. USAF has no suggestions for improving the IO program.

5. POC is Lt Col (b)(2),(b)(6) alternate is
SMSgt (b)(2),(b)(6)



SAF/IG

Bo Kennen, 23 Nov 05

// See atch'd SSS //

HQ USAF/XOI

Walker, 9 Nov 05

// See atch'd SSS //

SAF/GC



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

Office of the Secretary

28 Nov 05

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight, Jul - Sep 05

Between 1 Jul and 30 Sep 05, the Air Force conducted 14 Intelligence Oversight inspections. All inspections were deemed compliant. Also during this quarter, the Intelligence Oversight Panel reviewed actions taken after the discovery of a potentially reportable incident under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R identified during an Air Combat Command Unit Compliance Inspection of the 56th Information Warfare Flight (56 IWF) reported in the first quarter this year. After reviewing the results of the investigation, the Panel concluded there was no intelligence oversight violation and has since closed the matter. Aside from these events, there was no other significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period.

//signed//

STEVEN R. POLK
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1019



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

Office of the Secretary

2 May 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight (IO), Jan - Mar 06

Between 1 Jan and 31 Mar 06, the Air Force conducted 35 Intelligence Oversight inspections. All but one of the inspections were deemed compliant. In the case of the noncompliant unit, the owning major command verified effective corrective actions were taken before their team left at the conclusion of the inspection. There were no illegal activities or violations of IO that met reporting criteria outlined in E.O. 12333 or DoD 5240.1-R. Inspection details may be found in the attached summary.

//signed/rfs/2 May 06//

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1020

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT
TO THE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Jan - 31 Mar 06)

1. There was no significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period with the exception of the inspections noted below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R. The USAF conducted 35 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections during this quarter. All but one of these inspections were deemed compliant with IO requirements. Details of the noncompliant unit may be found in para 2a below. Also below is the summary list of inspected units for this quarter:

- a. Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) conducted seven IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

55th Electronic Combat Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
355th Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
27th Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, NM
728th Air Control Squadron, Eglin AFB, FL
169th Intelligence Squadron (UTANG), Salt Lake City, UT
480th Intelligence Wing, Langley AFB, VA**
116th Air Control Squadron, Warrenton, OR

*Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

** Does not Comply

As noted above, the 480th Intelligence Wing (480 IW) did not meet AF IO program requirements:

- The unit did not use AFI 14-104, Attachment 3 - Inspection Guidance, when accomplishing compliance-oriented staff assistance visits and unit self-inspections to assess the adequacy of personnel awareness and understanding of applicable Intelligence Oversight program provisions.
- A minimum of 75 % of sampled individuals did not understand or were not aware of two applicable provisions (critical items) of the Intelligence Oversight program. Only 68 % (36 of 53) of sampled personnel understood the "US Person" pertains to associations, corporations, and resident aliens as well as US citizens. Additionally, only 51 % (32 of 63) of sampled personnel were aware that using the chain of command for reporting "questionable activities" is encouraged, where feasible.
- The unit did not have primary and alternate Intelligence Oversight monitors appointed in writing.

Corrective action taken: All discrepancies listed above were fixed immediately. However, due to the "does not comply" grade received, the wing is required to report via a follow on memorandum the status of its self-inspection program, stating the program continues to be in compliance to be cleared for CY 2006 IO requirements.

b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

17th Training Wing, Goodfellow AFB, TX
97th Air Mobility Wing, Altus AFB, OK

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome Research Site, Rome, NY

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

507 ARW, Tinker AFB, OK
301 FW, Carswell NAS, Ft Worth JRB, TX

e. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted 16 IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

Region 6 Staff, Hickam AFB, HI
AFOSI Detachment 601, Hickam AFB, HI
AFOSI Detachment 602, Andersen AFB, Guam
AFOSI 61 FIS, Osan AB, Korea
AFOSI 61 FIS/OL-A, Camp Hialeah, Korea
AFOSI Detachment 611, Osan AB, Korea
AFOSI Detachment 613, Kunsan AB, Korea
AFOSI Detachment 614, Seoul, Korea
AFOSI 62 FIS, Yokota AB, Japan
AFOSI Detachment 621, Yokota AB, Japan
AFOSI Detachment 622, Tokyo, Japan
AFOSI Detachment 623, Misawa AB, Japan
AFOSI Detachment 624, Kadena AB, Japan
AFOSI 63 FIS, Elmendorf AFB, AK
AFOSI Detachment 631, Elmendorf AFB, AK
AFOSI Detachment 632, Eielson AFB, AK

Additionally, ATSD(IO) conducted three IO inspections at Detachment 113, Hill AFB, UT and Field Investigation Region 2 OL-B forward operation locations in Quito and Mauta, Ecuador during this period.

f. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted four IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

437th Operations Support Squadron, Charleston AFB, SC
436th Operations Support Squadron, Dover AFB, DE
6th Operations Support Squadron, MacDill AFB, FL
153rd Operations Support Flight (ANG), Cheyenne, WY

h. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT/LOCATION

3rd Wing, Elmendorf AFB, AK
611th Air Intelligence Squadron, Elmendorf, AK
353rd Combat Training Squadron, Eielson AFB, AK

i. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no IO inspections this quarter. Staff members from the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for IO (ATSD(IO)) conducted an IO inspection of USAFE/A2 offices and other intelligence entities at Ramstein AB, GE this quarter. All units were found to be fully compliant.

j. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

3. USAF plans to conduct 57 IO inspections during the Apr - Jun 06 period:

a. HQ ACC has eight inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

123rd Air Control Squadron, Cincinnati, OH
180th Fighter Wing, Toledo, OH
381st Intelligence Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, AK
9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale AFB, CA
109th Air Control Squadron, Salt Lake City, UT
303rd Intelligence Squadron, Osan AB, ROK
Det 2, 18th Intelligence Squadron, Osan AB, ROK
548th Intelligence Group, Beale AFB, CA*

*Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

- b. HQ AETC has one inspection planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

173 Fighter Wing, Kingsley, OR

- c. HQ AFMC has two inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

377th ABW, Kirtland AFB, NM

66th ABW, Hanscom AFB, MA

- d. HQ AFRC has five inspections planned:

UNIT/LOCATION

419th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, UT

514th Flight Test Squadron, Hill AFB, UT

939th ARW, Portland IAP, OR

911th Pittsburgh IAP ARS, PA

911th Civil Engineering Squadron Det 1, Morgantown, WV

- e. HQ AFOSI has 29 inspections planned (subordinate units of Region 2):

UNIT/LOCATION

AFOSI Region 2 OL-A, Shaw AFB, SC

AFOSI Region 2 OL-B, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ

AFOSI Region 2 OL-BH, Homestead, FL

AFOSI Region 2 OL-G, Manama, Bahrain

AFOSI Detachment 201, Langley AFB, VA

AFOSI Detachment 202, Ft Meade, MD

AFOSI Detachment 204, Offutt AFB, NE

AFOSI Detachment 206, Nellis AFB, NV

AFOSI Detachment 207, Whiteman AFB, MO

AFOSI Detachment 211, Moody AFB, GA

AFOSI Detachment 212, Shaw AFB, SC

AFOSI Detachment 216, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC

AFOSI Detachment 217, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ

AFOSI Detachment 218, Beale AFB, CA

AFOSI Detachment 219, Barksdale AFB, LA

AFOSI Detachment 221, Mountain Home AFB, ID

AFOSI Detachment 222, Dyess AFB, TX

AFOSI Detachment 224, Cannon AFB, NM

AFOSI Detachment 225, Holloman AFB, NM

AFOSI Detachment 226, Ellsworth AFB, SD

AFOSI Detachment 228, Minot AFB, ND

AFOSI 24 Expeditionary Field Investigations Squadron, Prince Sultan AB, KSA
AFOSI Detachment 242, Prince Sultan AB, KSA
AFOSI Detachment 243, Riyadh (Eskan Village), KSA
AFOSI Detachment 245, Al Jaber AB, Kuwait
AFOSI Detachment 245/OL-A, Ali Al Salem AB, Kuwait
AFOSI Detachment 246, Al Dhafra AB, UAE
AFOSI Detachment 248, Muscat, Oman
AFOSI Detachment 253, San Antonio, TX (HQ AIA)

- f. HQ AFSPC has no inspections planned.
- g. HQ AMC plans to conduct four inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

19th Operations Support Squadron, Robins AFB, GA
166th Operations Support Flight (ANG), Wilmington DE
107th Operations Support Flight (ANG), Niagara Falls, NY
151st Operations Support Flight (ANG), Salt Lake City, UT

- h. HQ PACAF plans to conduct five inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

8th FW, Kunsan AB ROK
51st FW, Osan AB ROK
7th AF, Osan AB ROK
607th Air Intelligence Group*
607th Air Support Operations Group*
* Subordinate units of 7th AF

- i. HQ USAFE has no inspections planned.
- j. HQ AFSOC plans to conduct three inspections:

UNIT/LOCATION

720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, FL
16th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL
AF Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL

4. USAF has no suggestions for improving the IO program.

5. POC is Lt Col (b)(2),(b)(6) alternate is
SMSgt (b)(2),(b)(6)

// LGen Sams, 2 May 06 //
SAF/IG

// BGen Kennedy, 24 Apr 06 //
HQ USAF/A2

// Ms Walker, 21 Apr 06 //
SAF/GC



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

AUG 25 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Quarterly Report on Intelligence Oversight (IO), Apr - Jun 06

Between 1 Apr and 30 Jun 06, the Air Force conducted 46 Intelligence Oversight inspections. All but two of the inspections were deemed fully compliant. Owning major commands of the noncompliant units verified effective corrective actions were put in place prior to their inspection teams departing. There were no illegal activities or violations of IO that met reporting criteria outlined in E.O. 12333 or DoD 5240.1-R. Inspection details may be found in the attached summary.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1027

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE REPORT

TO THE

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

(For the Period 1 Apr - 30 Jun 06)

1. There was no significant intelligence oversight activity in the reporting period with the exception of the inspections noted below.
2. No questionable activity was reported during the quarter warranting a report under the criteria of E.O. 12333 and DoD 5240.1-R. The USAF conducted 46 Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections during this quarter. All but two of these inspections were deemed fully compliant with IO requirements. Details of the "in compliance with comments" units may be found in paras 2a and h below. Also below is the summary list of inspected units for this quarter:

- a. Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) conducted 10 IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
123rd Air Control Squadron	Cincinnati, OH
180th Fighter Wing	Toledo, OH
381st Intelligence Squadron	Elmendorf AFB, AK
9th Reconnaissance Wing	Beale AFB, CA
303rd Intelligence Squadron	Osan AB, ROK
Det 2, 18th Intelligence Squadron	Osan AB, ROK
*/**548th Intelligence Group	Beale AFB, CA
120th Fighter Wing	Great Falls, MT
690th Information Operations Group	Lackland AFB, TX
142d Fighter Wing	Portland, OR

*Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

** Complies with comments

As noted above, the 548th Intelligence Group did not meet all AF IO program requirements:

- Primary and alternate IO monitors were not appointed in writing. This deficiency was corrected during the inspection.

- b. Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
37th Training Wing	Lackland AFB, TX
59th Medical Wing	Lackland AFB, TX
AF Institute of Technology	Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

c. Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC) conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
377th ABW	Kirtland AFB, NM

d. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC) conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
419th Fighter Wing	Hill AFB, UT
939th Air Refueling Wing	Portland IAP, OR
911th Air Reserve Station	Pittsburgh IAP, PA

e. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI) conducted 22 IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Region 2 Staff	Langley AFB, VA
AFOSI Region 2 OL-A	Shaw AFB, SC
AFOSI Region 2 OL-B	Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
AFOSI Detachment 201	Langley AFB, VA
AFOSI Detachment 202	Ft Meade, MD
AFOSI Detachment 204	Offutt AFB, NE
AFOSI Detachment 206	Nellis AFB, NV
AFOSI Detachment 207	Whiteman AFB, MO
AFOSI Detachment 211	Moody AFB, GA
AFOSI Detachment 212	Shaw AFB, SC
AFOSI Detachment 216	Seymour Johnson AFB, NC
AFOSI Detachment 217	Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
AFOSI Detachment 218	Beale AFB, CA
AFOSI Detachment 219	Barksdale AFB, LA
AFOSI Detachment 221	Mountain Home AFB, ID
AFOSI Detachment 222	Dyess AFB, TX
AFOSI Detachment 224	Cannon AFB, NM
AFOSI Detachment 225	Holloman AFB, NM
AFOSI Detachment 226	Ellsworth AFB, SD
AFOSI Detachment 228	Minot AFB, ND
AFOSI 24 Expeditionary Field Investigations Squadron	Prince Sultan AB, KSA
AFOSI Detachment 253	San Antonio, TX (HQ AIA)

Additionally, ATSD(IO) conducted IO inspections at the 52d Field Investigations Squadron and Detachment 521, Ankara Turkey; Detachment 522, Incirlik AB, Turkey and Detachment 523, Izmir AS, Turkey during this period.

f. Headquarters Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC) did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

g. Headquarters Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC) conducted four IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
19th Operations Support Squadron	Robins AFB, GA
166th Operations Support Flight (ANG)	Wilmington, DE
107th Operations Support Flight (ANG)	Niagara Falls, NY
151st Operations Support Flight (ANG)	Salt Lake City, UT

h. Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF) conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
8th Fighter Wing	Kunsan AB, ROK
**51st Fighter Wing	Osan AB, ROK
7th Air Force	Osan AB, ROK
*607th Air Intelligence Group	
*607th Air Support Operations Group	

- * Subordinate units of 7th AF
- ** Complies with comments

As noted above, the 51st FW program did not meet all AF IO program requirements:

- The unit training program did not contain all items listed in Attachment 2 to AFI 14-104. The deficiencies were fixed during the inspection, and all assigned personnel were trained on the additional items before the inspectors departed.

i. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) conducted no IO inspections this quarter. Staff members from the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for IO (ATSD(IO)) also conducted an IO inspection of the 39th Operational Support Squadron's Intelligence Flight. ATSD(IO) characterized the Flight's program as meeting program minimums while providing an action item to USAFE/A2 to update their initial/refresher training briefing for subordinate units.

j. Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC) conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
720th Special Tactics Group	Hurlburt Field, FL
16th Special Operations Wing	Hurlburt Field, FL
AF Special Operations School	Hurlburt Field, FL

3. USAF plans to conduct 36 IO inspections during the Jul - Sep 06 period:

a. HQ ACC has 11 inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
25th Information Operations Squadron	Hurlburt Field, FL
552d Air Control Wing	Tinker AFB, OK
28th Bomb Wing	Ellsworth AFB, SD
150th Fighter Wing	Kirtland AFB, NM
104th Fighter Wing	Westfield, MA
366th Fighter Wing	Mountain Home AFB, ID
726th Air Control Squadron	Mountain Home AFB, ID
*543d Intelligence Group	Lackland AFB, TX
57th Wing	Nellis AFB, NV
90th Information Operations Squadron	Lackland AFB, TX
67th Information Operations Group	Lackland AFB, TX

*Includes all co-located subordinate active duty elements and squadrons

b. HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

c. HQ AFMC has two inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
OC-ALC/72d ABW	Tinker AFB, OK
WR-ALC/78th ABW	Robins AFB, GA

d. HQ AFRC has four inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
434th Airlift Wing	Grissom ARB, IN
HQ AFRC	Robins AFB, GA
932d Airlift Wing	Scott AFB, IL
954th Reserve Support Squadron	Scott AFB, IL

e. HQ AFOSI has 13 inspections planned (subordinate units of Region 8):

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Region 8 Staff	Peterson AFB, CO
Region 8 OL-A	Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
AFOSI Detachment 801	Buckley AFB, CO
AFOSI Detachment 802	Patrick AFB, FL
AFOSI Detachment 803	Peterson AFB, CO
AFOSI Detachment 804	Vandenberg AFB, CA

UNIT

AFOSI Detachment 804/OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 805
AFOSI Detachment 806
AFOSI Detachment 807
AFOSI Detachment 808
AFOSI Detachment 809
AFOSI Detachment 809 OL-A

LOCATION

Onizuka AS, CA
F.E. Warren AFB, WY
Malmstrom AFB, MT
Schriever AFB, CO
United States Air Force Academy, CO
Colorado Springs, CO
Vandenberg AFB, CA

f. HQ AFSPC has no inspections planned.

g. HQ AMC has three inspections planned:

UNIT

118th Operations Support Flight (ANG)
152d Operations Support Flight (ANG)
172d Operations Support Flight (ANG)

LOCATION

Nashville, TN
Reno, NV
Jackson, MS

h. HQ PACAF has two inspections planned:

UNIT

354 Fighter Wing
168 Air Refueling Wing

LOCATION

Eielson AFB, AK
Eielson AFB, AK

i. HQ USAFE has no inspections planned.

j. HQ AFSOC has one inspection planned:

UNIT

919th Special Operations Wing

LOCATION

Duke Field, FL (AFRES)

4. USAF has no suggestions for improving the IO program.

5. POC is Lt Col (b)(2),(b)(6) alternate is
SMSgt (b)(2),(b)(6)

// Donald F. Jones //
SAF/IG

// Col (b)(6) 25 Jul 06 //
HQ USAF/A2

// Ms Walker, EXIV, 4 Aug 06 //
SAF/GC



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, DC



JAN 31 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Report on Intelligence Oversight, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 06 (Reference: ATSD(IO)
Memo, dtd 8 Dec 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress)

Between 1 Oct and 31 Dec 06, the Air Force and ATSD(IO) conducted 18 inspections of Intelligence Oversight (IO) programs. Inspections assessed unit compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons, and the adequacy of IO programs. Although several discrepancies were noted, all programs were assessed as "in compliance" with program requirements.

Additionally, our governing instruction, AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, requires all units not receiving a higher headquarters (HHQ) IO program inspection during the calendar year to conduct a self inspection of their program during the last quarter of the year. From 1 Oct-31 Dec, over 500 unit self inspections were conducted, and all programs were assessed as "in compliance." Discrepancies noted during the self inspections were mostly administrative, and quickly corrected.

Additionally, the attached report includes information requested in the ATSD(IO) memo, referenced above, to include substantiated violations of the laws governing IO and recent changes to AF IO policy, directives or programs.

If you have questions, your staff may contact my POC, Lt Col (b)(6) at (b)(2) Thank you.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

**USAF Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
1 Oct - 31 Dec 06**

Ref: ATSD(IO) Memo, dated December 8, 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement

Please Note: The following paragraphs provide a summary of Air Force IO program activity for the quarter 1 Oct - 31 Dec 2006, a summary of IO self inspections conducted throughout the year, as well as the new IO information requested by ATSD(IO) for the annual IO Report to Congress (ATSD(IO) memo, referenced above).

1. Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations. There were no violations of law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the period.

2. A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections. The subparagraphs below summarize higher headquarters (HHQ) and unit self inspections conducted during the quarter. Please note, AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, requires units not receiving an HHQ compliance inspection during the calendar year to evaluate their IO program as part of their unit self inspection.

a. Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections:

(1) HQ Air Combat Command (ACC). Six HHQ IO inspections were conducted this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
8th Air Force (AF)	Barksdale AFB, LA
2d Bomb Wing (BW)	Barksdale AFB, LA
18th Intelligence Operations Squadron (IOS)	Vandenberg AFB, CA*
31st Intelligence Squadron (IS)	Fort Gordon, GA*
102d Fighter Wing (FW)	Falmouth, MA
106th Rescue Wing (RW)	Gabreski, NY

* Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

(18th IOS) Discrepancy: The 18th IOS did not ensure initial and annual IO training lesson plans covered the minimum objectives, as outlined in AFI 14-104, Attachment 2. Specifically, initial and annual training did not cover the central tenets concerning permissible activities, collection techniques, and support to law enforcement. **Corrective Action:** Inspector assisted unit IO Program Manager in updating initial and annual training lesson plans to include the central tenets concerning permissible activities, collection techniques, and support to law enforcement during the inspection. Program was current prior to IG team departure.

(31st IS) Discrepancy: The 31st Intelligence Squadron (IS) did not ensure initial and annual training lesson plans covered the minimum objectives, as outlined in AFI 14-104, Attachment 2. Specifically, initial training did not cover the requirement concerning restrictions on collection of publicly available information by intelligence professionals acting in an official capacity and on certain restricted internet-based activities. Additionally, not all annual training covered the requirement concerning restrictions on collection of publicly available information by intelligence professionals acting in an official capacity and on certain restricted internet-based activities. **Corrective Action:** The HHQ inspector assisted the unit IO Program Manager in updating initial and annual training lesson plans to include (a) restrictions on collection of publicly available information by intelligence professionals acting in an official capacity and on certain restricted internet-based activities and (b) collection of publicly available information by intelligence professionals acting in an official capacity and on certain restricted internet-based activities. Program was current prior to IG team departure.

Additionally, the following discrepancies were noted by ACC (via the AIA/IG) through unit self inspections:

(a) 67th Network Warfare Wing (NWW), Lackland AFB, TX (Parent Unit).

Discrepancy: The 26th Network Operations Group (NOG), Ramstein AB, GE, had not established an IO program since the activation of their unit in July 06. **Corrective Action:** The unit has subsequently appointed IO monitors and has implemented an IO program and required training.

Discrepancy: Unit members assigned to the 426th Information Operations Squadron (IOS), Vogelweh, GE, were not current on initial and refresher IO training. Additionally, personnel were not familiar with key IO authorities and were not providing IO support to subordinate organizations. **Corrective Action:** Unit members have since received required training and are now providing appropriate support to subordinate organizations.

Discrepancy: The 7th Information Warfare Flight (IWF), Osan AB, ROK, had not adequately trained their personnel on the IO program. **Corrective Action:** Unit members have since received appropriate training on the IO program.

(b) 70th Intelligence Wing (IW), Fort Meade, MD (Parent Unit).

Discrepancy: Three units subordinate to the 70th IW were lacking appointment letters for their designated IO monitors. **Corrective Action:** IO monitors were formally appointed for the units.

(2) HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC). HQ AETC did not conduct any inspections this quarter.

(3) HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC). HQ AFMC conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT

Aeronautical Systems Center
88th Air Base Wing
Air Force Research Laboratory

LOCATION

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

(4) **HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC).** HQ AFRC conducted four IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT

934th Airlift Wing
482d Fighter Wing
931st Air Refueling Group
610th Intelligence Flight

LOCATION

Minneapolis/St Paul IAP, MN
Homestead ARB, FL
McConnell AFB, KS
Offutt AFB, NE

(5) **HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI).** HQ AFOSI did not conduct any inspections this quarter, however, the following unit was inspected by ATSD/IO, with no discrepancies noted:

UNIT

61st Field Investigations Squadron

LOCATION

Osan AB, ROK

(6) **HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC).** HQ AFSPC conducted one IO inspection this quarter.

UNIT

21 Space Wing

LOCATION

Peterson AFB, CO

(7) **HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC).** HQ AMC conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

UNIT

463rd Operations Support Squadron
22d Operations Support Squadron

LOCATION

Little Rock AFB, AR
McConnell AFB, KS

(8) **HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF).** HQ PACAF did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(9) **HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE).** HQ USAFE conducted one IO inspection this quarter.

UNIT

100th Air Refueling Wing

LOCATION

RAF Mildenhall, UK

(10) **HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC).** HQ AFSOC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

c. **Trends Noted.** During this reporting period, 18 IO inspections were conducted by HHQ

and over 500 unit self inspections were conducted. Although some discrepancies were noted, all inspected units were assessed as "in compliance" with IO program requirements. The majority of discrepancies noted were related to familiarity of unit personnel with program requirements, as well as the need for IO managers to implement more comprehensive training plans. Recommendations for improving this area were provided by HQ ACC (see para 6).

d. **Upcoming Inspections.** The USAF plans to conduct 33 IO inspections during the Jan - Mar 07 period at the following locations:

(1) HQ ACC has 10 inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
390th Intelligence Squadron	Kadena AB, Japan
Det 3, 25th Intelligence Squadron	Kadena AB, Japan
82nd Reconnaissance Squadron	Kadena AB, Japan
12th Air Force	Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
355th Wing	Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
55th Electronic Combat Group	Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
150th Fighter Wing	Kirtland AFB, NM
7th Bomber Wing	Dyess AFB, TX
49th Fighter Wing	Holloman AFB, NM
1st Fighter Wing	Langley AFB, VA

(2) HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

(3) HQ AFMC has one inspection planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
95th Air Base Wing	Edwards AFB, CA

(4) HQ AFRC has four inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
340th Fighter Training Group	Randolph AFB, TX
710th Intelligence Flight	Brooks City Base, TX
913th Airlift Wing	Willow Grove ARS, PA
10th Air Force	Carswell ARS, TX

(5) HQ AFOSI has 15 inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Region 4 Staff	Randolph AFB, TX
AFOSI Detachment 401	Randolph AFB, TX
AFOSI Detachment 405	Maxwell AFB, AL
AFOSI Detachment 406	Columbus AFB, MS
AFOSI Detachment 407	Keesler AFB, MS

AFOSI Detachment 408
 AFOSI Detachment 409
 AFOSI Detachment 410
 AFOSI Detachment 411
 AFOSI Detachment 419
 AFOSI Detachment 421
 AFOSI Detachment 422
 AFOSI Detachment 426
 AFOSI Detachment 427
 AFOSI Detachment 438

Goodfellow AFB, TX
 Lackland AFB, TX
 Laughlin AFB, TX
 Sheppard AFB, TX
 Tyndall AFB, FL
 Luke AFB, AZ
 Altus AFB, OK
 New York City, NY
 Little Rock AFB, AR
 Vance AFB, OK

(6) HQ AFSPC has one inspection planned:

UNIT

595th Space Group

LOCATION

Schriever AFB, CO

(7) HQ AMC has two inspections planned:

UNIT

43d Operations Support Squadron
 128th Operations Support Flight

LOCATION

Pope AFB, NC
 Billy Mitchell, WI (ANG)

(8) HQ PACAF has no inspections planned.

(9) HQ USAFE has no inspections planned.

(10) HQ AFSOC has no inspections planned.

3. Summary of Substantive Department/Agency/Combatant Command-level Changes to IO Programs. The AF/A2 Intelligence Oversight points of contact continued to update/improve the IO Community of Practice (CoP) during this quarter. The IO CoP, residing within the AF Knowledge Now on the Air Force Portal, was established in May 2006 and is supported by the AF Intelligence Oversight Panel members (SAF/IG/GC and AF/A2). The IO CoP was developed to provide "one stop shopping" where IO monitors at major command/field units and intelligence component personnel can go and in collaborative workspace use and share information. General CoP features include document posting/sharing; discussion forum; frequently asked questions, and alert notifications. For example, the "inspections" folder includes examples of current inspection finding so all IO monitors can learn from each other and improve their IO programs. There was no directive or policy which directed us to implement the IO CoP, it was an effort to improve the overall IO program.

4. Summary of Any Department/Agency/Combatant Command-Level Changes to Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Change. AF/A2 is the OPR for AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, current instruction is dated Apr 2005. AF/A2 began

a revision of AFI 14-104 due to SAF/GC recommendation to delineate intelligence functions for each procedure identified in DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*, and clarify intelligence function in the force protection arena. The revision also includes feedback we've received from the field since the Apr 2005 version went out. During the Oct - Dec 06 timeframe, we've obtained Major Command (MAJCOM) coordination and are proceeding with Air Staff review. Our goal is to send out the revised AFI 14-104 in early 2007. A copy of the new document will be forwarded when published.

5. Procedure 15 Inquiries. There are no on-going Procedure 15 inquiries.

6. Recommendations for IO Program Improvement. ACC/IG recommended the AF develop and institute a formal or computer-based training course for AF IO program managers. The course would equip the IO program managers with the tools required to properly develop and institute a training lesson plan which covers the minimum objectives outlined in AFI 14-104, Attachment 2. ACC also recommended the course address methods on how to adequately gauge unit IO program awareness through unit self inspections. Alternatively, ACC recommended the AF IO program office provide examples of comprehensive IO training plans.

IO Panel members reviewed the recommendation and concurred with the development of an IO training program/plan that can be used by IO program managers AF-wide. AF/A2 will take the lead and report back to the panel members at the next scheduled IO Panel.


7. Our primary POC for this report, Lt Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Our alternate, (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6).



DAVID A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance



Mary L. Walker
General Counsel



RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



NOV 28 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Report on Intelligence Oversight, 1 Jul-30 Sep 07 (Reference: ATSD(IO)
Memo, dtd 8 Dec 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress)

Between 1 July and 30 September 2007, the Air Force conducted 45 inspections of Intelligence Oversight (IO) programs. Inspections assessed unit compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons, and the adequacy of IO programs. Of the 45 unit IO programs inspected this quarter, 2 unit programs experienced critical item failures and were assessed as "Does Not Comply/Unsatisfactory". Both units were suspended to retrain all their personnel on the specific deficient items in order to meet compliance standards. The remaining 43 unit IO programs were assessed as "in compliance" or "satisfactory."

This report also includes information requested in the referenced memo regarding substantiated violations of the laws governing IO and recent changes to AF IO policy, directives or programs.

If you have questions, your staff may contact my POC, Maj (b)(2),(b)(6)
Thank you.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

EFF

1040

UNCLASSIFIED

USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
(1 July– 30 September 2007)

References:

- a. ATSD(IO) Memo, dated December 8, 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement
- b. AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

Please note: The following paragraphs conform to the reporting requirements outlined in the ATSD(IO) memo referenced above, and provide a summary of AF IO program activity for the quarter 1 Jul - 30 Sep 07.

1. **Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations.** There were no violations of law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the period.
2. **A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.** The subparagraphs below summarize higher headquarters (HHQ) and unit self inspections conducted during the quarter.

a. Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections:

(1) **HQ Air Combat Command (ACC).** HQ ACC conducted five inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
116th Air Control Wing (ACW)*	Robins AFB, GA
20th Fighter Wing (FW)	Shaw AFB, SC
609th Air Intelligence Group (AIG)*	Shaw AFB, SC
156th Air Wing (AW)*	San Juan IAP, PR
388th Fighter Wing (FW)*	Hill AFB, UT

* Critical/Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

116th Air Control Wing Discrepancy:

Results of a standard 12-question, multiple-choice test showed eighty-one percent (29 of 36) of assigned intelligence personnel were unaware of the specific procedures and restrictions governing the collection of intelligence on US persons by methods such as electronic or physical surveillance. (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraph A3.2.3). This critical item failure resulted in the 116 ACW's IO program being rated Does Not Comply/Unsatisfactory.

Corrective Action: The inspector reassessed the unit's training program and determined it to be in compliance with all facets of AFI 14-104. Questioning revealed that the unsatisfactory assessment result was primarily caused by a lack of emphasis on this critical item by instructors during initial and annual training. To remedy this situation the unit was required, within ten duty days of the inspection's completion, to retrain all its

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personnel on this specific item and assess to assure a minimum of 75 percent of personnel are aware of the specific provisions governing these types of collection. The unit certified compliance via an email memorandum.

609th Air Intelligence Group Discrepancy:

Thirty-five percent (6 of 17) of in-processing checklists sampled did not record accomplishment of initial intelligence oversight training within 45 days of individual being assigned to the unit. (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2)

Corrective Action: The inspector educated unit IO monitor on the importance of correctly and consistently documenting training. No further action required.

156th Airlift Wing Discrepancy:

Unit did not provide intelligence oversight orientation training to unit Inspector General. (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraph 5.1).

Corrective Action: Unit IO member provided an IO orientation briefing to the unit IG. No further action required.

388th Fighter Wing Discrepancy:

Results of a standard 12-question, multiple-choice test showed less than seventy-five percent (17 of 24) of assigned intelligence personnel were aware that DoD 5200.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons describes the circumstances under which information on US persons may be collected (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraph A3.2.2.). This critical item failure resulted in the 388 FW's IO program being rated Does Not Comply/Unsatisfactory.

Corrective Action: The inspector reassessed the unit's training program and determined it to be in compliance with all facets of AFI 14-104. Questioning revealed that the unsatisfactory assessment result was primarily caused by a lack of emphasis on this critical item by instructors during initial and annual training. To remedy this situation the unit was required, within ten duty days of the inspection's completion, to retrain all its personnel on this specific item and assess to assure a minimum of 75 percent of personnel are aware of the specific provisions governing these types of collection. The unit certified compliance via an email memorandum.

(2) **HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC).** HQ AETC conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
81st Training Wing (TRW)	Keesler AFB, MS

(3) **HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC).** HQ AFMC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

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(4) **HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC).** HQ AFRC conducted two IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
442d Fighter Wing (FW)	Whiteman AFB, MO
701st Combat Operations Squadron, Det 1	Hickam AFB, HI

(5) **HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI).** HQ AFOSI/IG conducted 24 inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Field Investigative Region (FIR) 5 Staff	Ramstein AB, GE
FIR 5 OL-Force Protection Detachment (FPD)	Vogelweh AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 501	Ramstein AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 502	Seimbach ABS, GE
AFOSI 51st Field Investigations Squadron (FIS)	Mildenhall AB, UK
AFOSI 51st FIS/OL-A	Bonn, GE
AFOSI 51st FIS/OL-C	London, UK
AFOSI 51st FIS/OL-D	Berlin, GE
AFOSI Detachment 512	Lakenheath AB, UK
AFOSI Detachment 514	Alconbury, UK
AFOSI Detachment 514 OL-A	RAF Fairford, UK
AFOSI Detachment 514 OL-B	RAF Menwith Hill, UK
AFOSI Detachment 515	Ramstein AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 516	Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal
AFOSI Detachment 517	Stuttgart AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 518	Spangdahlem AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 519	Brussels, Belgium
AFOSI Detachment 521	Ankara, Turkey
AFOSI Detachment 522	Incirlık AB, Turkey
AFOSI Detachment 523	Izmir, Turkey
AFOSI Detachment 531	Aviano AB, Italy
AFOSI Detachment 532	Moron AB, Spain
AFOSI Detachment 535	Rome, Italy
AFOSI Detachment 538	Paris, France

* Critical/Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

FIR 5 OL-FPD Discrepancy:

During CY05 Self Inspection on 14 Dec 05, unit self identified two individuals not receiving annual IO training due to long term TDYs. (Non-Critical)

Corrective Action: This oversight appears to have been corrected with the appointment of the current program manager as all members currently assigned to the FPD have received initial training upon arrival and annual training as required.

AFOSI Detachment 531 Discrepancy:

Over the inspection period, various agents did not have their initial, annual and/or pre-

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deployment IO training documented. (Non-Critical)

Corrective Action: All members of the detachment are current on annual training. Additionally, the unit has implemented a process to track all initial training, annual and pre-deployment training.

(6) **Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD/IO):** ATSD/IO did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter

(7) **HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC).** HQ AFSPC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(8) **HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC).** HQ AMC conducted seven IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
89th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)	Andrews AFB, MD (18 AF)
92d Operations Support Squadron (OSS)	Fairchild AFB, WA (18 AF)
141st Operations Support Flight (OSF)	Fairchild AFB, WA (ANG)
165th Operations Support Flight (OSF)	Savannah, GA (ANG)
167th Operations Support Flight (OSF)	Martinsburg, WV (ANG)
133d Operations Support Flight (OSF)	Minneapolis, MN (ANG)
375th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)	Scott AFB, IL (18 AF)

(9) **HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF).** HQ PACAF did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(10) **HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE).** HQ USAFE conducted two IO inspection this quarter.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
48th Fighter Wing (FW)	RAF Lakenheath, UK
501st Combat Support Wing (CSW)	RAF Alconbury, UK

(11) **HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC).** HQ AFSOC conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
353 Special Operations Group	Kadena AB, Japan

(12) **AF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF ISR) Agency.** AF ISR conducted three IO inspections this quarter.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
544th Intelligence Group	Peterson AFB, CO
Detachment 46**	Schriever AFB, CO
485th Intelligence Squadron	Mainz-Kastel Station, GE

**Administratively supported unit.

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c. **Trends Noted.** The majority of units and personnel assessed during this period appeared familiar with IO program requirements. Two of five ACC units appeared to misunderstand both the required level of detail of IO instruction and the criteria for inspections. IO monitors are being instructed to provide more in-depth education on the particulars of the program and to ensure they understand what SAVs and IGs will be looking for during inspections. Although minor discrepancies were also noted in the AFOSI units above, no significant trends of overall non-compliance or mismanagement of the IO program were identified in these units within USAFE.

d. **Upcoming Inspections.** The USAF plans to conduct 27 IO inspections during the period 1 Oct - 31 Dec 07 at the following locations:

(1) HQ ACC has five inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
148th Fighter Wing (FW)	Duluth, MN
174th Fighter Wing (FW)	Syracuse, NY
917th Wing	Barksdale AFB, LA
28th Bomb Wing (BW)	Ellsworth AFB, SD
169th Fighter Wing (FW)	Eastover, SC

(2) HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

(3) HQ AFMC has no inspections planned.

(4) HQ AFRC has eight inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
908th Airlift Wing (AW)	Maxwell AFB, AL
43rd Flight Test Squadron (FLTS)	Columbus AFB, MS
514th Air Mobility Wing (AMW)	McGuire AFB, NJ
71st Aerial Port Squadron (APS)	Langley AFB, VA
307th Fighter Squadron (FS)	Langley AFB, VA
622d Communications Flight (CS)	Langley AFB, VA
710th Combat Operations Squadron (COS)	Langley AFB, VA
953rd Reserve Support Squadron (RSS)	Norfolk NAS, VA

(5) HQ AFOSI has 6 inspections planned. With the exception of FIR 6 staff and 24th Expeditionary Field Investigative Squadron, who were previously inspected by ATSD/IO in CY07, the following Regions and associated field units will conduct self-inspections of their IO programs during 4th quarter CY07.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
AFOSI 1st Field Investigations Region (FIR)	Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
AFOSI 2d Field Investigations Region (FIR)	Langley AFB, VA
AFOSI 3rd Field Investigations Region (FIR)	Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI 6th Field Investigations Region (FIR)	Hickam AFB, HI
AFOSI 7th Field Investigations Region (FIR)	Arlington, VA
AFOSI 8th Field Investigations Region (FIR)	Peterson AFB, CO

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(6) HQ AFSPC has no inspections planned:

(7) HQ AMC has one inspection planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
305th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)	McGuire AFB, NJ (18 AF)

(8) HQ PACAF has two inspections planned.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
613th Air & Space Operations Center (AOC/IRD)	Hickam AFB, HI
13 AF/A2	Hickam AFB, HI

(9) HQ USAFE has no inspection planned.

(10) HQ AFSOC has two inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
193 Special Operations Wing (ANG)	Harrisburg, PA
352 Special Operations Group	RAF Mildenhall

(11) AF ISR Agency has three inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
67th Network Warfare Wing*	Laekland AFB, TX
39th Information Operations Squadron*	Hurlburt Fld, FL
25th Intelligence Squadron*	Hurlburt Field, FL

* ACC unit inspected by AF ISR Agency due to Service Cryptologic Element authority.

3. Summary of Substantive Department/Agency/Combatant Command-level Changes to IO Programs. AF ISR Agency is no longer part of ACC and is now apart of AF/A2. It will develop an AF ISR Instruction and C&SRL to support AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*.

4. Summary of Any Department/Agency/Combatant Command-Level Changes to Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Change.

(AF/A2) The Air Force (to include HAF staff and MAJCOM headquarters staffs) reviewed the reissue draft of Department of Defense Regulation 5240.01-R, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities*. The Air Force submitted a concur with 87 comments to ATSD(10). This is the first revision to DoD 5240.1-R since it was written in 1982.


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
5. **Procedure 15 Inquiries.** For the period 1 Jul - 30 Sep 07, the Intelligence Oversight Panel did not received any reports of ongoing Procedure 15, DoD 5240.1-R inquiries or any additional matters pertinent to the Air Force intelligence oversight programs.

6. **Recommendations for IO Program Improvement.** The Air Force has no recommendations this reporting period.

7. If you have any questions, our primary POC, Maj (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Our alternate, Lt Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Thank you.

for
//e-signed//Maj Gen Dettmer
DAVID A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance


RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General


for
//e-signed// Robert T. Maguire, SES
Mary L. Walker
General Counsel



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Report on Intelligence Oversight, 1 Oct-31 Dec 07 (Reference: ATSD(IO)
Memo, dtd 8 Dec 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress)

Between 1 October and 31 December 2007, the Air Force conducted 20 inspections of Intelligence Oversight (IO) programs. Inspections assessed unit compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons, and the adequacy of IO programs. Of the 20 unit IO programs inspected this quarter, three unit programs experienced critical item failures and were assessed as "Does not Comply/Unsatisfactory." Two units immediately retrained their personnel and were re-evaluated on the specific deficient items in order to meet compliance standards. The third unit is aggressively training their personnel and will soon be in compliance. The remaining 17 unit IO programs were assessed as "in compliance" or "satisfactory."

This report also includes information requested in the referenced memo regarding substantiated violations of the laws governing IO and recent changes to AF IO policy, directives or programs.

If you have questions, your staff may contact my POC, Maj (b)(2),(b)(6)
Thank you.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

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USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
(1 October– 31 December 2007)

References:

- a. ATSD(IO) Memo, dated December 8, 2006, Sbj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement
- b. AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

Please note: The following paragraphs conform to the reporting requirements outlined in the ATSD(IO) memo referenced above, and provide a summary of AF IO program activity for the quarter 1 Oct - 31 Dec 07.

1. **Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations.** There were no violations of law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the period.
2. **A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.** The subparagraphs below summarize higher headquarters (HHQ) and unit self inspections conducted during the quarter.

a. **Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections:**

- (1) **HQ Air Combat Command (ACC).** ACC conducted five IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
148th Fighter Wing (FW)*	Duluth, MN
174th Fighter Wing (FW)*	Syracuse, NY
917th Wing	Barksdale AFB, LA
28th Bombardment Wing (BW)	Ellsworth AFB, SD
169th Fighter Wing (FW)*	Eastover, SC

* Critical/Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

(148FW) Discrepancy: Less than 75 percent of assigned intelligence personnel (8 of 11) were aware that DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons, describes the circumstances under which information on US persons may be collected. (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraph A3.2.2.)

Corrective Action: A re-assessment of the unit's training program was accomplished and it was determined to be in compliance with all facets of AFI 14-104. The unit immediately retrained and re-evaluated all personnel with satisfactory results.

(174FW) Discrepancy: Fifty percent of intelligence personnel were not aware that DOD 5240.1-R describes the circumstances under which information on US persons may be collected. (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraph A3.2.2)

Corrective Action: A re-assessment of the unit's training program was accomplished and it was determined to be in compliance with all facets of AFI 14-104. The unit immediately

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retrained and re-evaluated all personnel with satisfactory results. Additionally, a test primer was developed by ACC/IG to better prepare units for the requirements of AFI 14-104 assessments. This primer has been distributed to all ACC units scheduled for inspection. Also, a revamped "IO Smart Card" was developed by the Unit Support Section of HQ ACC/A2's Intelligence Squadron.

(169FW) Discrepancy: Eighty-one percent (51 of 63) of persons covered under the 169th Fighter Wing's IO program were either untrained or overdue for annual IO refresher training. (Ref: AFI 14-104, Paragraph A3.1.2)

Corrective Action: A cause assessment was conducted, which found the unsatisfactory rating resulted from the unit's failure to conduct and/or document IO training for their aircrew members, who are included under the local IO program directive (169OSF Operating Instruction 14-9, dated 3 November 2007). As a result of the assessment, the unit conducted a review of its missions and capabilities and determined that their aircrews meet the application criteria of the Air Force's IO program. The unit is currently retraining all personnel.

(2) HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC). HQ AETC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(3) HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC). HQ AFMC conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Directed Energy Directorate	Kirtland AFB, NM

(4) HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC). HQ AFRC conducted four IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
908th Airlift Wing (AW)	Maxwell AFB, AL
43rd Flight Test Squadron (FLTS)	Columbus AFB, MS
514th Air Mobility Wing (AMW)	McGuire AFB, NJ
710th Combat Operations Squadron (COS)	Langley AFB, VA

(5) HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI). HQ AFOSI did not conduct any inspections quarter; however, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (OATSD/IO) conducted three inspections of the following AFOSI units this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
5th Field Investigative Squadron (FIS)	Osan AB, Korea
AFOSI Detachment 613	Kunsan AB, Korea
AFOSI Detachment 614	Seoul, Korea

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(6) **HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC)**. HQ AFSPC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(7) **HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC)**. HQ AMC conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
305th Operation Support Squadron (OSS)	McGuire AFB, NJ

(8) **HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF)**. HQ PACAF conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
13th Air Force (AF)	Hickam AFB HI

(9) **HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE)**. HQ USAFE conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
52 OSS/IN	Spangdahlem AB, GE

(10) **HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC)**. HQ AFSOC conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
352 SOG	RAF Mildenhall, UK

(11) **AF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF ISR) Agency**. AF ISR Agency conducted three IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
67th Network Warfare Wing ⁺	Lackland AFB, TX
39th Information Operations Squadron ⁺	Hurlburt Field, FL
25th Intelligence Squadron ⁺	Hurlburt Field, FL

⁺ ACC unit inspected by AF ISR Agency due to Service Cryptologic Element authority

c. **Trends Noted.** Training within some ACC units appeared to be inadequate to ensure personnel were thoroughly familiar with IO requirements. Further there appeared to be a tendency to inadequately document IO training, an issue that has previously been reported as problematic within AFOSI. Both commands have taken steps to correct the situation. If upcoming reports indicate a continued problem, The Air Force IO panel will consider whether Air Force-wide corrective action is required.

d. **Upcoming Inspections.** The USAF plans to conduct 47 IO inspections during the period 1 Jan – 31 Mar 08 at the following locations:

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- (1) HQ ACC has six inspections planned:

UNIT

5th Bombardment Wing (BW)
55th Wing
9th Reconnaissance Wing (RW)
159th Fighter Wing (FW)
366th Fighter Wing (FW)
177th Fighter Wing (FW)

LOCATION

Minot AFB, ND
Offutt AFB, NE
Beale AFB, CA
New Orleans, LA
Mt. Home, ID
Egg Harbor, NJ

- (2) HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

- (3) HQ AFMC has two inspections planned:

UNIT

Arnold Engineering Development Center
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center

LOCATION

Arnold AFB, TN
Robins AFB, GA

- (4) HQ AFRC has five inspections planned:

UNIT

304th Rescue Squadron
446th Airlift Wing
920th Rescue Wing
943rd Rescue Group
349th Air Mobility Wing

LOCATION

Portland IAP, OR
McChord AFB, WA
Patrick AFB, FL
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
Travis AFB, CA

- (5) HQ AFOSI has twenty-one inspection planned.

UNIT

1st Field Investigative Region (FIR)
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-B
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-C
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-D
AFOSI Detachment 102
AFOSI Detachment 102 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 102 OL-B
AFOSI Detachment 104
AFOSI Detachment 104 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 105
AFOSI Detachment 106
AFOSI Detachment 111
AFOSI Detachment 113
AFOSI Detachment 114
AFOSI Detachment 116
AFOSI Detachment 117

LOCATION

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Indianapolis, IN
Pittsburg, PA
Youngstown, OH
Grissom ARB, IN
Hanscom AFB, MA
Westover ARB, MA
Niagara Falls ARB, NY
Eglin AFB, FL
Hurlburt Field, FL
Robins AFB, GA
Arnold AFB, TN
Edwards AFB, CA
Hill AFB, UT
Tinker AFB, OK
Kirtland AFB, NM
Smyrna, GA

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AFOSI Detachment 118
AFOSI Detachment 119
AFOSI Detachment 119 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 120

Arlington, TX
San Diego, CA
March ARB, CA
Cannon AFB, NM

(6) HQ AFSPC has one inspection planned:

UNIT
50th Space Wing (SW)

LOCATION
Schriever AFB, CO

(7) HQ AMC has three inspections planned:

UNIT
62d Operations Support Squadron (OSS)
182d Operations Support Flight (OSF)
60th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)

LOCATION
McChord AFB WA (18 AF)
Peoria IL (ANG)
Travis AFB CA (18AF)

(8) HQ PACAF has one inspections planned.

UNIT
374th Air Wing AW

LOCATION
Yokota AB Japan

(9) HQ USAFE has one inspection planned:

UNIT
31 OSS/IN

LOCATION
Aviano AB, Italy

(10) HQ AFSOC has one inspection planned:

UNIT
353 SOG

LOCATION
Kadena AB, Japan

(11) AF ISR Agency has six inspections planned:

UNIT
692d Information Operations Group
Detachment 419⁺
488th Intelligence Squadron
95th Reconnaissance Squadron⁺⁺
693d Intelligence Group
450th Intelligence Squadron

LOCATION
Kunia HI
Kunia HI
Mildenhall UK
Mildenhall UK
Ramstein GE
Ramstein GE

* Administratively supported unit.

** ACC unit inspected by AF ISR Agency due to Service Cryptologic Element authority.

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3. Summary of Substantive Department/Agency/Combatant Command-level Changes to IO Programs. There were no substantive changes to IO programs this quarter.


4. Summary of Any Department/Agency/Combatant Command-Level Changes to Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Change. Other than Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, which was significantly revised this past year and which will be reported in the annual report, there were no significant changes to published directives or policies.

5. Procedure 15 Inquiries. For the period 1 Oct - 31 Dec 07, the Intelligence Oversight Panel did not receive any reports of ongoing Procedure 15, DoD 5240.1-R inquiries or any additional matters pertinent to the Air Force intelligence oversight programs.

6. Recommendations for IO Program Improvement. While there are no recommendations to improve the overall IO program, the following improvements to the Air Force IO program were noted during the reporting period:

- a. A test primer was developed by ACC/IG to better prepare units for the requirements of AFI 14-104 assessments. This primer was distributed to all ACC units scheduled for inspection.
- b. The Unit Support Section of HQ ACC/A2's Intelligence Squadron developed an "IO Smart Card".

7. If you have any questions, our primary POC, Maj (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Our alternate, Lt Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Thank you.



DAVID A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance

//Signed//Walker, EXIV, 5 Feb 08
MARY L. WALKER
General Counsel

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



Office of the Secretary

MAY 14 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Report on Intelligence Oversight, 1 Jan – 31 Mar 07 (Reference: ATSD(IO)
Memo, dtd 8 Dec 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress)

Between 1 Jan and 31 Mar 07, the Air Force and ATSD(IO) conducted 30 inspections of Intelligence Oversight (IO) programs. Inspections assessed unit compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons, and the adequacy of IO programs. Several non-critical discrepancies were noted during these inspections for which corrective action was taken.

Additionally, the attached report includes information requested in the ATSD(IO) memo, referenced above, to include substantiated violations of the laws governing IO and recent changes to AF IO policy, directives or programs as applicable.

If you have questions, your staff may contact my POC, Lt Col (b)(2),(b)(6)
Thank you.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

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**USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
(1 January - 31 March 2007)**

Refs: ATSD(IO) Memo, dated December 8, 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement and AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

Please note: The following paragraphs provide a summary of AF IO program activity for the quarter 1 January - 31 March 2007.

1. Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations. There were no violations of law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the period.

2. A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections. The subparagraphs below summarize higher headquarters (HHQ) and unit self inspections conducted during the quarter.

a. Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections:

(1) HQ Air Combat Command (ACC). A total of seven IO inspections were conducted this quarter as scheduled:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
390th Intelligence Squadron (IS)	Kadena AB, Japan
Detachment 3, 25th Intelligence Squadron (IS)	Kadena AB, Japan
82d Reconnaissance Squadron	Kadena AB, Japan
612th Air Intelligence Squadron	Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ
150th Fighter Wing (FW)	Kirtland AFB, NM
49th Fighter Wing (FW)	Holloman AFB, NM
1st Fighter Wing (FW)*	Langley AFB, VA

*** Deficiencies noted in the units above included:**

(1st FW) Discrepancy: The 1st FW Operational Support Squadron intelligence flight did not ensure initial IO training was conducted for all assigned personnel, as outlined in AFI 14-104, Paragraph 5.1. Additionally, the flight did not track annual IO refresher training for all assigned personnel as outlined in AFI 14-104, Paragraph 5.2 and the Attachment 3 checklist. **Corrective Action:** Upon observing the discrepancies previously mentioned, the inspectors educated the unit IO program manager on the requirement to provide initial and annual training to all assigned personnel (regardless of Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)), and to track the training once accomplished. The unit IO program manager promptly added the individual's name to the IO training tracker, and is also updating the unit's local operating instruction to state that "all assigned personnel regardless of AFSC will receive initial and annual IO training."

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(2) **HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC).** HQ AETC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(3) **HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC).** HQ AFMC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

(4) **HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC).** HQ AFRC conducted five IO inspections this quarter.

UNIT

934th Airlift Wing (AW)
482d Fighter Wing (FW)
931st Air Reserve Group
710th Intelligence Operations Flight
10th Air Force

LOCATION

Minneapolis/St Paul IAP, MN
Homestead ARB, FL
McConnell AFB, KS
Brooks City-Base, TX
Carswell JRB/NAS, Ft. Worth, TX

(5) **HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI).** HQ AFOSI conducted 15 inspections this quarter. Additionally, six other units were inspected by ATSD/IO, with no discrepancies noted:

(a) UNIT

AFOSI 4th Field Investigations Region (FIR)
AFOSI Detachment 401
AFOSI Detachment 405
AFOSI Detachment 406
AFOSI Detachment 407
AFOSI Detachment 408
AFOSI Detachment 409
AFOSI Detachment 410
AFOSI Detachment 411
AFOSI Detachment 419*
AFOSI Detachment 421*
AFOSI Detachment 422*
AFOSI Detachment 426
AFOSI Detachment 427
AFOSI Detachment 438

LOCATION

Randolph AFB, TX
Randolph AFB, TX
Maxwell AFB, AL
Columbus AFB, MS
Keesler AFB, MS
Goodfellow AFB, TX
Lackland AFB, TX
Laughlin AFB, TX
Sheppard AFB, TX
Tyndall AFB, FL
Luke AFB, AZ
Altus AFB, OK
New York City, NY
Little Rock AFB, AR
Vance AFB, OK

* Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

(1) **AFOSI Detachment 419:** Non-Critical discrepancy: Training was current for all personnel; however, documentation of initial training could not be located for four personnel. In addition, the unit was not tracking pre-deployment IO training. **Corrective Action:** The unit tracks all initial training on an in-processing checklist. IO training has been added to the HQ AFOSI/DP pre-deployment out-processing checklist.

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(2) **AFOSI Detachment 421:** Non-Critical discrepancy: Training was current for all personnel; however, documentation of initial training could not be located for three personnel. **Corrective Action:** IO training has been added to the HQ AFOSI in-processing checklist. Discrepancies attributed to administrative error. The individual records involved were documented with initial training dates and all training is current.

(3) **AFOSI Detachment 422:** Non-Critical discrepancy: Training was current for all personnel; however, documentation of initial or pre-deployment training could not be located for two personnel. **Corrective Action:** The unit tracks all initial training on an in-processing checklist. IO training has been added to the HQ AFOSI pre-deployment out-processing checklist.

(b) **Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD/IO):** The following units were inspected by ATSD/IO, with no discrepancies noted:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
24th Expeditionary Field Investigation Squadron	Al Udeid, Qatar
AFOSI Detachment 241	Al Udeid, Qatar
AFOSI Expeditionary Detachment 2402	Ali Al Salem, Kuwait
Force Protection Detachment Jordan	Amman, Jordan
Force Protection Detachment Yemen	Sana'a, Republic of Yemen
6th Field Investigations Region (FIR) Staff	Hickam AFB, Hawaii

(6) **HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC).** HQ AFSPC did not conduct any inspections this quarter.

(7) **HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC).** HQ AMC conducted two IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
128th Operations Support Flight (OSF)	Milwaukee WI (ANG)
43d Operations Support Squadron (OSS)	Pope AFB NC (18 AF)

(8) **HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF).** HQ PACAF conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

(9) **HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE).** HQ USAFE conducted no IO inspections this quarter.

(10) **HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC).** HQ AFSOC conducted one IO inspection this quarter.

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UNIT
66th Air Operations Squadron

LOCATION
Ft Bragg, NC

b. **Trends Noted.** In AFOSI, while it appears that all personnel are receiving initial IO training, units are not documenting the training in a manner that is easily identified as initial training. In addition, pre-deployment IO training is not being tracked. **Corrective Action:** The AFOSI IO program manager has contacted all IO monitors and requested that they remind all subordinate monitors of the requirement to document the initial and pre-deployment training.

c. **Upcoming Inspections.** The USAF plans to conduct 20 IO inspections during the period 1 Apr – 30 Jun 07 at the following locations:

(1) HQ ACC has seven inspections planned:

UNIT
Air Force Information Operations Center
346th Test Squadron
Det 3, 544th Intelligence Operations Group
Det 1, 70th Intelligence Wing
451st Information Operations Squadron
OL-ME 690th Alteration & Installation Squadron
183d Fighter Wing (FW)

LOCATION
Lackland AFB, TX
Lackland AFB, TX
Sugar Grove, WV
Menwith Hall Station, UK
Menwith Hall Station, UK
Menwith Hall Station, UK
Capital Map, IL

(2) HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

(3) HQ AFMC has no inspections planned.

(4) HQ AFRC has two inspections planned:

UNIT
22d Air Force
4th Air Force

LOCATION
Dobbins ARB, GA
March ARB, CA

(5) HQ AFOSI has no inspections planned.

(6) HQ AFSPC has two inspections planned:

UNIT
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)
341st Space Wing

LOCATION
Los Angeles AFB, CA
Malmstrom AFB, MT

(7) HQ AMC has three inspections planned:

UNIT
146th Operations Support Flight (OSF)
145th Operations Support Flight (OSF)

LOCATION
Channel Islands, CA (ANG)
Charlotte, NC (ANG)

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117th Operations Support Flight (OSF)

Birmingham, AL (ANG)

(8) HQ PACAF has four inspections planned:

UNIT

36th Wing
254th Air Base Group
154th Wing
15th Airlift Wing

LOCATION

Anderson AFB, Guam
Anderson AFB, Guam
Hickam AFB, HI
Hickam AFB, HI

(9) HQ USAFE has one inspection planned:

UNIT

39th Air Base Wing (ABW)

LOCATION

Incirlik AB, Turkey

(10) HQ AFSOC has one inspection planned:

UNIT

193rd Special Operations Wing

LOCATION

Harrisburg, PA

3. **Summary of Substantive Department/Agency/Combatant Command-level Changes to IO Programs.** During the reporting period, AF/A2 Intelligence Oversight points of contact continued to update and improve the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Community of Practice (CoP) located at "Air Force Knowledge Now" on the Air Force Portal. Also added onto the portal was Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy concerning domestic use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Additionally, our SAF/IGI counterparts added report templates to facilitate compilation of data for quarterly reports.

4. **Summary of Any Department/Agency/Combatant Command-Level Changes to Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Change.** Revised Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, underwent Air Staff and other mandatory coordination this quarter, and was subsequently submitted for certification and approval for publication. The Instruction has been substantially revised to ensure commanders, intelligence oversight monitors, intelligence personnel, inspectors general and judge advocates/legal advisors are cognizant of intelligence oversight policy and requirements; to clarify training and reporting requirements, domestic imagery guidance, and intelligence functions in the force protection arena; to delineate intelligence functions for each procedure identified in DOD 5240.1-R; and to add guidance for reporting incidentally acquired threat information and Internet usage. A copy of the new document will be included in the 4th quarter report.

5. **Procedure 15 Inquiries.** For the period January 1 - March 31 2007, the Intelligence Oversight Panel has not received any reports of ongoing Procedure 15, DoD 5240.1-R inquiries or any additional matters pertinent to the Air Force intelligence oversight programs.

6. **Recommendations for IO Program Improvement.** The Air Force has no recommendations this reporting period. For the information of the IOB, the Air Force IO Panel

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sent a memorandum to MAJCOM Commanders thanking them for their response to the call for new report elements, pointing out that all incidents of questionable conduct must be reported, even if resolved, and encouraging suggestions for improvement in the intelligence oversight program.

7. Our primary POC for this report, Lt Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Our alternate, Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6).

for
e-signed BGen DePuma
DAVID A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance

e-signed Walker, EXIV
Mary L. Walker
General Counsel

Ronald F. Sams
RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General



Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC



MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAF/IG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Report on Intelligence Oversight, 1 Apr-30 Jun 07 (Reference: ATSD(IO)
Memo, dtd 8 Dec 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress)

Between 1 April and 30 June 2007, the Air Force conducted 18 inspections of Intelligence Oversight (IO) programs. Inspections assessed unit compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons, and the adequacy of IO programs. All IO programs during this period were assessed as meeting standards and there were no trends noted.

This report also includes information requested in the referenced memo regarding substantiated violations of the laws governing IO and recent changes to AF IO policy, directives or programs.

If you have questions, your staff may contact my POC, Maj (b)(2),(b)(6)
(b)(2) Thank you.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

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USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
(1 April - 30 June 2007)

References:

- a. ATSD(IO) Memo, dated December 8, 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement
- b. AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

Please note: The following paragraphs conform to the reporting requirements outlined in the ATSD(IO) memo referenced above, and provide a summary of AF IO program activity for the quarter 1 Apr - 30 Jun 07.

1. **Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations.** There were no violations of law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the period.
2. **A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.** The subparagraphs below summarize higher headquarters (HHQ) and unit self inspections conducted during the quarter.

a. Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections:

- (1) **HQ Air Combat Command (ACC).** Three IO inspections were conducted this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
183d Fighter Wing (FW)	Capital Map, IL
140 th FW	Buckley, CO
509 th Bomb Wing (BW)	Whiteman AFB, MO

- (2) **HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC).** HQ AETC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

- (3) **HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC).** HQ AFMC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

- (4) **HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC).** HQ AFRC conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
604 th Regional Support Group (4 AF)	March ARB, CA

- (5) **HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI).**

- (a) HQ AFOSI did not conduct any inspections this quarter.

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(b) Correction to 1 Jan - 31 Mar 07 Report: The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD/IO) did not inspect AFOSI Expeditionary Detachment 2402, Ali Al Salem, Kuwait, as previously reported.

(6) **HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC)**. HQ AFSPC conducted two inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)	Los Angeles AFB, CA
341 st Space Wing (SW)	Malmstrom AFB, MT

(7) **HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC)**. HQ AMC conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1117 th Operation Support Flight (OSF)	Birmingham, AL (ANG)
146 th OSF	Channel Island, CA (ANG)
145 th OSF	Charlotte, NC (ANG)

(8) **HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF)**. HQ PACAF conducted three IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
36 th Wing	Anderson AFB, Guam
154 th Wing	Hickam AFB, HI
15 Airlift Wing (AW)	Hickam AFB, HI

(9) **HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE)**. HQ USAFE conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
39 th Air Base Wing (ABW)	Incirlik AB, Turkey

(10) **HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC)**. HQ AFSOC conducted one IO inspection this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
193 Special Operations Wing (SOW)(ANG)	Harrisburg, PA

(11) **AF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF ISR) Agency**. AF ISR conducted four IO inspections this quarter:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
AF Information Operation Center	Lackland AFB, TX
544 th Intelligence Group, Det 3	Sugar Grove, WV
70 th Intelligence Wing (IW)	RAF Menwith Hill Station, UK
451 st Intelligence Squadron (IS)	RAF Menwith Hill Station, UK

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c. **Trends Noted.** Units and personnel assessed during this period appeared familiar with IO program requirements. No negative trends were noted by any of the MAJCOMs IG teams. SAF/GC, SAF/IG, or AF/AZ.

d. **Upcoming Inspections.** The USAF plans to conduct 49 IO inspections during the period 1 Jul - 30 Sep 07, at the following locations:

(1) HQ ACC has four inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
116 th Air Control Wing (ACW)	Warner Robins AFB, GA
609 th Air Operations Group (AOG)	Shaw AFB, SC
20 th Fighter Wing (FW)	Shaw AFB, SC
152d Air Wing	San Juan, PR

(2) HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

(3) HQ AFMC has no inspections planned.

(4) HQ AFRC has nine inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
442d Fighter Wing (FW)	Whiteman AFB, MO
96 th Aerial Port Squadron (APS)	Little Rock AFB, AR
48 th APS	Hickam AFB, HI
624 th Aeromedical Staging Squadron	Hickam AFB, HI
624 th Civil Engineer Squadron (CES)	Hickam AFB, HI
624 th Regional Support Group	Hickam AFB, HI
701 st Combat Operations Squadron, Det 1	Hickam AFB, HI
44 th APS	Anderson AFB, Guam
724 th Aeromedical Flight	Anderson AFB, Guam

(5) HQ AFOSI has 23 inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
AFOSI 5th Field Investigations Region (FIR) Staff	Ramstein AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 501	Ramstein AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 502	Sembach AB, GE
AFOSI 51 st Field Investigative Squadron (FIS)	RAF Mildenhall, UK
AFOSI 51 st FIS/OL-A	Bonn, GE
AFOSI 51 st FIS/OL-C	London, UK
AFOSI 51 st FIS/OL-D	Berlin, GE
AFOSI Detachment 512	RAF Lakenheath, UK
AFOSI Detachment 514	RAF Alconbury, UK
AFOSI Detachment 514 OL-A	RAF Fairford, UK
AFOSI Detachment 514 OL-B	RAF Menwith Hill, UK
AFOSI Detachment 515	Ramstein AB, GE

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AFOSI Detachment 516	Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal
AFOSI Detachment 517	Stuttgart AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 518	Spangdahlem AB, GE
AFOSI Detachment 519	Brussels, Belgium
AFOSI Detachment 521	Ankara, Turkey
AFOSI Detachment 522	Incirlik AB, Turkey
AFOSI Detachment 523	Izmir, Turkey
AFOSI Detachment 531	Aviano AB, Italy
AFOSI Detachment 532	Moron AB, Spain
AFOSI Detachment 535	Rome, Italy
AFOSI Detachment 538	Paris, France

(6) HQ AFSPC has no inspections planned.

(7) HQ AMC has 7 inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
89 th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)	Andrews AFB, MD
92d OSS	Fairchild AFB, WA
141 st OSF	Fairchild AFB, WA (ANG)
165 th OSF	Savannah, GA (ANG)
167 th OSF	Martinsburg, WV (ANG)
133d OSF	Minneapolis, MN (ANG)
375 th OSS	Scott AFB, IL

(8) HQ PACAF has no inspections planned.

(9) HQ USAFE has one inspection planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
48 th Fighter Wing (FW)	RAF Lakenheath, UK

(10) HQ AFSOC has two inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
353 rd Special Operations Group (SOG)	Kadena, Japan
Special Operations Command Special Ops	Osan AB, Korea

(11) AF ISR Agency has three inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
544 th Intelligence Group	Peterson AFB, CO
Detachment 46	Schriever AFB, CO
485 th Intelligence Squadron	Mainz-Kastel Station, GE

3. Summary of Substantive Department/Agency/Combatant Command-level Changes to IO Programs. AF/A2 Intelligence Oversight (IO) points of contact continued to update and improve the IO Community of Practice (CoP) on AF Knowledge Now on the AF Portal during

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the reporting period. The IO CoP was launched by AF/A2 on 8 May 06 and is supported by SAF/GCM and SAF/IGI. The CoP provides quick and easy access to IO information, and is open to anyone with .mil or AF Portal access.

4. Summary of Any Department/Agency/Combatant Command-Level Changes to Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Change. During this period, the revision to AF Instruction (AFI) 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*, dated 16 April 2007, became available for downloading from the AF e-Publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil/. The AFI has been substantially revised to ensure commanders, intelligence oversight monitors, intelligence personnel, inspectors general and judge advocates/legal advisors are cognizant of intelligence oversight policy and requirements; to clarify training and reporting requirements, domestic imagery guidance, and intelligence function in the force protection arena; to delineate intelligence functions for each procedure identified in DOD 5240.1-R; and to add guidance for reporting incidentally acquired threat information and Internet usage.


5. Procedure 15 Inquiries. For the period 1 Apr - 30 Jun 07, the Intelligence Oversight Panel did not received any reports of ongoing Procedure 15, DoD 5240.1-R inquiries or any additional matters pertinent to the Air Force intelligence oversight programs.

6. Recommendations for IO Program Improvement. The Air Force has no recommendations this reporting period.

7. If you have any questions, our interim POC, Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Our alternate, Lt Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Thank you.

//e-signed// Deptula, Lt Gen
DAVID A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance

for
//e-signed// Deavel, SES
Mary L. Walker
General Counsel



RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

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Office of the Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON DC

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

FROM: SAPIG
1140 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1140

SUBJECT: USAF Report on Intelligence Oversight, 1 Jan-31 Mar 08

Between 1 January and 31 March 2008, the Air Force conducted 45 inspections of Intelligence Oversight (IO) programs. Inspections assessed unit compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons, and the adequacy of IO programs. Of the 45 unit IO programs inspected this quarter, two unit programs experienced critical item failures and were assessed as "Does not Comply/Unsatisfactory." Both units immediately fixed any deficiencies and/or retrained their personnel and were re-evaluated on the specific deficient items in order to meet compliance standards. The remaining 43 unit IO programs were assessed as "in compliance" or "satisfactory."

This report also includes information regarding a potential questionable activity that may have violated law, regulation, or policy. This AFOSI-identified, questionable activity involved a cyber operation commonly referred to as a "honey net" operation. The operation has been suspended pending legal clarification.

If you have questions, your staff may contact my POC, Maj (b)(2),(b)(6)
Thank you.

RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
IO Report

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**USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
(1 January- 31 March 2008)**

The following paragraphs provide a summary of AF IO program activity for the first quarter of CY 2008 (1 Jan - 31 Mar).

1. Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations. There was one potential violation of law, regulation, or policy reported during this quarter.

1.1. AFOSI identified one potential questionable activity during this quarter involving a cyber operation. Commonly referred to as a "honey net" operation, in May 06 an OPLAN was approved to develop a website to identify & exploit foreign threats to DoD equities. In Oct 07, during the course of coordinating the operation with another agency, it was realized that the collection of some information targeting non-US persons may be incongruent with a Spring 07 classified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court (FISC) opinion which may require a FISA warrant for legal interception in such cyber operations. This opinion was not released within USAF/DoD channels & neither SAF/GC nor AFOSI/SJA has been privy to it. In fact, it was only recognized that this FISC opinion may be applicable to AFOSI when it was reported in the open press and a member of AFOSI/SJA happened to read it.

1.2. Upon identification of this potential questionable activity, the operation was suspended and AFOSI/SJA began coordination with SAF/GC seeking clarification of the FISC opinion. At that time, SAF/GC made a request for the subject document but was denied by DoJ National Security Law Division. To date, neither SAF nor AFOSI has been granted access to the FISC opinion. Legal coordination seeking clarification of this potential questionable activity is ongoing.

2. A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections. The subparagraphs below summarize higher headquarters (HHQ) and unit self inspections conducted during the quarter. In all, 45 IO inspections were conducted this quarter

2.1. Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections.

2.1.1. HQ Air Combat Command (ACC). HQ ACC conducted six IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

UNIT

5th Bomb Wing
55th Wing
9th Reconnaissance Wing
159th Fighter Wing
366th Fighter Wing
177th Fighter Wing

LOCATION

Minot AFB, ND
Offutt AFB, NE
Beale AFB, CA
New Orleans JRB, LA
Mountain Home AFB, ID
Egg Harbor, NJ

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2.1.2. HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC). HQ AETC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

2.1.3. HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC). HQ AFMC did not conduct any IO inspections this quarter.

2.1.4. HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC). HQ AFRC conducted five IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

UNIT

304th Rescue Squadron (RQS)
446th Airlift Wing (AW)
349th Air Mobility Wing (AMW)
920th Rescue Wing (RQW)
943rd Rescue Group (RQG)

LOCATION

Portland IAP, OR
McChord AFB, WA
Travis AFB, CA
Patrick AFB, FL
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ

2.1.5. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Inspector General (AFOSI/IG): AFOSI/IG conducted 22 inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted. Additionally, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (OATSD/IO) did not conduct any inspections of AFOSI units during this quarter.

UNIT

1st Field Investigative Region Staff
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-B
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-C
AFOSI Detachment 101 OL-D
AFOSI Detachment 102
AFOSI Detachment 102 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 102 OL-B
AFOSI Detachment 102 OL-C AFRL
AFOSI Detachment 104
AFOSI Detachment 104 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 105
AFOSI Detachment 106
AFOSI Detachment 111
AFOSI Detachment 113
AFOSI Detachment 114
AFOSI Detachment 116
AFOSI Detachment 117
AFOSI Detachment 118
AFOSI Detachment 119
AFOSI Detachment 119 OL-A
AFOSI Detachment 120

LOCATION

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Indianapolis, IN
Pittsburgh, PA
Youngstown, OH
Grissom ARB, IN
Hanscom AFB, MA
Westover ARB, MA
Niagara Falls ARB, NY
Rome, NY
Eglin AFB, FL
Hurlburt Field, FL
Robins AFB, GA
Arnold AFB, TN
Edwards AFB, CA
Hill AFB, UT
Tinker AFB, OK
Kirtland AFB, NM
Smyrna, GA
Arlington, TX
San Diego, CA
March ARB, CA
Cannon AFB, NM

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2.1.6. HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC). HQ AFSPC conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

UNIT

50th Space Wing (SW)

LOCATION

Schriever AFB, CO

2.1.7. HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC). HQ AMC conducted three IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

UNIT

62d Operations Support Squadron (OSS)

182d Operations Support Flight (OSF)

60th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)

LOCATION

McChord AFB WA (18 AF)

Peoria IL (ANG)

Travis AFB CA (18AF)

2.1.8. HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF). HQ PACAF conducted one IO inspection this quarter.

UNIT

374 Air Wing (AW)*

LOCATION

Yokota AB, Japan

* Critical/Non-critical deficiencies noted in the unit above:

2.1.8.1. 374 AW Discrepancy. The unit's IO training program did not include all core curriculum requirements as defined in AFI 14-104, Attachment 2. Deficiencies were corrected on the spot.

2.1.9. HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE). HQ USAFE did not conduct any IO inspection this quarter.

2.1.10. HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC). HQ AFSOC conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted.

UNIT

353d Special Operations Group (SOG)

LOCATION

Kadena AB, Japan

2.1.11. AF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF ISR) Agency. AF ISR Agency conducted three IO inspections this quarter.

UNIT

692d Intelligence Group*

324th Intelligence Squadron

352d Information Operations Squadron *

LOCATION

Hickam AFB, HI

Hickam AFB, HI

Hickam AFB, HI

* ACC unit inspected by AF ISR Agency due to Service Cryptologic Element authority

* Critical/Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

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2.1.11.1. 692 IG Discrepancy: Unit received an UNSATISFACTORY rating for not meeting 75 percent minimum requirement for knowledge in one critical area. A minimum of 10% of 692 IG personnel (30% sampled) did not indicate knowledge of specific procedures and restrictions governing collection of intelligence on US persons by methods such as electronic or physical surveillance, reference AFI 14-104, paragraph A3.2.3. The 692 IG immediately conducted unit-wide retraining to bring the unit into compliance.

2.2. Trends Noted. No significant trends of overall non-compliance or mismanagement of the IO program were identified.

2.3. Upcoming Inspections. The USAF plans to conduct 28 IO inspections during the period 1 Apr - 30 Jun 08 at the following locations:

2.3.1. HQ ACC has three inspections planned:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
1st Fighter Wing (FW)	Langley AFB, VA
3rd Air Support Operations Group	Ft. Hood, TX
127th Wing	Selfridge, MI

2.3.2. HQ AETC has no inspections planned.

2.3.3. HQ AFMC has no inspections planned.

2.3.4. HQ AFRC has no inspections planned.

2.3.5. HQ AFOSI has fourteen inspection planned.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
AFOSI Office of Special Projects Directorate	Crystal City, VA
AFOSI PJ Operating Location A (OL-A)	Scott AFB, IL
AFOSI PJ OL-B	Langley AFB, VA
Detachment 1	Las Vegas, NV
Detachment 2	Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
Detachment 2 OL-A	Marietta, GA
Detachment 3	Eglin AFB, FL
Detachment 3 OL-A	Tuscon, AZ
Detachment 4	Hanscom AFB, MA
Detachment 5	Kirtland AFB, NM
Detachment 6	Pentagon, DC
Detachment 7	Lancaster, CA
Detachment 8	Crystal City, VA
Detachment 9	Arlington, TX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

2.3.6. HQ AFSPC has two inspection planned:

UNIT

460th Space Wing
137th Space Warning Squadron

LOCATION

Buckley AFB, CO
Greeley, CO

2.3.7. HQ AMC has two inspections planned:

UNIT

319th Operations Support Squadron (OSS)
123d Operations Support Flight (OSF)

LOCATION

Grand Forks AFB ND (18 AF)
Louisville KY (ANG)

2.3.8. HQ PACAF has two inspections planned.

UNIT

8th Fighter Wing (FW)
51st Fighter Wing (FW)

LOCATION

Kunsan AB, ROK
Osan AB, ROK

2.3.9. HQ USAFE has no inspections planned:

2.3.10. HQ AFSOC has eight inspection planned:

UNIT

720th Special Tactics Group (STG)
24th Special Tactics Squadron (STS)
21st Special Tactics Squadron (STS)
23rd Special Tactics Squadron (STS)
22d Special Tactics Squadron (STS)
10th Combat Weather Squadron (CWS)
10th Combat Weather Squadron (CWS) Det 5
10th Combat Weather Squadron (CWS) Det 1

LOCATION

Hurlburt Fld FL
Ft Bragg, NC
Pope AFB, NC
Hurlburt Fld, FL
Mc Coord AFB, WA
Hurlburt Fld, FL
Ft Bragg, NC
Ft Lewis, WA

2.3.11. AF ISR Agency has eleven inspections planned:

UNIT

303d Intelligence Squadron
DET 2, 18th Intelligence Squadron
National Air & Space Center
DET 1, 18th Intelligence Squadron
DET 3, 83d Network Operations Squadron**
488th Intelligence Squadron
DET 2, 25th Intelligence Squadron
DET 4, 18th Intelligence Squadron
693d Intelligence Group
450th Intelligence Squadron
426th Information Operations Squadron **

LOCATION

Osan AB, Korea
Osan AB, Korea
Wright Patterson AFB, OH
Wright Patterson AFB, OH
Wright Patterson AFB, OH
RAF Mildenhall AB, UK
RAF Mildenhall AB, UK
RAF Feltwell, UK
Ramstein AB, Germany
Ramstein AB, Germany
Ramstein AB, Germany

** ACC unit inspected by AF ISR Agency due to Service Cryptologic Element authority.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3. **Summary of Substantive Department/Agency/Combatant Command-level Changes to IO Programs.** There were no substantive changes to IO programs this quarter.

4. **Summary of Any Department/Agency/Combatant Command-Level Changes to Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Change.** There were no significant changes to published directives or policies.


5. **Procedure 15 Inquiries.** For the period 1 Jan - 31 Mar 08, the Intelligence Oversight Panel did not received any reports of ongoing Procedure 15, DoD 5240.1-R inquiries or any additional matters pertinent to the Air Force intelligence oversight programs.

6. **Recommendations for IO Program Improvement.** The Air Force recommends that ATSD(IO), in coordination with the DoD General counsel, contact the Department of Justice, to create procedures to permit affected DoD entities to have access to FISC opinions that may affect their activities (see paragraph 1.1 of this report). Perhaps a repository of such opinions could be established in the DoD GC. If access to the FISC opinions by subordinate DoD entities is not permitted, we recommend that ATSD(IO) ensure that important legal or policy issues addressed in such opinions be published in some manner as guidance to the DoD intelligence community.

7. If you have any questions, our primary POC, Maj (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Our alternate, Lt Col (b)(6) may be reached at (b)(2) or emailed at (b)(2),(b)(6). Thank you.

//Signed//Lt Gen Deptula, 30 May 08
DAVID A. DEPTULA
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance

//Signed//Walker, EXIV, 28 May 08
MARY L. WALKER
General Counsel


RONALD F. SAMS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

UNCLASSIFIED

6

EEF

1074



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1014 N STREET SE SUITE 100
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser 00/0189
12 FEB 2002

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333 of 4 Dec 81
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1 of 25 Apr 88
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R of 7 Dec 82
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3D


Encl: (1) Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Oversight Report of
15 Jan 02
(2) Deputy Naval Inspector for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC)
Oversight Report of 10 Jan 02
(3) Listing of Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 October 2001-31 December 2002. Reference (d) tasks ten Navy commanders and the DNIGMC to report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVIG) their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. Notable interest items are forwarded as enclosures (1) and (2). Inspections conducted this past quarter are listed in enclosure (3).

2. Summary of IO reports received this quarter: Most of the commands continued training during this reporting period, and inspections were conducted by: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM), Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (CNRIC), DNIGMC and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

3. Note of interest for this reporting period. ONI and DNIGMC continue to work IO issues related to the War on Terrorism (see enclosure (1)). Also the DNIGMC reported their work towards a policy change by the Defense Intelligence Agency authorizing Services/Commands approval authority for internal domestic airborne imagery (see enclosure 2).

4. During this reporting period, NAVIG received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.


MICHAEL D. HASKINS

Copy to:
UNSECNAV, UNSECNAV (ASP), CNO, VCNO, DOGC, JAG, DNIGMC, DNI (N2)

EFF

1075



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
4251 SUITLAND ROAD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20395-5720

IN REPLY REFER TO

3820
Ser OCA1/0003
15 Jan 02

From: Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) QUARTERLY REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) DoDDIR 5240.1-R
(c) ONI ltr 3820 Ser ONI-OCA1/0029 of 15 Oct 01

1. This is a consolidated Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO (N2)) and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) IO Quarterly Report for the period 1 October through 31 December 2001.
2. Annual IO training for ONI has been completed for 2001 with exception of out-of-area personnel who will complete the training in the near future. Due to the events of 11 September and destruction of CNO (N2) Pentagon spaces and subsequent physical move to new spaces, completion of the annual training requirement for the CNO (N2) staff was extended until 31 January.
3. The ONI Inspector General and Staff Judge Advocate, as well as the CNO (N2) Staff Judge Advocate, continue to work closely with U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service personnel concerning ONI and CNO IO issues related to maritime defense of the homeland and the War on Terrorism (WOT).
4. No CNO (N2) or ONI incidents or activities which would raise any question of legality or propriety under the provisions of references (a) and (b) have come to the attention of the undersigned since the submission of the last report, reference (c).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
CNO (N2J)

EFF

1076
TOTAL P.02
PAGE 02



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3800
IGO
10 Jan 02

From: Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps
Matters/Inspector General of the Marine Corps
To: Naval Inspector General (NIG-00G1)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE FIRST
QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2002
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) MCO 3800.2A

1. Per the references, the following information is provided:

a. During the subject period no intelligence or counterintelligence activities were discovered or reported which were believed to be questionable, illegal, improper, or contrary to applicable law, statutes, directives, or policies.

b. The most significant intelligence oversight activity during the reporting period continued to surround the response the 11 September terror events. The volume of communications with Marine Corps CONUS bases and stations considerably increased to provide guidance and clarification on Intelligence Oversight regulations related to intelligence support to anti-terrorism/force protection efforts. Information has been disseminated via information papers, Naval message, electronically, in newsletters, meetings, and on the Marine Corps internet homepage.

c. On 28 November 2001 the Defense Intelligence Agency released a message authorizing Services/Commands approval authority for internal domestic airborne imagery "Proper Use" requests. This change in policy was the direct result of a Marine Corps initiative. The Inspector General has developed, staffed, received DIA approval, and subsequently promulgated new internal oversight policy for tactical domestic imagery.

d. Other highlights of general intelligence oversight activity during the reporting period include on-site surveys and inspections of the Headquarters, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), Indian Head, MD; Special Operations Training Group, Atlantic during an urban training exercise near Richmond, VA; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command,

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1077

Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE FOURTH
QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2001

Quantico, VA; the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico,
VA; and 1st Marine Division, 1st Force Service Support Group, and
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, in Southern CA.

e. Marine Corps commands and support activities conducted
required annual training, refresher training, and inspections
during the reporting period.

2. Please direct any inquiries to (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Director,
Oversight Division, at commercial (b)(2)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Copy to:

CMC (IO)

COMMARFORPAC (INSP)

COMMARFORLANT (G-7)

COMMARFORRES (G-7)

CO, MCIA

CO, MSG, BN

CO, MARSPTEN

The following is a summary of component commands inspected for Intelligence Oversight during the period 1 October-31 December 2001:

CINCPACFLT

COMSUBGRU NINE

COMNAVSPECWARCOM

NAVSPECWARGRU TWO

NAVSPECWARDEVGRU

CNRIC

RIA 10

DNIGMC

HQ, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, Indian Head, MD

Special Operations Training Group, Atlantic, Richmond, VA

Marine Corp Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA

Marine Corp Intelligence Activity, Quantico, VA

1st Marine Division (Southern CA)

1st Force Service Support Group (Southern CA)

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (Southern CA)

NCIS

NCIS Middle East Field Office



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1014 N STREET SE SUITE 100
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3820
Ser 00/0825
14 MAY 2001


From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Via: (1) Judge Advocate General
(2) General Counsel
(3) Under Secretary of the Navy
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT
Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333 of 4 Dec 81
(b) DOD Directive 5240.1 of 25 Apr 88
(c) DOD Directive 5240.1-R of 7 Dec 82
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
Encl: (1) Summary and Reports of Oversight Activities Conducted
by Components Reporting to the Naval Inspector General

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 January 2001 through 30 April 2001. Reference (d) tasks ten Navy commanders and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters to report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVIG) their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. These reports are forwarded as enclosure (1).

2. Summary of IO reports received this quarter: Most of the commands continued training during this reporting period, and inspections were conducted by: Commander, Naval Security Group Command, Commander, Naval Reserve Security Group Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Marine Corps, and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command.

3. Note of interest for this reporting period. The 16 January 2001 NCIS issue at the Mayport Field Office, which was identified by your office, illustrates the types of pitfalls that can hinder an organization's mission success. NCIS has a vital role in the counterintelligence community and will continue to work hard at practicing sound IO judgment. We believe the action taken to resolve this issue will discourage reoccurrence.

4. NAVIG received one report from COMNAVRESINTCOM that raised a question of legality. A reservist assigned to DIAHQ 1482 observed information that may have been about an U.S. person in a DIA database. The reservist stopped work on his project and notified the chain of command and the DIA team chief. COMNAVRESINTCOM determined the question was properly addressed and no violation had occurred.


MICHAEL D. HASKINS

Copy to: CNO, VCNO, DNIGMC, DNI (N2), UNSECNAV (ASP)

EFF

1080

SUMMARY AND REPORTS OF OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

CONDUCTED BY

COMPONENTS REPORTING TO THE NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1081

The following is a summary of component commands inspected for Intelligence Oversight during this past quarter:

COMNAVSECGRU

Naval Security Group Activity, Bahrain
Naval Security Group Activity, Pearl Harbor, HI
(Findings: training deficiencies. See IO inspection summary.)

COMNAVSPECWARCOM

COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
COMPSECBOATRON TWO
NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE

COMNAVRESINTCOM

RIA 19, Washington, DC

- ONI 0466
- ONI 0566
- ONI 0766
- ONI 1566
- ONI 1666
- DIAHQ 0166
- DIAHQ 0366
- DIAHQ 0466
- FLTAIR KEF 1066
- NCIS HQ 0166
- CNO INTEL 0166
- OSD TECH TRANSFER 0166

RIA 6, Ft Worth, TX

- USCINCSO 0270
- DIAHQ 1310
- JICPAC 1070
- CINCPACFLT INTEL

COMNAVRESSECGRU

NAVRESSECGRU, New Orleans
RCAC East

Marine Corps (On-site surveys)

Various sites in Hawaii (including HQ in Pearl Harbor)
Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Center, Dam Neck, VA

NCIS

NCISRA Sigonella

NAVIG

CINCLANTFLT Norfolk, VA



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
250 MAKALAPA DRIVE
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-3131

3820 IN REPLY REFER TO:
Ser/N00IG/0758
16 Apr 01

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: CY01 FIRST QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) CNO WASHINGTON DC 252203Z SEP 98 (NAVOP 009/98)

1. This report is provided in accordance with reference (a)
2. During the first quarter of calendar year 2001, no intelligence activity believed to violate U.S. law, Executive Order, Presidential directive, or applicable DoD or DON policies was reported to CINCPACFLT.
3. No intelligence oversight inspections were conducted during the quarter. However, program compliance is continually monitored. Discrepancies will be reported. These practices are considered to be in consonance with reference (b).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Fleet Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 250
NORFOLK, VA. 23551-2487

3800
N2/016180
7 May 01

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (N2M)
To: Naval Inspector General (NIG-23)


Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT QUARTERLY REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) CINCLANTFLTINST 5041.9B


Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Report First Quarter CY-01

1. Per references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is forwarded:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

A large rectangular area at the bottom of the page is redacted with a solid grey fill. The redaction covers the bottom portion of the page's content.

1. Subject report for 1st quarter CY-01 is provided in accordance with reference (a):

a. Illegal Intelligence Activities. No illegal intelligence activity or activity contrary to reference (a) was noted or reported by this command or its subordinates during reporting period.

b. Significant oversight activities.

(1) Scheduled Intelligence oversight Inspections: Nvy Inspector General conducted assist visit for CINCLANTFLT on 19 April.

(2) Command oversight training and/or inspections:

(a) Training: One hundred and eleven personnel trained.

(b) Inspections: N/A/

c. Suggestions for improvement: Change to semi-annual reporting.

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE
BOX 2
7 NORTH AUDLEY STREET
LONDON, W.1.

3820
Ser N2SSO/03-01
2 Apr 01

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
To: Naval Inspector General (ATTN: NIG-00G), Washington Navy
Yard, Washington D.C. 20374-2001

Subj: CY-01 FIRST QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (I/O) REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) CINCUSNAVEUR ltr 3820 Ser N23/05-00 of 29 Dec 00

1. This report is submitted in accordance with reference (a). Reference (b) was CINCUSNAVEUR CY-00 Fourth quarter report.

2. Basic Findings. We are not aware of any intelligence activity in the USNAVEUR area of responsibility during this reporting period which could be construed as illegal, questionable, or contrary either to the strictures of EO 12863 or reference (a). There have been no reported instances of fraud, waste, abuse, standards of conducts or ethics violations, financial misconduct or conflicts of interest, which have impacted Intelligence operations.

3. CURRENT STATUS AND UNDERTAKINGS.

a. CINCUSNAVEUR (N2), and ONI SPINTCOMM CINCUSNAVEUR. Continued to use I/O reading material for orientation of all incoming Intelligence Division personnel. I/O indoctrination provided to six newly reported personnel assigned to Intelligence Division. Annual Intelligence oversight refresher training was provided to all Intelligence directorate personnel as part of annual Security Refresher training. An overall introduction to the Intelligence oversight program was also provided to all other SCI indoctrinated personnel as part of their annual security refresher training.

b. COMSIXTHFLT. I/O training is included as part of SSO check-in/indoctrinations. I/O indoctrination provided to ten newly reported personnel reporting to Intelligence Division.

c. COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIX SEVEN/SIX NINE. SSO Naples provided initial I/O indoctrinations to thirty-three newly reported personnel assigned to commands supported.

Subj: CY-01 FIRST QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (I/O) REPORT

d. TACTICAL SUPPORT CENTER SIGONELLA. I/O training is included as part of SSO check-in/indoctrinations. I/O indoctrination provided to three newly reported personnel.

e. FAIRECONRON TWO (VQ-2). I/O policies and security awareness continues to be emphasized during all officer meetings, quarters, crew briefings and SSO indoctrinations. Documented reindoctrinations were conducted for CRC's-1 through 7 prior to deployment. Twenty-five individuals were indoctrinated and introduced to intelligence oversight procedures.

f. CROF SOUDA BAY CRETE. I/O training is included as part of SSO check-in/indoctrinations. I/O indoctrination provided to two newly reported personnel this quarter.

4. THEATER SUMMARY. The following recapitulates intelligence subordinate units which are subject to I/O Program requirements:

- (1) Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR N-2).
- (2) Commander Sixth Fleet (N2).
- (3) Commander Task Force SIX SEVEN (CTF 67 N2).
- (4) Commander Task Force SIX NINE (CTF 69 N2).
- (5) Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron TWO (VQ-2).
- (6) Tactical Support Center Sigonella, Sicily.
- (7) Consolidated Reconnaissance Operations Facility (CROF), Souda Bay, Crete.

All organizations listed above have the capability to collect, retain and/or disseminate intelligence within the meaning of reference (a). Each conducts and complies with its I/O responsibilities as enumerated in reference (a).

5. Commands inspected this quarter: None - Based on IDTC reductions, CINCUSNAVEUR will monitor and report but not inspect subject program compliance for subordinates.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

STEPHEN B. SALE
Fleet Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
FPO AE 09501-6008

IN REPLY TO:
3820
Ser 01/341
4 Apr 01

From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
To: Navy Inspector General (NIG-00G)

Subj: FY-01 SECOND QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) Executive Order 12333
(c) Executive Order 12863

1. This quarterly report of intelligence oversight (IO) is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. We are not aware of any intelligence activity in the CENTCOM area of responsibility during this reporting period, which could be constructed as illegal, questionable, or contrary to references (a) through (c).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Chief of Staff

Copy to:
USCENTCOM (CCJ2-CSB)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
4251 SUITLAND ROAD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20395-5720

IN REPLY REFER TO

3820
Ser OCA1/0012
12 Apr 01

From: Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) QUARTERLY REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) DoDDIR 5240.1-R
(c) ONI ltr 3820 Ser ONI-OCA1/0003 of 19 Jan 01

Encl: (1) Copies of ONI Inspector General NORTHSTAR web pages
(2) 30 copies of Compact Disc (CD) containing copies
of ONI Intelligence Oversight posters

1. This is a consolidated Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO (N2)) and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) IO Quarterly Report for the period 1 January through 31 March 2001.

2. We have continued development of the ONI Intranet (NORTHSTAR) IG home page which includes extensive IO information and training aids. Enclosure (1) contains copies of (a) the NORTHSTAR ONI IG Roles, Responsibilities and Authorities page which is hyperlinked to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) home page under the IO portion of the page, (b) the IO training page which is hyperlinked to a streaming video on IO training, and (c) an IO quiz page with 21 questions which are hyperlinked to the answers.

3. Enclosure (2) is forwarded in response to your request for electronic copies of the two ONI Intelligence Oversight posters previously provided in hard copy format. Additional CDs may be obtained through our point of contact, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(2)

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) QUARTERLY REPORT

4. No CNO(N2) or ONI incidents or activities which would raise any question of legality or propriety under the provisions of references (a) and (b) have come to the attention of the undersigned since the submission of the last report, reference (c).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
CNO(N2J)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
9800 SAVAGE ROAD, SUITE 6585
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MD 20755-6585

3820
Ser N00IG/197
14 Mar 01

From: Inspector General, Naval Security Group Command
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
EFFORTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING MARCH 2001

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D


Encl: (1) Summary of Intelligence Oversight Inspections

1. This quarterly report of intelligence oversight (IO) within the Naval Security Group Command is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. The inspection team noted no deviations from the guidance provided by reference (a). The inspections consisted of an interview with the IO Manager, a review of program documentation, a review of individual training records and random interviews with command personnel.

3. The Naval Security Group Command conducted two IO inspections during this quarter. Enclosure (1) includes a summary of the inspections of U.S. Naval Security Group Activity, Bahrain and Naval Security Group Activity Pearl Harbor. Actions taken on deficiencies sited in the enclosure will be addressed in the next quarterly report.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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Copy to:
CNO(N2)

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT U.S. NSGA
BAHRAIN

INSPECTION DATES: 13 - 16 FEBRUARY 2001

OUTCOME: ONE FORMAL FINDING

The inspection of U.S. NSGA Bahrain revealed that the command has taken little to no action on the Intelligence Oversight program since the inspection by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight on 23 January 2000. Although command personnel were familiar with the provisions of Executive Order 12333, SECNAVINST 3820.3D, NAVSECGRUINST 3820.1C and USSID 18 governing Intelligence Oversight (IO), annual training has not been conducted. The only exposure to IO at the command is a block of instruction on the Operational Job Qualification Requirements (JQR) that command members must complete.

NSGA Bahrain has been directed to re-energize their command program. Specific recommendations included at a minimum a IO Program Manager designation letter; inclusion of IO as part of the command check-in process and part of the command annual training plan; a process to document training, and a process to ensure deployed personnel receive IO training.

The Command has been directed to report on actions taken until the program deficiencies have been rectified. A re-inspection of intelligence oversight at the command has been scheduled.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT NSGA PEARL HARBOR

INSPECTION DATES: 5 - 9 MARCH 2001
OUTCOME: ONE INFORMAL FINDING

NSGA Pearl has a very effective Intelligence Oversight (IO) Program. Newly assigned command personnel are introduced to IO as part of the command check-in process. Each individual is given a command checklist and is required to see the IO officer as part of their check-in. Additionally, individuals are given an IO information card that is attached to the back of their access badges. These small cards outline basic information dealing with IO. The IO officer also explains the concepts in the governing instructions in detail so that first term sailors know exactly what IO means.

In August 2000 the command conducted IO training as part of a security stand down. Muster sheets were used to document attendance at the IO training, however, documentation was not recorded in individual training records or in any form of database. Additionally, it did not appear that anyone followed up to ensure that the entire command received the training. This is very critical in a command involved in direct support (DIRSUP) to the fleet, where large numbers of command personnel are deployed during single IO training sessions. The command instruction, dated 1998 requires the IO officer to "...ensure documentation of IO training is accurate and completely maintained".

The IO officer is proactive with the command Planning Board for Training and the N7 Training Department. IO training will be given three times a year at the command to cover deployers and will conduct the training at the end of standard GMT sessions. IO training tapes will also be used in future GMTs.

In summary, the command is aware of their responsibilities to provide IO training to command personnel. They have a very good process in place that starts with command orientation when personnel check into the command. Their IO summary cards attached to the back of their badges provide an excellent overview of the program requirements. Their only shortfall was the incomplete and inaccurate documentation of annual IO training. The command was cited with an Informal Finding requiring action and reporting until the documentation deficiency is rectified.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND
2000 TRIDENT WAY
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92155-5599

5800
Ser N2/0210
16 Apr 01

From: Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Navy Inspector General)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT - 2Q, FY01
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

1. Per reference (a), the following subject report is submitted:

a. No intelligence or counterintelligence activity that was illegal, improper, or contrary to laws and directives came to the attention of this command this quarter.

b. Intelligence oversight inspections completed/date:

COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE	JAN 01
COMSPECBOATRON TWO	MAR 01
NAVSPECWARUNIT ONE	JAN 01

2. Intelligence oversight inspections scheduled for 3Q, FY01:

COMNAVSPECWARGRU TWO	TBD
COMNAVSPECWARDEVGRU	TBD
SPECBOATRON ONE	TBD
NAVSPECWARUNIT THREE	TBD

TBD based on Command Inspection Schedule.

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
COMNAVSPECWARGRU TWO
COMNAVSPWARDEVGRU
COMSPECBOATRON ONE
COMSPECBOATRON TWO

EFF

1094

COMSPECBOATRON TWO
COMNAVSPPEARDEVGRU



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
 NAVAL AIR STATION, JOINT RESERVE BASE
 1550 DOOLITTLE AVENUE
 FT WORTH TX 76127-1550

3820

Ser N00I/192

APR 30 2001

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command
 To: Office of the Navy Inspector General (Attn: OOG)
 Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR SECOND
 QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2001
 Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

1. Per reference (a), the subject report is forwarded for the period 1 January to 31 March 2001.
2. The following Intelligence Oversight inspections were conducted during this quarter:

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>INSPECTION DATE</u>
RIA 19; Washington, D.C.	6-7 January 2001
ONI 0466	
ONI 0566	
ONI 0766	
ONI 1566	
ONI 1666	
DIAHQ 0166	
DIAHQ 0366	
DIAHQ 0466	
FLTAIR KEF 1066	
NCIS HQ 0166	
CNO INTEL 0166	
OSD TECH TRANSFER 0166	
RIA 6; Ft. Worth, TX	2-4 March 2001
US CINCSO 0270	
DIAHQ 1310	
JICPAC 1070	
CONCPACFLT INTEL	

3. During this quarter, as forecasted in the prior quarterly report, the Deputy Senior Inspector drafted a pocket-sized Intelligence Oversight training handout that includes the texts of, among other legal authorities, the United States Constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act, and the applicable portions of DoD and Navy instructions implementing the Intelligence Oversight laws. During each of the above listed Reserve Intelligence Area Intelligence Oversight inspections,

EFF

1096

Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR SECOND
QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2001

the Deputy Senior Inspector also conducted interactive Intelligence Oversight training to enhance understanding within the Area of the purposes and practical value of Intelligence Oversight laws.

4. Other than the special project described in the preceding paragraph and presented to SECNAV IG staff in April 2001, which the Deputy Senior Inspector believes would increase the overall effectiveness of the NRIC Intelligence Oversight training program and compliment the message to "protect the constitutional rights of U.S. persons" on one of the two new Intelligence Oversight posters that SECNAV IG staff unveiled at the 12-13 October 2000 ATSD-IO Intelligence Oversight Conference, there are no further recommendations for improvements to the current Intelligence Oversight system.

5. During the reporting quarter, one question of legality was raised by a reservist assigned to DIAHQ 1482 in Reserve Area 3, involving information in a DIA database that the reservist thought might be about an U.S. person. The reservist immediately stopped work on his project and raised the question with his reserve chain of command and the appropriate DIA Team Chief. The NRIC Deputy Senior Inspector determined that the question was properly addressed to the appropriate authorities, properly reported up the chain of command, and did not involve a violation by any Naval Reserve Intelligence personnel.

6. The point of contact for Intelligence Oversight matters within this Command continues to be the Deputy Senior Inspector,

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Deputy

Copy to:
COMNAVRESFOR IG
ONI (ONI-OCA)
COMNAVRESINTCOM (N001)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3800
IGO
12 Apr 01

From: Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps
Matters/Inspector General of the Marine Corps
To: Naval Inspector General (NIG-00G1)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND
QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2001
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) MCO 3800.2A

1. Per the references, the following information is provided:

a. During the subject period no intelligence or counterintelligence activities were discovered or reported which were believed to be questionable, illegal, improper, or contrary to applicable law, statutes, directives, or policies.

b. Highlights of intelligence oversight activity undertaken during this reporting period include on-site surveys of the Headquarters, Marine Forces Pacific, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as well as selected units in the geographic vicinity, and the Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia.

c. Marine Corps commands and support activities conducted required annual training, refresher training, and inspections during the reporting period.

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

/ By direction

Copy to:
CMC (IO)
COMMARFORPAC (INSP)
COMMARFORLANT (G-7)
COMMARFORRES (G-7)
CO, MCIA
CO, MSG, BN
CO, MARSPTBN



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
 1550 HALSEY AVENUE
 NAVAL AIR STATION
 JOINT RESERVE BASE
 FORT WORTH TX 76127-1550

3820
 Ser N1/097
 12 Apr 01

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Security Group Command
 To: Office of the Navy Inspector General (NIC-00G1)
 Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) REPORT
 Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
 (b) Executive Order 12333

1. Per reference (a), subject report is submitted for the period January through March 2001.

2. During this reporting period IO inspections were conducted at the following units:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>
NAVRESSECGRU New Orleans	February 2001
RCAC East	February 2001

3. NAVRESSECGRU periodically inspects subordinate units to:

- Ensure compliance with governing directives.
- Verify that proper documentation is maintained.
- Examine all personnel to ensure they fully understand the requirements of references (a) and (b).

4. No recommendations for improvement were identified during this reporting period.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
 COMNAVAIRESFOR (N9)

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages ▶

To

From

ONRSG FT WORTH

Dept/Agency

Phone #

Fax #

Fax #

NSN 7540-01-317-7368

5099-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

EFF

1099

TOTAL P.01

PAGE.01

(b)(2)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD BLDG 111
716 SICARD STREET SE
WASHINGTON DC 20388-5380 5370

Ser 06/1U0011
02 May 2001

From: Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
To: Naval Inspector General (Attn: NIG-OOG)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT MATTERS
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3d, Conduct and Oversight of
Intelligence Activities within DoN
Encl: (1) Oversight Inspection Visits by NCIS Field Offices

1. This quarterly report is submitted in accordance with reference (a), covering the period 1 January 2001 through 30 March 2001.
2. NCIS Headquarters conducted inspections of the following field office components during this quarter:
NCIS Norfolk Field Office - February 2001
NCIS Washington, DC Field Office - March 2001
3. NCIS Field Office Managers completed mandated quarterly inspections and visits of subordinate components which included supervisory review of intelligence/counterintelligence operational activities. Enclosure (1) identifies the inspections and visits of the offices during which intelligence oversight matters were addressed.
4. On 16 Jan 2001 ATSD(IO) notified NCISHQ of a 9 Jan 2001 threat assessment produced by the NCIS Mayport Field Office that inappropriately included U.S. persons information (off-limits businesses in CONUS) and was posted on INTELINK. NCISHQ removed the threat assessment from INTELINK, counseled the responsible supervisor on the NCIS policy covering the reporting of off-limits facilities via criminal vice CI reporting, and directed the Field Office to recall the message. Mayport Field Office issued a cancellation notice to recipients of the initial report and reissued a corrected copy.
5. No other discrepancies or improprieties on the part of NCIS personnel relating to the mandates and guidelines cited in reference (a) were noted or reported during this quarter.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction U

EFF

1100

INSPECTION VISITS BY NCIS FIELD OFFICES

OFFICE VISITED

DATE OF VISIT

NCISRA Sigonella

14-17Feb01



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1014 N STREET SE SUITE 100
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3820
Ser 00/006
8 May 01

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (N2)
Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT INSPECTION RESULTS
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

1. Per reference (a), the Naval Inspector General's (NAVIG) Special Assistant for Intelligence Oversight and Special Programs Review conducted an Intelligence Oversight (IO) Inspection at your command on 19 April 2001. The inspection checked for compliance with Executive Order 12333 and its DoD and Navy implementing instructions.

2. The NAVIG inspection team noted zero deficiencies. Command personnel demonstrated a superior understanding of IO principles and responsibilities. This is primarily attributed to the forward thinking and can-do attitude of your IO Program Manager. By incorporating web-based technology, your IO authority created an interactive training environment not only for CINCLANTFLT but also for its component commands. With this cutting-edge approach to training, the Navy's IO message is being well received: "Know your mission, know your capabilities, and know your legal limitations."

3. To further improve IO awareness, we offer our partnership and support to standardize web-based training for the entire Navy and Marine Corps team. With your assistance, we hope to launch initiatives that will stimulate audiences to be more receptive to IO and cognizant of potential violations.

4. Thank you and your staff for the cooperation and assistance provided during this inspection.


MICHAEL D. HASKINS



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NAVY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

October 2, 2001

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Naval Inspector General Memorandum 3820
Ser 00/1394 of 22 Aug 01

From: General Counsel of the Navy
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Via: Under Secretary of the Navy *smk/101*
Susan Morrissey Livingstone
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1. Forwarded. Concur with JAG's assessment. NIG's note of interest warrants further investigation and resolution.

Alberto J. Mora

Copy to:
NAVINGEN
JAG



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
1322 PATTERSON AVENUE SE SUITE 3000
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-6086

IN REPLY REFER TO

3820

Ser 13/1MA12095.01

18 September 2001

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Naval Inspector General Memorandum 3820
Ser 00/1394 of 22 Aug 01

From: Judge Advocate General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Via: (1) General Counsel
(2) Under Secretary of the Navy
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

1. Forwarded, contents noted.

Paragraph 3 raises legitimate concerns.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. J. Guter", is written over the typed name.

D. J. GUTER
Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Judge Advocate General

Copy to:
NAVINGEN

EFF

1104



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1014 N STREET SE SUITE 100
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser 00/1394
22 AUG 2001

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Via: (1) Judge Advocate General
(2) General Counsel
(3) Under Secretary of the Navy

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333 of 4 Dec 81
(b) DOD Directive 5240.1 of 25 Apr 88
(c) DOD Directive 5240.1-R of 7 Dec 82
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3D


Encl: (1) Summary and Reports of Oversight Activities Conducted
by Components Reporting to the Naval Inspector General

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 May 2001 through 31 July 2001. Reference (d) tasks ten Navy commanders and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters to report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVIG) their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. These reports are forwarded as enclosure (1).

2. Summary of IO reports received this quarter: Most of the commands continued training during this reporting period, and inspections were conducted by: Commander, Naval Security Group Command, Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (CNRIC), Commander, Naval Reserve Security Group Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Marine Corps, and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command.

3. Note of interest for this reporting period. A CNRIC naval reservist inquired about a legal research, computer database (Lexis-Nexis) that carries reservists' names and their unit names. This database is operated by a civilian corporation and is primarily used by legal professionals. CNRIC believes this is an IO issue and an operational security risk for those reservists venturing overseas. Another concern is the Department of the Navy Promotion messages, which lists the naval reservists by name and by the last four of their social security number. Issue under review by NAVIG-N2B.

4. During this reporting period, NAVIG received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.


MICHAEL D. HASKINS

Copy to: CNO, VCNO, DNIGMC, DNI (N2), UNSECNAV (ASP)

EFF

1105

SUMMARY AND REPORTS OF OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

CONDUCTED BY

COMPONENTS REPORTING TO THE NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1106

The following is a summary of component commands inspected for Intelligence Oversight during this past quarter:

COMNAVSECGRU

Naval Security Group Activity, Groton, CT
Naval Security Group Detachment, Brunswick, ME
Naval Security Group Activity, Winter Harbor, ME
Naval Security Support Detachment Two, Winter Harbor, ME
(See IO inspection summary.)

COMNAVRESINTCOM

RIA 3, New Orleans, LA

- NR JICCEN
- NR NAVOINTEL
- NR DIAHQ 1482
- NR ONI 0682
- NR IVTU 0109

RIA 9, Chicago, IL

- NR EUCOMJAC 0366
- NR JFIC 0492
- NR JICTRANS 0169
- NR ONI 1992
- NR IVTU 0113
- NR IVTU 0114

RIA 16, Willow Grove, PA

- NR DIAHQ 0593
- NR DIAHQ 0492
- NR JFIC 0393
- NR IVTU 0104

Marine Corps (On-site surveys)

HQ, Marine Forces Reserves
4th Marine Div
4th Marine Aircraft Wing
4th Force Service Support Group, New Orleans, LA
Marine Security Guard Battalion, Quantico, VA

COMNAVRESSECGRU

RCAC South

NCIS

NCIS Northwest Field Office



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
250 MAKALAPA DRIVE
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-3131

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N00IG/1438
13 Jul 01

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: CY01 SECOND QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) CNO WASHINGTON DC 252203Z SEP 98 (NAVOP 009/98)

1. This report is provided in accordance with reference (a)
2. During the second quarter of calendar year 2001, no intelligence activity believed to violate U.S. law, Executive Order, Presidential directive, or applicable DoD or DoN policies was reported to CINCPACFLT.
3. No intelligence oversight inspections were conducted during the quarter. However, program compliance is continually monitored. Discrepancies will be reported. These practices are considered to be in consonance with reference (b).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Fleet Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 250
NORFOLK, VA. 23551-2487

3800
N2/016180
19 July 01

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (N2M)
To: Naval Inspector General (NIG-23)


Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT QUARTERLY REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) CINCLANTFLTINST 5041.9B


Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Report Second Quarter CY-01

1. Per references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is forwarded:

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



1. Subject report for 2nd quarter CY-01 is provided in accordance with reference (a):

a. Illegal Intelligence Activities. No illegal intelligence activity or activity contrary to reference (a) was noted or reported by this command or its subordinates during reporting period.

b. Significant oversight activities.

(1) Scheduled Intelligence oversight Inspections: Navy Inspector General conducted assist visit for CINCLANTFLT on 19 April.

(2) Command oversight training and/or inspections:

(a) Training: Zero personnel trained.

(b) Inspections: N/A/

c. Suggestions for improvement: Change to semi-annual reporting.

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE
PSC 802
FPO AE 09499-0151

3820
Ser N2SSO/05-01
28 Jun 01

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe
To: Naval Inspector General (ATTN: NIG-00G), Washington Navy
Yard, Washington D.C. 20374-2001

Subj: CY-01 SECOND QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (I/O) REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) CINCUSNAVEUR ltr 3820 Ser N23/03-01 dtd 2 Apr 01

1. This report is submitted in accordance with reference (a). Reference (b) was CINCUSNAVEUR CY-01 First quarter report.

2. Basic Findings. We are not aware of any intelligence activity in the USNAVEUR area of responsibility during this reporting period which could be construed as illegal, questionable, or contrary either to the strictures of EO 12863 or reference (a). There have been no reported instances of fraud, waste, abuse, standards of conducts or ethics violations, financial misconduct or conflicts of interest, which have impacted Intelligence operations.

3. CURRENT STATUS AND UNDERTAKINGS.

a. CINCUSNAVEUR (N2), and ONI SPINTCOMM CINCUSNAVEUR. Continued to use I/O reading material for orientation of all incoming Intelligence Division personnel. I/O indoctrination provided to four newly reported personnel assigned to Intelligence Division.

b. COMSIXTHFLT. I/O training is included as part of SSO check-in/indoctrinations. I/O indoctrination provided to fifteen newly reported personnel reporting to Intelligence Division.

c. COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIX SEVEN/SIX NINE. SSO Naples provided initial I/O indoctrinations to twenty-two newly reported personnel assigned to commands supported.

Subj: CY-01 SECOND QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (I/O) REPORT

d. TACTICAL SUPPORT CENTER SIGONELLA. I/O training is included as part of SSO check-in/indoctrinations. I/O indoctrination provided to one newly reported personnel.

e. FAIRECONRON TWO (VQ-2). I/O policies and security awareness continues to be emphasized during all officer meetings, quarters, crew briefings and SSO indoctrinations. Documented reindoctrinations were conducted for CRC's-1 through 7 prior to deployment. Eighteen individuals were indoctrinated and introduced to intelligence oversight procedures.

f. CROF SOUDA BAY CRETE. I/O training is included as part of SSO check-in/indoctrinations. I/O indoctrination provided to four newly reported personnel this quarter.

4. THEATER SUMMARY. The following recapitulates intelligence subordinate units which are subject to I/O Program requirements:

- (1) Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR N-2).
- (2) Commander Sixth Fleet (N2).
- (3) Commander Task Force SIX SEVEN (CTF 67 N2).
- (4) Commander Task Force SIX NINE (CTF 69 N2).
- (5) Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron TWO (VQ-2).
- (6) Tactical Support Center Sigonella, Sicily.
- (7) Consolidated Reconnaissance Operations Facility (CROF), Souda Bay, Crete.

All organizations listed above have the capability to collect, retain and/or disseminate intelligence within the meaning of reference (a). Each conducts and complies with its I/O responsibilities as enumerated in reference (a).

5. Commands inspected this quarter: None - Based on IDTC reductions, CINCUSNAVEUR will monitor and report but not inspect subject program compliance for subordinates.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Fleet Inspector General



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
FPO AE 09501-6008

IN REPLY TO:
3820
Ser 01/ 660
26 Jul 01


From: Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
To: Navy Inspector General (NIG-00G)

Subj: FY-01 THIRD QUARTER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) Executive Order 12333
(c) Executive Order 12863

1. This quarterly report of Intelligence Oversight (IO) is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. We are not aware of any intelligence activity in the CENTCOM area of responsibility during this reporting period, which could be constructed as illegal, questionable, or contrary to references (a) through (c).


R. V. KIKLA
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
USCENTCOM (CCJ2-CSB)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
4251 SUITLAND ROAD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20395-5720

IN REPLY REFER TO

3820
Ser OCA1/0023
12 Jul 01

From: Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) QUARTERLY REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) DoDDIR 5240.1-R
(c) ONI ltr 3820 Ser ONI-OCA1/0012 of 12 Apr 01

Encl: (1) 30 copies of ONI IO Training Video Compact Disc (CD)
(2) 30 copies of DIA IO Training Video Compact Disc (CD)

1. This is a consolidated Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO (N2)) and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) IO Quarterly Report for the period 1 April through 30 June 2001.

2. Enclosure (1) contains video CD copies of the IO training video we produced in 1998. Enclosure (2) contains video CD copies of an IO training video previously produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The video CDs are setup to play on PCs with Real Player or Microsoft Media software, or on a DVD player. Additional video CDs may be obtained through our point of contact, (b)(2),(b)(6)

3. To enhance our internal IO training program, we now have both our ONI produced video and the DIA produced video hyper-linked as streaming video on our ONI IG SCI home page. Additionally, we have created documentation software that will allow us to conduct annual training using the streaming video while recording time viewed and date for those who watch it. Those viewing the video will only receive credit for the annual requirement by watching the entire video. We plan to use this method to record annual training for our employees using SCI workstations. For the others, we plan to provide copies of the unclassified Video CD, enclosure (1), for viewing via individual PCs and using signature sheets to record the training.

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1114

Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) QUARTERLY REPORT

4. No CNO(N2) or ONI incidents or activities which would raise any question of legality or propriety under the provisions of references (a) and (b) have come to the attention of the undersigned since the submission of the last report, reference (c).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
CNO (N2J)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
9800 SAVAGE ROAD, SUITE 6585
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MD 20755-6585

3820
Ser N00IG/548
6 Jul 01

From: Inspector General, Naval Security Group Command
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
EFFORTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING JUNE 2001

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

Encl: (1) Summary of Intelligence Oversight Inspections
(2) Corrective actions taken to deficiencies reported in
last quarterly report

1. This quarterly report of intelligence oversight (IO) within the Naval Security Group Command is submitted in accordance with reference (a).

2. The inspection team noted no deviations from the guidance provided by reference (a). The inspections consisted of an interview with the IO Manager, a review of program documentation, a review of individual training records and random interviews with command personnel.

3. The Naval Security Group Command conducted four IO inspections during this quarter. Enclosure (1) includes a summary of the inspections of Naval Security Group Activity, Groton, Naval Security Group Detachment Brunswick, Naval Security Group Support Detachment Two, and Naval Security Group Activity Winter Harbor. Enclosure (2) includes a listing of actions taken on deficiencies noted in the last quarterly report. Any deficiencies cited in enclosure (1) will be addressed in the next quarterly report.

(U)(C),(b)(7)(C)

Copy to:
CNO (N2)

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT NSGA GROTON

INSPECTION DATES: 11 - 15 JUNE 2001

OUTCOME: ONE INFORMAL FINDING

The Executive Officer functions as the Command Intelligence Oversight (IO) Program Manager and is assisted by a program coordinator within the N1 Department. The Command also has a Command instruction on Conduct and Oversight of Intelligence Activities that outline the responsibilities of the Command IO Officer and the requirements for the Command Training Officer to document IO training.

Personnel checking onboard the command are introduced to IO as part of the command indoctrination process. The Assistant IO Program Manager requires all newly assigned personnel to view a video presentation on IO. Upon completion of this briefing, personnel sign required documentation that is annotated in the command-training database. The Program Coordinator also keeps a hardcopy record of the initial training.

IO training continues at the command through Plan of the Day notes, USSID 18 presentations at GMT and during the month of November during security standdown. Command personnel also carry IO guidelines (white cards) on their identification badges.

The NSGAGRTINST 3820.1 (Conduct and Oversight of Intelligence Activities) tasks the IO Officer to conduct "periodic spot check" interviews to ensure command personnel remain current and understand IO information. Documentation of these spot checks is required to be in individual training records. However, there was no indication that these spot checks were being conducted by the IO Program Managers.

In summary, initial and annual IO training are being conducted at the command as required by governing instructions. Documentation of this training is kept in the command-training database as well as in the IO Program Managers folder. The command is not in compliance with their own local instruction that requires periodic spot check interviews to ensure personnel are knowledgeable of IO requirements.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT NSGDET BRUNSWICK

INSPECTION DATES: 18 - 19 JUNE 2001

OUTCOME: NO FINDINGS

The Detachment has appointed an Intelligence Oversight (IO) Program Coordinator who is designated in writing. IO is addressed in a number of forums throughout the year. All personnel are trained annually per applicable governing documents. Additionally, IO is covered on a quarterly basis to ensure that personnel deployed during the annual presentation are provided with the mandated annual training. All personnel review USSID 18 biannually. All personnel interviewed displayed a thorough knowledge of IO. IO training at NSGD Brunswick is being effectively conducted in accordance with applicable directives and instructions.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT NSGA WINTER HARBOR

INSPECTION DATES: 20 - 22 JUNE 2001

OUTCOME: NO FINDINGS

NSGA Winter Harbor has an appointed IO Program Coordinator who is properly designated in writing. Due to cessation of all cryptologic operations in September 2000 and the planned decommissioning of the site in January 2002, personnel (primarily in support roles) are no longer provided with IO training. IO training was previously provided annually in the years since the last CNSG IG inspection per applicable governing documents. Additionally, all personnel were provided with the requisite training in September 2000, just prior to the closure of the remaining cryptologic operations.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT NSGS DETACHMENT TWO

INSPECTION DATES: 20 - 22 JUNE 2001

OUTCOME: NO FINDINGS

Naval Security Group Support Detachment (DET) Two at Winter Harbor has an appointed IO Program Coordinator who is designated in writing. The DET uses the applicable Naval Information Warfare Activity (their parent command) instruction on IO as their guide. All personnel are trained annually per applicable governing documents. Additionally, IO is covered at least biannually to ensure that those personnel who were deployed during the year are provided with the mandated annual training. All personnel in the DET also review USSID 18 biannually. Overall it was determined that IO training at NSGS DET Two is being effectively conducted in accordance with applicable directives and instructions.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AT NSGA BAHRAIN

INSPECTION DATES: 13 - 16 FEBRUARY 2001

OUTCOME: ONE FORMAL FINDING

The inspection of NSGA Bahrain revealed that the command has taken little to no action on the Intelligence Oversight program since the inspection by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight on 23 January 2000. Although command personnel were familiar with the provisions of Executive Order 12333, SECNAVINST 3820.3D, NAVSECGRUINST 3820.1C and USSID 18 governing Intelligence Oversight (IO), annual training has not been conducted. The only exposure to IO at the command is a block of instruction on the Operational Job Qualification Requirements (JQR) that command members must complete.

NSGA Bahrain has re-energized their command intelligence oversight program. An IO Program Manager has been designated in writing and has been included in the command check-in process. IO training has been added to the command annual training plan and a training database has been established to track all training, including IO training.

The Inspector General will re-inspect the IO and other programs in January 2002.

INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT PROGRA MANAGEMENT AT NSGA PEARL HARBOR

INSPECTION DATES: 5 - 9 MARCH 2001

OUTCOME: ONE INFORMAL FINDING

The inspection of NSGA Pearl Harbor established that the command had a very effective Intelligence Oversight (IO) program. Being a Direct Support Command places an extra burden on the command to ensure that individuals who are deployed during the IO training are provided the training when they return from sea. The command presents IO training three times a year to cover deployers and also provided video presentation to their personnel for make up training. The one area that was sited as being deficient was their documentation of IO training. Their command IO instruction, dated 1998, requires the IO officer to "ensure documentation of IO training is accurate and completely maintained".

As a result of the informal finding during the inspection, IO training has recently been added to the command-wide training department database. The command is now able to maintain a more accurate record of scheduled and administered IO training. The IO Program Coordinator will ensure that the proper information is provided to the Training Department Head who in turn will ensure that the information is properly documented in the database.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND
2000 TRIDENT WAY
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92155-5599

5800
Ser. N2/0589
30 Jul 01

From: Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Navy Inspector General)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT - 3Q, FY01
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

1. Per reference (a), the following subject report is submitted:

a. No intelligence or counterintelligence activity that was illegal, improper, or contrary to laws and directives came to the attention of this command this quarter.

2. Intelligence oversight inspections scheduled for 3Q and 4Q FY01:

NAVSPECWARGRU 2	AUG
NAVSPECWARDEVGRU	AUG
SEAL TEAM 3	SEP 01
NAVSPECWARUNIT 3	TBD
(Rescheduled due to THREATCON Level in AOR)	

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE
COMNAVSPECWARGRU TWO
COMSPECBOATRON ONE
COMSPECBOATRON TWO
COMNAVSPEWARDEVGRU



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
NAVAL AIR STATION, JOINT RESERVE BASE
1550 DOOLITTLE AVE
FT WORTH TEXAS 76127-1550

3820
Ser N001/330
25 Jun 01

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command
To: Office of the Navy Inspector General (Attn: OOG)

Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR 3RD QUARTER FY-01

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

1. Per reference (a), the subject report is forwarded for the period 1 April to 30 June 2001.
2. The following Intelligence Oversight (IO) inspections were conducted during this quarter:

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>INSPECTION DATE</u>
RIA 03; New Orleans, LA Unit(s): NR JICCEN NR NAVOINTEL NR DIAHQ 1482 NR ONI 0682 NR IVTU 0109	5-6 May 2001
RIA 09; Chicago, IL Unit(s): NR EUCOMJAC 0366 NR JFIC 0492 NR JICTRANS 0169 NR ONI 1992 NR IVTU 0113 NR IVTU 0114	12-13 May 2001
RIA 16; Willow Grove, PA Unit(s): NR DIAHQ 0593 NR DIAHQ 0602 NR JFIC 0393 NR IVTU 0104	23-24 June 2001

3. During this quarter, the Deputy Senior Inspector and/or the Staff Judge Advocate/Intelligence Oversight Program Area Evaluator disseminated a pocket-sized Intelligence Oversight training handout that includes the text(s) of, among other legal authorities, the United States Constitution, the *Posse Comitatus Act*, and the applicable portions of Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Navy (DoN) instructions implementing the Intelligence Oversight laws. Further, during each of the above listed Reserve Intelligence Area Intelligence Oversight Inspections or Quality Improvement Assist Visits, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)/Intelligence Oversight Inspection (Quality Improvement Assist Visit) Evaluator conducted Interactive Intelligence Oversight training to enhance the understanding of personnel within the specific Reserve Intelligence Area being visited; and to ensure personnel understood the purposes and practical value of Intelligence Oversight laws.


Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR 3RD QUARTER FY-01

4. Other than the special training initiative and information or product dissemination described in the preceding paragraph and presented to the SECNAV IG staff in April 2001, which the then, Deputy Senior Inspector (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) believes would increase the overall effectiveness of the NRIC Intelligence Oversight training program and compliment the federal or U.S. Government and DoD/DoN message(s) to "protect the constitutional rights of U.S. persons" on one of the two "new" Intelligence Oversight posters that the SECNAV IG staff unveiled at the 12-13 October 2000 ATSD-IO Intelligence Oversight Conference, there are no further recommendations for improvements to the current Intelligence Oversight system.

5. During the past reporting quarter, one question of procedure and protocol was raised by a Naval Reservist member of the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command. This Naval Reservist raised an issue that transcends the arenas of Operational Security (OPSEC) and Intelligence Oversight (IO). It is respectfully submitted that this issue area may require the promulgation and issuance of guidance by competent, higher Navy authority. Stated succinctly, the issue is quoted, in pertinent part, and paraphrased as well, thusly, "...the legal research, computer database system known as Lexis-Nexis lists Naval Reservists and the Naval Reservists Unit name on their system. Additionally, Department of the Navy promotion messages are issued with the Naval Reservists name and the last four numbers of his or her social security number as well as the individual Naval Reservists designator", for all who may be interested to access or to track them. Similarly, "this information can be found "on-line" by anyone who may wish to "download" the information from the respective database. It would be extremely easy to put this information in a subsequent, newly created database and cause havoc for anyone traveling overseas." This OPSEC/IO area may present an "area of OPSEC/IO vulnerability" especially for Naval Reserve Intelligence personnel and other Department of Defense intelligence professional(s) venturing overseas pursuant to Navy orders. Therefore, guidance from competent, higher Navy authority concerning the proper handling and resolution of the identified issue is respectfully solicited.

6. The point of contact for Intelligence Oversight matters within this Command is the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)/Intelligence Oversight Program Evaluator,

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



J. MANZELMANN

Copy to:
COMNAVRESFOR IG
ONI (ONI-OCA)
COMNAVRESINTCOM (N00I/N00L)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3800
IGO
12 July 01

From: Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps
Matters/Inspector General of the Marine Corps
To: Naval Inspector General (NIG-00G1)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE THIRD
QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2001
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) MCO 3800.2A

1. Per the references, the following information is provided:

a. During the subject period no intelligence or counterintelligence activities were discovered or reported which were believed to be questionable, illegal, improper, or contrary to applicable law, statutes, directives, or policies.

b. Significant intelligence oversight activity during the reporting period includes issuance by the IGMC of policy guidance to all commands and activities establishing procedures for review and approval of Proper Use Statements wherein U.S. territory is imaged by Marine Corps tactical air reconnaissance assets (Manned and Unmanned).

c. Highlights of general intelligence oversight activity during the reporting period include on-site surveys of the Headquarters, Marine Forces Reserve, 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 4th Force Service Support Group, New Orleans, Louisiana, as well as the Marine Security Guard Battalion, Quantico, Virginia. The Director of the Oversight Division and the Counsel to the IGMC attended the Intelligence Law Workshop at the Army Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, VA from 4-7 June.

d. Marine Corps commands and support activities conducted required annual training, refresher training, and inspections during the reporting period.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

EFF

1126

Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE THIRD QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2001

2. Please direct any inquiries to the undersigned at commercial (b)(2)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
CMC (IO)
COMMARFORPAC (INSP)
COMMARFORLANT (G-7)
COMMARFORRES (G-7)
CO, MCIA
CO, MSG, BN
CO, MARSPTEN

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
1550 HALSEY AVENUE
NAVAL AIR STATION
JOINT RESERVE BASE
FORT WORTH TX 78127-1550

3820
Ser N1/170
12 Jul 01

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Security Group Command
To: Office of the Navy Inspector General (NIC-00G1)

Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) Executive Order 12333

1. Per reference (a), subject report is submitted for the period April through June 2001.
2. During this reporting period IO inspections were conducted at the following units:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>
RCAC South	June 2001

3. NAVRESSECGRU periodically inspects subordinate units to:

- Ensure compliance with governing directives.
- Verify that proper documentation is maintained.
- Examine all personnel to ensure they fully understand the requirements of references (a) and (b).

4. No recommendations for improvement were identified during this reporting period.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRESFOR (N9)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD BLDG 111
716 SICARD STREET SE
WASHINGTON DC 20388-5380

5370
Ser 006/IU0025
16 August 2001

From: Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
To: Naval Inspector General (Attn: NIG-OOG)
Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT MATTERS
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3d, Conduct and Oversight of
Intelligence Activities within DoN

1. This quarterly report is submitted in accordance with reference (a), covering the period 1 April 2001 through 30 June 2001.
2. NCIS Headquarters conducted inspections of the following field office components during this quarter:
 - NCIS European Field Office - April 2001
 - NCIS Northwest Field Office - May 2001
3. NCIS Field Office Managers completed mandated quarterly inspections and visits of subordinate components which included supervisory review of intelligence/counterintelligence operational activities.
4. No other discrepancies or improprieties on the part of NCIS personnel relating to the mandates and guidelines cited in reference (a) were noted or reported this quarter.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1014 N STREET SE SUITE 100
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3820
Ser N2/0646
13 MAY 2002


From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT
Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333 of 4 Dec 81
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1 of 25 Apr 88
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R of 7 Dec 82
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
Encl: (1) Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Oversight Report of 12 Apr 02
(2) Listing of Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 January-31 March 2002. Reference (d) tasks ten Navy commanders and the DNIGMC to report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVIG) their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. Notable interest item is forwarded as enclosure (1). Inspections conducted this past quarter are listed in enclosure (2).

2. **Summary of IO reports received this quarter:** Most of the commands continued training during this reporting period, and inspections were conducted by: Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (CNRIC), Deputy Naval Inspector for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

3. **Note of interest for this reporting period.** In the aftermath of September 11th, the U.S. Coast Guard intelligence element was made a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). Traditionally, the element has focused its collection efforts against law enforcement and investigative information; however, this contradicts IO policy applicable to IC members. Due to their close working relationship, ONI IG and Staff Judge Advocate are providing their expertise to help the Coast Guard intelligence element's IO program (see enclosure (1)).

4. During this reporting period, NAVIG received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.


MICHAEL D. HASKINS

Copy to:
UNSECNAV, UNSECNAV (ASP), CNO, VCNO, DOGC, JAG, DNIGMC, DNI (N2)

EFF

1130



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
4251 SUITLAND ROAD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20395-5720

IN REPLY REFER TO

3820
Ser OCA1/0013
12 Apr 02

From: Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence
To: Naval Inspector General

Subj: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) QUARTERLY REPORT

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 3820.3D
(b) DoDDIR 5240.1-R
(c) ONI ltr 3820 Ser ONI-OCA1/0003 of 15 Jan 02

1. This is a consolidated Director of Naval Intelligence (CNO (N2)) and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) IO Quarterly Report for the period 1 January through 31 March 2002.

2. Annual IO training for the CNO(N2) staff which was extended until January 2002 has been completed.

3. Members of the staff of the ONI Inspector General and Staff Judge Advocate are assisting members of the U.S. Coast Guard with IO policy suggestions as the NFIP Coast Guard intelligence element is being developed. The element was authorized by amendment of the Security Act of 1947.

4. No CNO(N2) or ONI incidents or activities which would raise any question of legality or propriety under the provisions of references (a) and (b) have come to the attention of the undersigned since the submission of the last report, reference (c).

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
CNO (N2J)

ENCLOSURE (3)

EFF

1131

The following is a summary of component commands inspected for Intelligence Oversight during the period 1 January-31 March 2002:

NAVINGEN

NCIS HQ

COMNAVSECGRU

NSGA PENSACOLA

NSGA MENWITH HILL

NSGD FOUR MOLESWORTH

NSGD DIGBY

CNRIC

RIA 5

RIA 4

DNIGMC

HQ, Marine Forces Pacific Pearl Harbor

III MEF Units Okinawa and Iwakuni

HQ Marine Forces Reserve New Orleans

NCIS

NCIS Northeast Field Office

NCIS Hawaii Field Office

NCIS Gulf Coast Field Office



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3820
Ser N2/0173
31 JANUARY 2006

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E

Encl: (1) List of Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 01 October through 31 December 2005. Reference (d) requires Department of the Navy (DON) Intelligence Components, including the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC), to provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents.
2. During this reporting period, NAVINSGEN received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.
3. Significant activities this quarter: Inspections were conducted by the Office of the Naval Inspector General, Fleet Forces Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command, Naval Security Group Reserve, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Office of the Inspector General of the Marine Corps. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.
4. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

by direction

Copy to:
CNO (N2, N09J)
DNIGMC
DOGC
OUSN (ASP/I)

EFF

1133

Intelligence Oversight inspections conducted during the period 01 October-31 December 2005:

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (San Diego, CA)

COMMANDER, FLEET FORCES COMMAND

Commander, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (Fallon, NV)

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

Special Boat (SPECBOAT) Team Twelve (San Diego, CA)

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Reserve Intelligence Area Nine (Great Lakes, IL)

Naval Reserve (NR) Office of Naval Intelligence Unit 1992

NR U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Unit 0366

NR Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation (JICTRANS) Unit 0169

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP

Naval Security Group Reserve (NSGR) Minneapolis, MN

NSGR Ogden, UT

NSGR San Diego, CA

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS Hawaii Field Office (Pearl Harbor, HI)

NCIS Europe Field Office (Naples, IT)

NCIS Headquarters Administrative and Logistics Directorate (Washington, DC)

DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS

11 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Camp Pendleton, CA)

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) (Quantico, VA)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/1025
8 AUG 2005

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3D

Encl: (1) List of Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted (01 Apr 05 - 30 Jun 05)

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 01 April - 30 June 2005. Reference (d) requires DoN Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) to provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their respective Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents.

2. During this reporting period, NAVINSGEN received the following two reports of interest from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components/activities:

a. Naval Reserve Intelligence Command is presently reviewing the activity of a former Direct Commission naval reservist in Iraq. In 2003, prior to receiving military intelligence officer training, individual was sent to Baghdad area (Iraq) in support of his civilian employer. While working in Baghdad between late 2003 and early 2004, the individual represented himself as a naval intelligence reservist to several military units in Iraq and offered to do "intelligence work." Representation was made on member's own initiative and was without supporting orders from or the knowledge of his affiliated reserve command (in CONUS). As a result of his actions, four USA and USAF commands reportedly used him to briefly work on select force protection and security issues. Member has since returned to CONUS and also resigned his commission. Of note, on 20 June 05, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command sent formal queries to cognizant USA brigade and USAF wing commanders in an effort to follow up as to whether nature of work at respective units involved any potential Intelligence Oversight issues. Final assessment will be provided upon completion of review.


b. In June 05, a detainee at the Interrogation Facility, Al Asad, Iraq, claimed that he was beaten while being interrogated by HUMINT Exploitation Team 10, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Criminal Investigations Division, 2nd Military Police Battalion, Multinational Forces West subsequently conducted an investigation and found the allegation to be unsubstantiated.

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

3. **Significant activities this quarter:** Inspections were conducted by: Office of the Naval Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General of the Marine Corps, Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Special Warfare Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (Headquarters), Naval Security Group Reserve, and Naval Reserve Intelligence Command. Enclosure (1) pertains.

4. **Actions and/or recommendations:** None.

(B)(6),(B)(7)(C)



Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/I)
CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC
CNRIC

Department of the Navy Intelligence Oversight inspections conducted (01 Apr - 30 Jun 2005):

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

ONI

Office of Naval Intelligence

ONI Det Newport, RI
ONI HUMINT Office, Boston, MA

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

SEAL Team TWO
COMNAVSPECWARCEN

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

RIA FIFTEEN, Norfolk, VA

NR IVTU 0206
NR SACT 0107
NR NSW INTEL TWO
NR NMTC 0186
NR NCIS 0986
NR JRIP 0186
NR JFIC 0286
NR CFPC OPINTEL 0186
NR AFSOUTH INTEL 0124

RIA EIGHTEEN, Fort Devens, MA

NR IVTU 0101
NR ONI 0397
NR DIAHQ 0797
NR NCIS 0297
NR JICCENT 0597

RIA NINETEEN, Washington, DC

NR IVTU 0106
NR NGA 0166
NR JMIC DET 0966
NR ONI 0566
NR DIAHQ 0166
NR NCISHQ 0166
NR ONI 0466
NR CNO INTEL 0166
NR DIAHQ 0466
NR OSD TECH TRANS 0166

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP

NSGR Fort Dix
NSGR Orlando
NSGR St. Louis

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1137

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS Middle East Field Office

NCIS Norfolk Field Office

NCISHQ Personnel Operations and Services Department

NCISHQ Office of Military Support

Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet

USS TARAWA

ELATKWEPCOL Whidbey Island, WA

Deputy, Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters

I MEF

II MEF

Marine Corps Air Bases West

Marine Forces North



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/1578
10 NOV 2005

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) NAVINSGEN ltr 3820 Ser N2/1025 of 08 Aug 05
(f) CNRIC (CAPT Timothy Riggins) email of 11 Oct 05 (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) List of Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 01 July-30 September 2005. Reference (d) requires DoN intelligence components, including Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC), to provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents.

2. During this reporting period, NAVINSGEN received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

3. Significant activities this quarter:

a. Inspections were conducted by: the Office of the Naval Inspector General; the Office of Naval Intelligence; Naval Special Warfare Command; Naval Reserve Intelligence Command; Naval Reserve Security Group; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service; and the Deputy Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.

b. The new Navy Intelligence Oversight Instruction, SECNAVINST 3820.3E, was approved on 21 Sep 05. The instruction is available at http://www.ig.navy.mil/Directives/SECNAVINST_3820_3E.pdf.

c. The Naval Security Group Command was re-subordinated to Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command on 01 October 2005. Commander, Fleet Forces Command through Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command, is now responsible for review of their Intelligence Oversight Program.

d. Amplifying significant activities reported during the previous quarter (reference (e) pertains), Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command (CNRIC) reported that an investigation into a possible Procedure 15 violation was completed and no evidence of

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

inappropriate activity was found (reference (D) pertains). CNRIC contacted a U.S. Army Military Intelligence Brigade and U.S. Air Force units in Baghdad about the unauthorized service of a Naval Reserve Ensign at their commands in 2003-2004. The U.S. Army MI Brigade which employed the servicemember stated that during his time with them, the Ensign performed no collection, retention, or dissemination of information on U.S. persons. The U.S. Air Force units who allegedly employed the Ensign stated that they had no recollection of his service with them and could provide no further information.

4. Actions and/or recommendations: An item of interest was reported by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).

a. **Background:** An NCIS Headquarters review of a joint FBI/NCIS joint counterespionage operation revealed that an NCIS asset had conducted undisclosed participation in a U.S. organization (Procedure 10). Upon further inquiry by NCIS, the FBI claimed that pursuant to FBI manuals no prior FBI authorization for participation in the U.S. organization was required. However, this activity falls within the DoD definition of undisclosed participation in a U.S. organization. In accordance with Procedure 10 of DoD 5240.1-R, this case is being forwarded to Director, NCIS, for review and authorization of NCIS asset participation in the U.S. organization.

b. **Recommendation:** This incident reveals differences that may exist among different Federal agencies regarding appropriate Intelligence Oversight procedures, particularly in the area of interagency operations. ATSD/IO should consider addressing this issue as part of a Federal inter-departmental review of Intelligence Oversight issues.


JILL VINES LOFTUS
Deputy

Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/I)
CNO (N09, N2, N3IO)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC
NCIS (DDO, EAD/CI)
CFFC (N2)

Intelligence Oversight inspections conducted during the period 01 August - 31 October 2005:

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Special Warfare Command, San Diego, California

Office of Naval Intelligence

Special Security Office Jacksonville, Jacksonville, Florida

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

SEAL Team EIGHT
SDV Team TWO

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Reserve Intelligence Activity THREE, New Orleans, Louisiana units -
NR VTU INTELLIGENCE 0109
NR DIA HQ 1482
NR OFFICE OF NAVINTEL 0682
NR NAVOCEANO INTEL 0182
NR JNTINTELCENTCTLCOM 0382

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP

NSGR Fort Gordon, Georgia
NSGR Denver, Colorado

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS Northeast Field Office
Department of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility
NCIS Washington DC Field Office

Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters

Marine Forces Europe
Marine Forces Strategic Command
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center
American Embassy, Paris, France



Enclosure (1)

3820
Ser N2

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E

Encl: (1) List of Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 January-31 March 2006. Reference (d) requires DoN Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents.

2. During this reporting period, NAVINSGEN received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

3. Significant activities this quarter:

- a. Inspections were conducted by: Office of the Naval Inspector General; Commander, Pacific Fleet; Commander, U.S. Forces Europe; the Office of Naval Intelligence; Naval Special Warfare Command; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for the Marine Corps. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.
- b. The Marine Corps suspended reporting requirements for the Marine Corps Strategic Command due to evaluation of the mission and personnel shortages at the command. The requirements may be reinstated upon reevaluation of the mission and the need for reporting.
- c. The Office of the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters inspected the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC), a new component of the U.S. Special Operations Command, this quarter in preparation for the command's activation.

4. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/I)
CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC

Intelligence Oversight inspections conducted during the period
01 January -31 March 2006:

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Commander, US Pacific Fleet

APSPAC OSD Honolulu, HI
COMSUBPAC Pearl Harbor, HI
COMNAVFORKOREA
COMLOGWESTPAC
COMNAVFORJAPAN Yokosuka, Japan
COMSEVENTHFLT

Commander, US Naval Forces Europe

CROF Souda Bay, Crete

Office of Naval Intelligence

ONI-352 Detachment San Diego, CA
ONI FASSO San Diego, CA
ONI FASSO Norfolk, VA

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

SEAL Team TEN
COMNAVSPECWARGRU TWO

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS Europe Field Office

Deputy, Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters

1st Marine Air Wing, Okinawa, Japan
3rd Marine Logistics Group, Okinawa, Japan
3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, Okinawa, Japan
Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan
Marine Air Detachment, China Lake, Nevada
Marine Special Operations Command

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1144



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/1222
7 Aug 2006

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E

Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components (1 April - 30 June 2006)

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 April through 30 June 2006. Reference (d) requires Department of the Navy (DoN) Intelligence Components, including the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC), to provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents.

2. During this reporting period, NAVINSGEN received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

3. Significant activities this quarter:

a. Inspections were conducted by the Office of the Naval Inspector General; Naval Special Warfare Command; Commander, Navy Reserve Intelligence Command; Commander Naval Reserve Security Group; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service; and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted. (Note: To date, NAVINSGEN has not received the quarterly input from Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. Upon receipt, that information will be included in the next quarterly report.)

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DON Intelligence Components

(1 April - 30 June 2006)

NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP

- NR NIOC Minneapolis
- NR NIOC Ogden
- NR NIOC Fort Gordon
- NR NIOC Detroit
- NR NIOC Washington
- NR NIOC St. Louis
- NR NIOC Medina

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

- NCIS Central Field Office (Pensacola, FL)
- NCISHQ Counterintelligence Directorate (Washington, DC)

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS

- Tactical Exercise Control Group (29 Palms, CA)
- Company L & Company B, National Security Agency (Ft. Meade, MD)
- Counterintelligence/Security Detachment at HMX-1 (Quantico, VA)

Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DON Intelligence Components
(1 April - 30 June 2006)

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Commander, Naval Security Group Reserve
(Fort George G. Meade, MD)

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

SEAL Team SEVEN (San Diego, CA)

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Reserve Intelligence Area Thirteen (Jacksonville, FL)

- NR CENTCOM 0174
- NR NAVCENT 0174
- NR NCIS 1274
- NR SOCOM 0208
- NR DIAHQ 0208
- NR JICSOUTH 0174
- NR JICCEN 0274
- NR IVTU 0208

Reserve Intelligence Area Five (Denver, CO)

- NR ONI 1071
- NR USSTRATCOM 0388
- NR JICPAC 0571
- NR ONI 0287
- NR NORCOM 0122
- NR IVTU 0118

Reserve Intelligence Area Four (San Diego, CA)

- NR ONI 0194
- NR NAVCENT 0394
- NR NCIS 2794
- NR CPF1 0194
- NR CPF1 0419
- NR IVTU 0121
- NR DIAHQ 1194
- NR FITCPAC 0194
- NR NSAWC INTEL 0294
- NR NSW INTEL-1
- NR STRATJIC 0219

Reserve Intelligence Area Six (Fort Worth, TX)

- NR JICCEN 0470
- NR JICPAC 1070
- NR IVTU 0111
- NR PACFLT 0270
- NR JICSOUTH 0270

Encl (1)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

4. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Copy to:
OUSN (ASP/I)
CNO (N2, N09J)
DOGC
DJAG
DNIGMC



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/1788
6 Nov 2006

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E

Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components
(01 July 2006 – 30 September 2006)

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 01 July – 30 September 2006. Reference (d) requires DoN Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) to provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues and/or incidents.
2. During this reporting period, NAVINSGEN received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise questions of legality or impropriety.
3. **Significant activities this quarter:** Inspections were conducted by: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command; Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command; Commander, Naval Security Group Reserve; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service; and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for the Marine Corps. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.
4. **Actions and/or recommendations:** None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

By direction

Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/I)
CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
DJAG
DNIGMC

EFF

1149

**Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components**

(01 July 2006 - 30 September 2006)

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Commander, U.S. Third Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT) (San Diego, CA)
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Detachment Intelligence Readiness Cell
(COMPACFLT DET INTEL READINESS CELL) (San Diego, CA)
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet Maritime Homeland Defense Detachment, Alaska
(COMPACFLT MHLA DET ALASKA) (Juneau, AK)
- Formerly Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Alaska

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

Special Boat Team TWO ZERO (Norfolk, VA)

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Reserve Intelligence Area (RIA) FOURTEEN, Marietta, GA
NR DIAHQ 1567
NR EUCOM JAC 0167
NR CNE-C6F 0167
NR ONI 2109
NR NAVCENT 0267
NR IVTU 0108

CNRIC HQ, Fort Worth, TX
NR EUCOM JAC 0430 (Molesworth, UK)

COMMANDER, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP RESERVE

NR Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Denver, CO
NR NIOC Detroit, MI
NR NIOC Ft Gordon, GA
NR NIOC San Diego, CA

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS HQ - *Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Directorates* (Washington, DC)
NCIS Field Office Southwest (San Diego, CA)
NCIS Field Office Marine Corps West (Camp Pendleton, CA)

**DEPUTY, NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS
(conducted with ATSD(IO))**

Defense Attaché and Regional Security Offices:

Pakistan
Afghanistan
Ethiopia
Djibouti

Also, various USMC tactical units located in the CENTCOM AOR
(unit names and locations omitted due to security considerations)

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1150



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3820
Ser N2/ 0165
1 Feb 2007

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) ATSD/IO memo (unser) of 08 Dec 06

Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components
(01 October 2006 – 31 December 2006)

1. Per references (a) through (e), this report is submitted for the period 01 October-31 December 2006. Reference (d) requires that DoN Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents. Reference (e) directs reporting of additional information in support of Congressional tasking.

2. During this reporting period, no reports were received from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities of either:

- a. Substantiated violations of law, regulation, or policy; or
- b. Activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

No Procedure 15 inquiries are under Department of the Navy review at this time.

3. Significant activities this quarter:

a. Inspections were conducted by: Commander, Naval Security Group Reserve, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.

b. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation.


c. There were no department-level changes to the Navy's Intelligence Oversight Programs this quarter.

d. There were no department-level changes to published Navy directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

4. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/D)
CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC

**Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components**

(01 October 2006 – 31 December 2006)

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE SECURITY GROUP

NR Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Pensacola, FL

NR NIOC Devens, MA

NR NIOC Naval Station Norfolk, VA.

NR NIOC Ft. Gordon, GA

NR NIOC Orlando, FL

NR NIOC North Island, CA

NR NIOC Washington, DC

NR NIOC Ft. Lewis, WA

NR NIOC Medina, TX

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS Field Office (NCISFO) Singapore

NCIS HQ – *Counterintelligence Directorate* (Washington, DC)

NCIS HQ – *Counterterrorism Directorate* (Washington, DC)

DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS

United States Marine Corps Forces, South (MARFORSOUTH) – G2 (Miami, FL)

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1153



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3820
Ser N2/ 1416
31 Oct 07

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) ATSD/IO memo (unser) of 08 Dec 06
(f) NAVINSGEN ltr N2/0661 of 10 May 07

Encl: (1) E-mail (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) NCIS, dtd 17 October 2007
(2) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components (01 July 2007 - 30 September 2007)

1. Per references (a) through (e), this report is submitted for the period 01 July -30 September 2007.

2. During this reporting period, no reports were received from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities of substantiated violations of law, regulation, or policy.

3. No new reports of activities that raised questions of legality or propriety were received this quarter. (b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)

4. There are no Procedure 15 inquiries under review by the Department of the Navy at this time.

5. Significant activities this quarter:

a. Intelligence Oversight inspections were conducted this quarter by: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT); Commander, Navy Reserve Intelligence Command; the Office of Naval Intelligence; Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC). Enclosure (2) lists inspections conducted.

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT


b. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation.

c. There were no department-level changes to the Navy's Intelligence Oversight Programs this quarter.

d. There were no department-level changes to published Navy directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

6. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/I)
CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2007 18:07
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: OPEN CASE

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Sorry about the delay getting back to you- with my transition and changing offices, it took me a while to get on the right systems to research this.

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A) This is an open and ongoing investigation- although the main subject (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) pled guilty and has been sentenced, (b)(7)(A)


(b)(7)(A)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)

I don't know how much background you have on the case, but you can get a pretty good overview from open press reporting (San Diego Union Tribune, 06OCT07). (b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)



Due in part to the security issues identified during the course of this investigation, CG IMEF ordered a series of security stand-downs for command element personnel, to include Security Manager refresher training, SSO refresher training, OPSEC training, IO training, and NCIS CI/CE briefs. The stand-downs occurred on 24MAY07, 31MAY07, and 01JUN07 and 35% of the command element reportedly attended.

As a criminal investigation into the compromise of classified material, IO issues were secondary/tertiary considerations. According to the desk officers, the IMEF and NCIS SJAs discussed IO for charges/prosecution, but it was decided IO was an administrative element subordinate to the criminal offenses (plus, there may have been a remedy issue). I'm not sure if there was any language indicating IO violations in the record of trial.

(b)(7)(A)



I will discuss with NCIS Deputy IG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and if you and/or your legal staffs need to review pertinent Reports of Investigation, I'm sure we can accommodate or meet in person to identify specific areas of interest. Please feel free to contact me if you need more details or information.

(b)(6),
(b)(7)(C) I'll try to give you a call tomorrow.

Regards,

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wed 10/17/2007 11:12 AM
To: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: OPEN CASE

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) sorry about the telephone tag. I assume your move to the Intel Directorate was something you wanted. I would still like to connect with the IG folks and maybe visit you as well at your location.

With regard to the open case, bottom line is that we are looking to finally determine if there is anything in the case that has Intel Oversight concerns? Due to the Crim investigation, a lot is close hold but there was a concern about the potential? (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) I would appreciate it if you could have your IO folks take a look and let me know if there is a concern. I only heard bits and pieces and based on that, I included him in my quarterly report to NAVINSGEN as a potential concern. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) is just trying to close the loop.

Unfortunately, I need to try and get an answer ASAP so please see what you can do. When we talk, I will coordinate a good date to come over.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

**Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components**

(01 July 2007 – 30 September 2007)

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

COMPATRECFORC7F/C5F

PATRECONFORSEVENTHFLT DET KADENA JA

COMAFLOATRAGRUEWESTPAC YOKOSUKA JA

COMMANDER, NAVY RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

RIA NORTHWEST, Bangor, WA

NR JICPAC 1589

NR ONI 0922

NR PACSUBFOR

NR CPF 0322

NR NCIS 2422

NR IVTU 0152

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

ONI FASSO Groton, CT

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Far East Field Offices (Japan, Korea)

HQ Intelligence Directorate

HQ Criminal Investigations Directorate

HQ Financial Management/Planning and Evaluation Directorate

DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Marine Special Operations Command

G-2 Marine Forces Europe

Enclosure (2)

EFF

1159



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/ 0146
5 Feb 08

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) ATSD/IO memo (unser) of 08 Dec 06
(f) NAVINSGEN ltr N2/0661 of 10 May 07
(g) NAVINSGEN ltr N2/1416 of 31 Oct 07


Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components
(01 October 2007 – 31 December 2007)

1. Per references (a) through (e), this report is submitted for the period 01 October -31 December 2007.
2. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service continues to conduct an investigation of the issue reported in refs (f) and (g).
3. No new reports of activities that raised questions of legality or propriety were received this quarter. A regular legal review of a counterintelligence operation by NCIS determined that a Director NCIS authorization for undisclosed participation in a U.S. organization had lapsed. Director's authorization for continuation of the undisclosed participation was subsequently obtained.
4. There are no Procedure 15 inquiries under review by the Department of the Navy at this time.
5. Significant activities this quarter:
 - a. Intelligence Oversight inspections were conducted this quarter by: Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters. Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.
 - b. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation.
 - c. The NAVINSGEN Director for Intelligence and Special Access Programs Oversight and her Deputy attended a NORTHCOM-sponsored Intelligence Oversight conference in El Paso, TX in December 2007.

d. There were no department-level changes to the Navy's Intelligence Oversight Programs this quarter.

e. There were no department-level changes to published Navy directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

6. Actions and/or recommendations: None.



A. L. WINNS

Copy to:
UNSECNAV (ASP/T)
CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC

**Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components**

(01 October 2007 – 31 December 2007)

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND
SPECBOAT TEAM TWELVE

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Singapore Field Office
Southwest Field Office
Southeast Field Office

DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS

Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, Quantico, VA
Marine Special Operations Command, Camp LeJeune, NC

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1162



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/ 0661
10 May 07

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) ATSD/IO memo (unser) of 08 Dec 06

Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components
(01 January 2007 – 31 March 2007)

1. Per references (a) through (e), this report is submitted for the period 01 January-31 March 2007. Reference (d) requires that DoN Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents. Reference (e) directs reporting of additional information in support of Congressional tasking.

2. During this reporting period, no reports were received from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities of substantiated violations of law, regulation, or policy.

3. Two reports of activities that raised questions of legality or propriety were received this quarter.

a. A U.S. Pacific Fleet airborne reconnaissance squadron (VAQ-133) reported that in October 2006, at the request of the squadron administrative officer, a member of the squadron's Intelligence Division reviewed the "MySpace.com" website pages of a VAQ-133 Sailor who was absent without leave (AWOL). The VAQ-133 Intelligence Officer recognized the potential for an Intelligence Oversight violation and called the Office of the Naval Inspector General for guidance. NAVINSGEN advised the squadron Intelligence Officer that, if needed, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service is responsible for investigative matters related to potential criminal or counterintelligence activities of Department of the Navy personnel. Commander, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Oversight staff reviewed the case and based on their guidance, refresher Intelligence Oversight training was provided for all VAQ-133 personnel.

(b)(7)(A)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

(b)(7)(A)

4. There are no Procedure 15 inquiries under review by the Department of the Navy at this time.

5. Significant activities this quarter:

a. The Office of the Naval Inspector General inspected the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) Intelligence Oversight program. CFFC was found to be fully compliant with E.O. 12333 and its implementing DOD and Navy directives. Relevant business processes were found to be well thought-out, efficient, and sound. As well, inspections were conducted by: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC). Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.

b. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation.

c. There were no department-level changes to the Navy's Intelligence Oversight Programs this quarter.

d. There were no department-level changes to published Navy directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

6. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

Copy to:
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CNO (N09, N2)
DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC

**Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components**

(01 January 2007 – 31 March 2007)

OFFICE OF THE NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) – Norfolk, VA

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Afloat Training Group Pacific (ATG PAC) – San Diego, CA

Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (Light) FOUR ONE (HSL-41) – NAS North Island, CA

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Contingency Response Field Office – Glynco, GA

Marine Corps West Field Office – Camp Pendleton, CA

NCIS HQ – *Administration and Logistics Directorate* (Washington, DC)

NCIS HQ – *Operational Support Directorate* (Washington, DC)

DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS

Third Marine Division – Okinawa, Japan

First Marine Air Wing – Okinawa, Japan

Marine Forces Pacific – Okinawa, Japan

Intelligence Support Battalion – Quantico, VA

United States Marine Forces, Central Command (MARFORCENT) – Tampa, FL

Enclosure (1)

EFF

1165



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2/ 1063
7 Aug 07

From: Naval Inspector General
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) ATSD/IO memo (unser) of 08 Dec 06
(f) NAVINSGEN ltr N2/0661 of 10 May 07

Encl: (1) Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by DoN Intelligence Components
(01 April 2007 – 30 June 2007)

1. Per references (a) through (e), this report is submitted for the period 01 April -30 June 2007. Reference (d) requires that DoN Echelon II commands and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC) provide a quarterly report to the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on their Intelligence Oversight (IO) efforts, to include information on subordinates' programs and training as well as any issues/incidents. Reference (e) directs reporting of additional information in support of Congressional tasking.
2. During this reporting period, no reports were received from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities of substantiated violations of law, regulation, or policy.
3. No reports of activities that raised questions of legality or propriety were received this quarter. The Deputy Investigator General for Marine Corps Matters has no update at this time to the possible violation reported in reference (f), paragraph 3b.
4. There are no Procedure 15 inquiries under review by the Department of the Navy at this time.
5. Significant activities this quarter:
 - a. Intelligence Oversight inspections were conducted this quarter by: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC); Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT); Naval Special Warfare Command; Commander, Navy Reserve Intelligence Command; Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS); and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters (DNIGMC). Enclosure (1) lists inspections conducted.
 - b. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation.


Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT

c. There were no department-level changes to the Navy's Intelligence Oversight Programs this quarter.

d. There were no department-level changes to published Navy directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

6. Actions and/or recommendations: None.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



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DOGC
JAG
DNIGMC

Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components
(01 April 2007 - 30 June 2007)

COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND

Naval Network Warfare Command, Norfolk, VA
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Little Creek, VA

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

VAQRON ONE TWO NINE
ELATKWEPCOL, Whidbey Island, WA
COMVAQWINGPAC, Whidbey Island, WA
COMPATRECONWING TEN
COMPATRECONWING TWO
AFLOATRAGRUMIDPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI

NAVY SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND

Naval Special Warfare Group THREE

COMMANDER, NAVY RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

RIA SE NOLA, Millington, TN
NR NAVOPINTEL 0182
NR DIAHQ 1482
NR ONI DET 0882
RIA MW, Great Lakes, IL
NR ONI 1992
NR EUCOM JAC 0366
NR JICTRANS 0169
NR JICPAC 0178
NR IVTU 113
RIA SIXTEEN, Willow Grove, PA
NR DIAHQ 0593
NR ONI 2393
NR JICCEN 0597
NR ONI 0397
NR IVTU 101

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Middle East Field Office, Bahrain
Office of Special Projects (re-inspection)
Information Technology Directorate (NCISHQ)

DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS

3rd MAW, Camp Pendleton, CA
1st Counterintelligence/HUMINT Company, Camp Pendleton, CA

Enclosure (1)



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1254 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20374-5006

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3820
Ser N2 0489
6 May 08

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ Unclassified upon removal of Enclosure (1)

From: Naval Inspector General

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT
FIRST QUARTER CY 2008

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1
(c) DoD Regulation 5240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(e) ATSD/IO memo (UNSER) of 08 Dec 06
(f) NAVINSGEN Itr N2/0661 of 10 May 07
(g) NAVINSGEN Itr N2/1416 of 31 Oct 07
(h) Office of the Director of National Intelligence General Counsel Itr of 05 Feb 08

Encl: (1) CMC-IGO 3800 of 15 Apr 08 (U)
(2) List of Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (e), this report is submitted for the period 01 January -31 March 2008.
2. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Office of the Inspector General of the Marine Corps continue to conduct an investigation of the issue reported in refs (f) and (g). Enclosure (1) updates the progress of the investigation.
3. No new reports of activities that raised questions of legality or propriety were received this quarter.
4. There is one Procedure 15 inquiry under review by the Department of the Navy at this time (see Paragraph 5.e. below). The Office of the Naval Inspector General is reviewing an Office of Naval Intelligence Inspector General investigation concerning a Foreign Intelligence-Sharing Agreement concluded in 2005.
5. Significant activities this quarter:
 - a. Intelligence Oversight inspections were conducted this quarter by the Office of the Naval Inspector General, Naval Special Warfare Command, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters. Enclosure (2) lists inspections conducted.

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Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT
FIRST QUARTER CY 2008.

b. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation.

c. The Office of the Naval Inspector General reviewed draft revisions of SECNAV Instructions 5430.7 and 5000.34, which provide Department of the Navy guidance on the oversight of intelligence policy and management. Staffing of revisions to these instructions is ongoing, and there were no department-level changes to the Navy's Intelligence Oversight programs this quarter.

d. There were no department-level changes to published Navy directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities.

e. In response to a request from the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ref (h)), the Office of the Naval Inspector General is reviewing two issues potentially concerning Intelligence Oversight which were considered for reporting, but not subsequently reported, to the Intelligence Oversight Board.

6. Actions and/or recommendations: None.


A. L. WINNS

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UNSECNAV (ASP/I)
CNO (N09, N2)
DGC
DJAG
USMC IG

~~SECRETNOFORN~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS/
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3800
CMC-IGO
15 Apr 08

From: Inspector General of the Marine Corps
To: Naval Inspector General (N2)

Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND QUARTER,
FISCAL YEAR 2008 (U/~~FOUO~~)

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1-R
(c) SECNAVINST 3820.3E
(d) MCO 3800.2B
(e) IGMCM: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND
QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2008
(f) (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

1. (U/~~FOUO~~) Standards and Definitions:

a. (U/~~FOUO~~) Reference (a) stipulates that certain activities of intelligence components that affect U.S. persons be governed by procedures issued by the agency head and approved by the Attorney General.

b. (U/~~FOUO~~) References (b) through (d) set forth procedures governing the activities of DoD intelligence components and personnel that affect United States Persons.

c. (U/~~FOUO~~) Reference (d) is primarily directed at intelligence components in the Marine Corps and governs all activities undertaken by such components. It also applies to the following:

(1) (U/~~FOUO~~) The Marine Corps total force regarding the participation in intelligence activities by any component or person.

(2) (U/~~FOUO~~) All military and civilian personnel assigned or attached to intelligence components on a permanent or temporary basis, regardless of specialty or job function.

(3) (U/~~FOUO~~) Contractors or consultants if they are involved in activities subject to the requirements of reference (a).

(4) (U/~~FOUO~~) Non-intelligence units and staffs when they are used for intelligence purposes and to personnel conducting intelligence activities as an additional duty, whether or not assigned or attached to an intelligence component.


Subj: QUARTERLY ^{/FOUO} INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR 2008 (U)

(a) (U/~~FOUO~~) Reference (d) states the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons by Marine Corps intelligence components will be governed by the requirements set forth in references (a), (b), (c) and (d).

(b) (U/~~FOUO~~) U.S. Person is defined as a citizen of the U.S.; an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien; an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens; or for a corporation incorporated in the U.S., except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.


(c) (U/~~FOUO~~) Questionable activity is defined as any conduct that constitutes, or is related to, an intelligence activity that may violate U.S. laws, statutes, Executive Orders, Presidential directives, applicable DoD directives, and DON or other service policies.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)



Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND QUARTER,
FISCAL YEAR 2008 (U/~~FOUO~~)


(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)



3. (U/~~FOUO~~) Discussion and Findings:


a. (U/~~FOUO~~) In order for a violation to occur the Marine participating in the questionable activity must fall within the parameters outlined in references (b) through (d) as an Intelligence component or person. Reference (d) is primarily directed at intelligence components in the Marine Corps; it also includes the Marine Corps total force regarding the participation in intelligence activities by any component or person. (b)(7)(A)

(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)




Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND QUARTER,
FISCAL YEAR 2008 (U/~~FOUO~~)


(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)



(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)




(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)



(b)(7)(A)




(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)




4. (U/~~FOUO~~) Summary:

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)




Subj: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT FOR THE SECOND QUARTER,
FISCAL YEAR 2008 (U//~~FOUO~~)

(b)(1),(b)(7)(A)




b. (U) There is a connection to US NORTHCOM with regard to potential Intelligence Oversight violations which need to be determined by the appropriate investigative activity. It is unknown if any of this USPERS information was used in a criminal proceeding at this time. NCIS is pursuing this matter. A legal opinion should be obtained to make a final determination.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)




d. (U) SCIF Security Review. IGMC will conduct a SCIF assessment of major USMC sites to examine physical security procedures, access controls and information and personnel security procedures to determine vulnerabilities and provide recommendations to mitigate future violations. This will be in concert with additional training during future site visits and inspections.

(b)(2),(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)



29Mar07

Memorandum For The Record

From: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

To: Inspector General, I Marine Expeditionary Force

Subj: Possible Intelligence Oversight Violations (U)

Ref: (a) (U) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

(b) (U) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program" Jan 97

(c) (U) DoD 5200.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons" 29 Apr 88


(d) (U) MCO 3800.2B, "Oversight of Intelligence Activities", 30 Apr 04

Encl: (b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)

(b)(1),(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)

2. (U) The undersigned will assist with any internal investigation, if needed. Actual emails are maintained in the IMEF Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) due to their classification.

(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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**Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted by
DoN Intelligence Components**

(01 January 2008 – 31 March 2008)

Office of the Naval Inspector General

Commander, Naval Forces Central Command
Commander, Naval Forces Europe
Naval Criminal Investigative Service

Naval Special Warfare Command

Naval Special Warfare Group ONE

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

Contingency Response Field Office
Carolinas Field Office

Inspector General of the Marine Corps

3rd Marine Air Wing

Enclosure (2)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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